The Art of War

[Ts’ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the title of

this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the temple

selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we should say, in

his tent. See. § 26.]

1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.

2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to

ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be

neglected.

3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be

taken into account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine

the conditions obtaining in the field.

4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The

Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

[It appears from what follows that Sun Tzŭ means by "Moral Law" a

principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzŭ in its moral

aspect. One might be tempted to render it by "morale," were it not

considered as an attribute of the *ruler* in § 13.]

5, 6. *The Moral Law* causes the people to be in complete accord with

their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives,

undismayed by any danger.

[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the

officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle;

without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute

when the crisis is at hand."]

7. *Heaven* signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two words

here. Meng Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing and waning" of

Heaven. Wang Hsi, however, may be right in saying that what is meant is

"the general economy of Heaven," including the five elements, the four

seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.]

8. *Earth* comprises distances, great and small; danger and security;

open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.

9. *The Commander* stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity,

benevolence, courage and strictness.

[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or

benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-control,

or "proper feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good faith. Here

"wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before "humanity or benevolence," and

the two military virtues of "courage" and "strictness" substituted for

"uprightness of mind" and "self-respect, self-control, or ‘proper

feeling.’"]

10. By *Method and discipline* are to be understood the marshalling of

the army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the

officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the

army, and the control of military expenditure.

11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows

them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.

12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the

military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in

this wise:—

13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?

[I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. § 5.]

(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?

(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?

[See §§ 7, 8]

(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?

[Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts’ao Ts’ao (A.D. 155-220),

who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his

own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned

himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of

corn! However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy

his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. Ts’ao Ts’ao’s own comment

on the present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay down a

law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the offender must

be put to death."]

(5) Which army is the stronger?

[Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch’en puts it, freely

rendered, "*esprit de corps* and ‘big battalions.’"]

(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?

[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "Without constant practice, the

officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle;

without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute

when the crisis is at hand."]

(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and

punishment?

[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be

properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?]

14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or

defeat.

15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will

conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that

hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let

such a one be dismissed!

[The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzŭ’s treatise was

composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king of the Wu

State.]

16. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any

helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.

17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s

plans.

[Sun Tzŭ, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish

theoric." He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract

principles; "for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main laws of

strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and

sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to

secure a favourable position in actual warfare." On the eve of the

battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the

Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations

were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find

himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a

critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will

attack the first tomorrow—I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord

Uxbridge. "Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any

idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you

expect me to tell you what mine are?" [1] ]

18. All warfare is based on deception.

[The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every

soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many

military qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary

skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend

and foe."]

19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our

forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy

believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are

near.

20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.

[All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in disorder, crush

him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzŭ is still illustrating

the uses of deception in war.]

21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in

superior strength, evade him.

22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him.

Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

[Wang Tzŭ, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his

adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and

immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.]

23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.

[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch’en has the note: "while

we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire himself out." The

*Yu Lan* has "Lure him on and tire him out."]

If his forces are united, separate them.

[Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the

commentators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division

between them."]

24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not

expected.

25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged

beforehand.

26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his

temple ere the battle is fought.

[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple

to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the

field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.]

The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand.

Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to

defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this

point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

[Ts’ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first count the

cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the

chapter is not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a

consideration of ways and means.]

1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field

a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred

thousand mail-clad soldiers,

[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu,

used for the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed

for purposes of defence. Li Ch’uan, it is true, says that the latter

were light, but this seems hardly probable. It is interesting to note

the analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric

Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot was the important factor, forming

as it did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of

foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are informed

that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy

chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into

a thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred

men.]

with provisions enough to carry them a thousand *li*,

[2.78 modern *li* go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly

since Sun Tzŭ’s time.]

the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of

guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots

and armour, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per

day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming,

the men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If

you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.

3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State

will not be equal to the strain.

4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength

exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to

take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be

able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has

never been seen associated with long delays.

[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of

the commentators. Ts’ao Kung, Li Ch’uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and

Mei Yao-ch’en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally

stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho

Shih says: "Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure

of energy and treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but

they bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by

remarking: "Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being

expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the people; true

cleverness insures against the occurrence of such calamities." Chang Yu

says: "So long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable

to clever dilatoriness." Now Sun Tzŭ says nothing whatever, except

possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than

ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much

more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious,

tardiness can never be anything but foolish—if only because it means

impoverishment to the nation. In considering the point raised here by

Sun Tzŭ, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur

to the mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome

against that of Hannibals’s isolated army, because it seemed to him

that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a

strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics

would have proved successful in the long run. Their reversal it is

true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative presumption

in their favour.]

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged

warfare.

7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war

that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a

long war can realize the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it

to a close. Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation,

but it fits well into the logic of the context, whereas the rendering,

"He who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits,"

is distinctly pointless.]

8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his

supply-waggons loaded more than twice.

[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for

reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh supplies,

but crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem an

audacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from

Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the value of time—that is, being a

little ahead of your opponent—has counted for more than either

numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to

commissariat.]

9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus

the army will have food enough for its needs.

[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means

"things to be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all

the impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.]

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by

contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a

distance causes the people to be impoverished.

[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the

next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is

so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text.

It never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation may

be necessary for the sense, and we get no help from them there. The

Chinese words Sun Tzŭ used to indicate the cause of the people’s

impoverishment clearly have reference to some system by which the

husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why

should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except because

the State or Government is too poor to do so?]

11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up;

and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.

[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its own

territory. Ts’ao Kung understands it of an army that has already

crossed the frontier.]

12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be

afflicted by heavy exactions.

13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the

homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their

incomes will be dissipated;

[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not of 3/10,

but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from

our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: "The *people* being

regarded as the essential part of the State, and *food* as the people’s

heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and be

careful of both?"]

while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,

breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,

protective mantlets, draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to

four-tenths of its total revenue.

15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One

cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s

own, and likewise a single *picul* of his provender is equivalent to

twenty from one’s own store.

[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of

transporting one cartload to the front. A *picul* is a unit of measure

equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).]

16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger;

that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have

their rewards.

[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see

the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from

the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have

a keen desire to fight, each on his own account."]

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been

taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags

should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled

and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be

kindly treated and kept.

18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own

strength.

19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy

campaigns.

[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzŭ

here reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended to

enforce."]

20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of

the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall

be in peace or in peril.

1. Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is

to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it

is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than

to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire

than to destroy them.

[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted

nominally of 12500 men; according to Ts’ao Kung, the equivalent of a

regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a detachment consists

from any number between 100 and 500, and the equivalent of a company

contains from 5 to 100 men. For the last two, however, Chang Yu gives

the exact figures of 100 and 5 respectively.]

2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme

excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s

resistance without fighting.

[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old

Chinese general. Moltke’s greatest triumph, the capitulation of the

huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.]

3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans;

[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full force of

the Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one

might be content to foil the enemy’s stratagems one after another, but

an active policy of counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in

his note: "When the enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must

anticipate him by delivering our own attack first."]

the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces;

[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzŭ, in

speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or

principalities into which the China of his day was split up.]

the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field;

[When he is already at full strength.]

and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be

avoided.

[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it in

1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley,

Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would

have been masters of the situation before the British were ready

seriously to oppose them.]

The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements

of war, will take up three whole months;

[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as

"mantlets", described. Ts’ao Kung simply defines them as "large

shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li Ch’uan, who says

they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting the city

walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman

*testudo*, ready made. Tu Mu says they were wheeled vehicles used in

repelling attacks, but this is denied by Ch’en Hao. See *supra* II. 14.

The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the "movable

shelters" we get a fairly clear description from several commentators.

They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled

from within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey

parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the

encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called "wooden

donkeys."]

and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three

months more.

[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of

the enemy’s walls in order to discover the weak points in the defence,

and also to destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding

note.]

5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men

to the assault like swarming ants,

[This vivid simile of Ts’ao Kung is taken from the spectacle of an army

of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing

patience at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the

place before his engines of war are ready.]

with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town

still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.

[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port

Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record.]

6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any

fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he

overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.

[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but does no

harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after

having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father and mother

of the people."]

7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire,

and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.

[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter part of

the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: "And thus,

the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."]

This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to

surround him; if five to one, to attack him;

[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.]

if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.

[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it

appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts’ao Kung, however,

gives a clue to Sun Tzŭ’s meaning: "Being two to the enemy’s one, we

may use one part of our army in the regular way, and the other for some

special diversion." Chang Yu thus further elucidates the point: "If our

force is twice as numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up

into two divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall

upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed

from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front."

This is what is meant by saying that ‘one part may be used in the

regular way, and the other for some special diversion.’ Tu Mu does not

understand that dividing one’s army is simply an irregular, just as

concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he is too

hasty in calling this a mistake."]

9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;

[Li Ch’uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase: "If

attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the able

general will fight."]

if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;

[The meaning, "we can *watch* the enemy," is certainly a great

improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no very

good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the saying

only applies if the other factors are equal; a small difference in

numbers is often more than counterbalanced by superior energy and

discipline.]

if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in

the end it must be captured by the larger force.

11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is

complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is

defective, the State will be weak.

[As Li Ch’uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if the

general’s ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed

in his profession), his army will lack strength."]

12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his

army:—

13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant

of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.

[Li Ch’uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the legs of a

thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One would naturally

think of "the ruler" in this passage as being at home, and trying to

direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators

understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of T’ai Kung: "A

kingdom should not be governed from without, and army should not be

directed from within." Of course it is true that, during an engagement,

or when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in the

thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise, he

will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give wrong

orders.]

14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he

administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in

an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier’s minds.

[Ts’ao Kung’s note is, freely translated: "The military sphere and the

civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can’t handle an army in kid

gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles on

which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility,

on the other hand, are military rather than civil virtues to assimilate

the governing of an army"—to that of a State, understood.]

15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination,

[That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.]

through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to

circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

[I follow Mei Yao-ch’en here. The other commentators refer not to the

ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs. Thus Tu Yu

says: "If a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he

must not be entrusted with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The

skilful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the

covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in

establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in

action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid

man has no fear of death."]

16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to

come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy

into the army, and flinging victory away.

17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He

will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.

[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive;

if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will

invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive

or the defensive.]

(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior

forces.

[This is not merely the general’s ability to estimate numbers

correctly, as Li Ch’uan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the

saying more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible

with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and *vice versa*. The secret

lies in an eye for locality, and in not letting the right moment slip.

Thus Wu Tzŭ says: ‘With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an

inferior one, make for difficult ground.’"]

(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout

all its ranks.

(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy

unprepared.

(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by

the sovereign.

[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzŭ as saying: "It is the sovereign’s function to

give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function of

the general." It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which

have been caused by undue interference with operations in the field on

the part of the home government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his

extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered by central

authority.]

Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points.

[Literally, “These five things are knowledge of the principle of

victory.”]

18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need

not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not

the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.

[Li Ch’uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch’in, who in 383 A.D.

marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. When warned not to

despise an enemy who could command the services of such men as Hsieh An

and Huan Ch’ung, he boastfully replied: "I have the population of eight

provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one

million; why, they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely

throwing their whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?"

Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the Fei

River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.]

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every

battle.

[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive,

knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive." He adds:

"Attack is the secret of defence; defence is the planning of an

attack." It would be hard to find a better epitome of the

root-principle of war.]

[Ts’ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the title of

this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the part of the two

armies with a view to discovering each other’s condition." Tu Mu says:

"It is through the dispositions of an army that its condition may be

discovered. Conceal your dispositions, and your condition will remain

secret, which leads to victory; show your dispositions, and your

condition will become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks

that the good general can "secure success by modifying his tactics to

meet those of the enemy."]

1. Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond

the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of

defeating the enemy.

2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the

opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.

[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy’s part.]

3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,

[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition of his

troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions."]

but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

4. Hence the saying: One may *know* how to conquer without being able

to *do* it.

5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat

the enemy means taking the offensive.

[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in §§ 1-3, in spite of

the fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning they

give, "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive," is plausible

enough.]

6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength;

attacking, a superabundance of strength.

7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret

recesses of the earth;

[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor

indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may

not know his whereabouts."]

he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of

heaven.

[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a

thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is the

opinion of most of the commentators.]

Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the

other, a victory that is complete.

8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is

not the acme of excellence.

[As Ts’ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it has

germinated," to foresee the event before the action has begun. Li

Ch’uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack the

vastly superior army of Chao, which was strongly entrenched in the city

of Ch’eng-an, said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to

annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner." The officers

hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But

Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the details of a clever

stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and

inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."]

9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and

the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to move

surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s intentions and balk his schemes,

so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood."

Sun Tzŭ reserves his approbation for things that

"the world’s coarse thumb

And finger fail to plumb."

10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;

["Autumn hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in

autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one

in Chinese writers.]

to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of

thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick

hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li Chu,

who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a

mustard seed; and Shih K’uang, a blind musician who could hear the

footsteps of a mosquito.]

11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins,

but excels in winning with ease.

[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in easy

conquering." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "He who only sees the obvious, wins

his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things,

wins with ease."]

12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor

credit for courage.

[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained

over circumstances that have not come to light, the world as large

knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch

as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he

receives no credit for courage."]

13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.

[Ch’en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile

attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu: "One

who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at

winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished;

whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are

not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably

win."]

Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it

means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.

14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes

defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the

enemy.

[A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. "Position" need not

be confined to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes

all the arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to

increase the safety of his army.]

15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle

after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat

first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which

will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not

begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no

longer be assured."]

16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly

adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control

success.

17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement;

secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly,

Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.

18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to

Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of

chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.

[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the

Chinese. The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground,

which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy’s strength, and to

make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are thus led to a

general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy’s chances with our own;

if the latter turn the scale, then victory ensues. The chief difficulty

lies in third term, which in the Chinese some commentators take as a

calculation of *numbers*, thereby making it nearly synonymous with the

second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of as a

consideration of the enemy’s general position or condition, while the

third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. On the other

hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative strength having been

settled, we can bring the varied resources of cunning into play." Ho

Shih seconds this interpretation, but weakens it. However, it points to

the third term as being a calculation of numbers.]

19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight

placed in the scale against a single grain.

[Literally, "a victorious army is like an *i* (20 oz.) weighed against

a *shu* (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a *shu* weighed against an *i*."

The point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force,

flushed with victory, has over one demoralized by defeat. Legge, in his

note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the *i* to be 24 Chinese ounces,

and corrects Chu Hsi’s statement that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li

Ch’uan of the T’ang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.]

20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up

waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical

dispositions.

1. Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same principle as

the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their

numbers.

[That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with

subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin’s

famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to him: "How large

an army do you think I could lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your

Majesty." "And you?" asked the Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more

the better."]

2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different

from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting

signs and signals.

3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the

enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvers direct

and indirect.

[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzŭ’s

treatise, the discussion of the *cheng* and the *ch’i*." As it is by no

means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to

render them consistently by good English equivalents; it may be as well

to tabulate some of the commentators’ remarks on the subject before

proceeding further. Li Ch’uan: "Facing the enemy is *cheng*, making

lateral diversion is *ch’i*. Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy, your

troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure

victory abnormal manœuvers must be employed." Mei Yao-ch’en: "*Ch’i* is

active, *cheng* is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity,

activity brings the victory itself." Ho Shih: "We must cause the enemy

to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed,

and vice versa; thus *cheng* may also be *ch’i*, and *ch’i* may also be

*cheng*." He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when

marching ostensibly against Lin-chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly

threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly

disconcerting his opponent. [Ch’ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told,

the march on Lin-chin was *cheng*, and the surprise manœuver was

*ch’i*." Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words:

"Military writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of *ch’i* and

*cheng*. Wei Liao Tzŭ [4th cent. B.C.] says: ‘Direct warfare favours

frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.’ Ts’ao Kung

says: ‘Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation;

appearing on the enemy’s rear is an indirect manœuver.’ Li Wei-kung

[6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: ‘In war, to march straight ahead is

*cheng*; turning movements, on the other hand, are *ch’i*.’ These

writers simply regard *cheng* as *cheng*, and *ch’i* as *ch’i*; they do

not note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each

other like the two sides of a circle [see infra, § 11]. A comment on

the T’ang Emperor T’ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: ‘A *ch’i*

manœuver may be *cheng*, if we make the enemy look upon it as *cheng*;

then our real attack will be *ch’i*, and vice versa. The whole secret

lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real

intent.’" To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other

operation is *cheng*, on which the enemy has had his attention fixed;

whereas that is *ch’i*," which takes him by surprise or comes from an

unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to

be *ch’i*," it immediately becomes *cheng*."]

4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against

an egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.

5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle,

but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.

[Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding

the enemy’s flanks or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of

"indirect tactics" which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord

Roberts’ night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war.

6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven

and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and

moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away

but to return once more.

[Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of *ch’i* and

*cheng*. But at present Sun Tzŭ is not speaking of *cheng* at all,

unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause relating

to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been

pointed out, the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military

operations, that they cannot really be considered apart. Here we simply

have an expression, in figurative language, of the almost infinite

resource of a great leader.]

7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of

these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.

8. There are not more than five primary colours (blue, yellow, red,

white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can

ever be seen.

9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt,

sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can

ever be tasted.

10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct

and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless

series of manœuvers.

11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is

like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the

possibilities of their combination?

12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even

roll stones along in its course.

13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon

which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.

[The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the context it is

used defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu defines this word

as "the measurement or estimation of distance." But this meaning does

not quite fit the illustrative simile in §. 15. Applying this

definition to the falcon, it seems to me to denote that instinct of

*self-restraint* which keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until

the right moment, together with the power of judging when the right

moment has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly

important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very

instant at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" went

into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for

several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying

with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was within close

range, when the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc on

the enemy’s nearest ships.]

14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and

prompt in his decision.

[The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement of

distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before striking.

But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzŭ meant to use the word in a

figurative sense comparable to our own idiom "short and sharp." Cf.

Wang Hsi’s note, which after describing the falcon’s mode of attack,

proceeds: "This is just how the ‘psychological moment’ should be seized

in war."]

15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to

the releasing of the trigger.

[None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile of

energy and the force stored up in the bent cross-bow until released by

the finger on the trigger.]

16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming

disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos,

your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against

defeat.

[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The subdivisions of the army having been

previously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating

and joining, the dispersing and collecting which will take place in the

course of a battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real

disorder is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your

dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite out

of the question."]

17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear

postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.

[In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to tone

down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts’ao Kung throws

out a hint of the meaning in his brief note: "These things all serve to

destroy formation and conceal one’s condition." But Tu Mu is the first

to put it quite plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to

lure the enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish

to display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme

courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the enemy

over-confident, you must have exceeding strength."]

18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of

subdivision;

[See *supra*, § 1.]

concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of

latent energy;

[The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word here

differently than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says:

"seeing that we are favourably circumstanced and yet make no move, the

enemy will believe that we are really afraid."]

masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical

dispositions.

[Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han

Emperor: “Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report

on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed

all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm

soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one

and all recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone

opposed them, saying: ‘When two countries go to war, they are naturally

inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our

spies have seen nothing but old age and infirmity. This is surely some

*ruse* on the part of the enemy, and it would be unwise for us to

attack.’ The Emperor, however, disregarding this advice, fell into the

trap and found himself surrounded at Po-teng.”]

19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains

deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act.

[Ts’ao Kung’s note is "Make a display of weakness and want." Tu Mu

says: "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy’s, weakness may

be simulated in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be led

to believe that we are strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact,

all the enemy’s movements should be determined by the signs that we

choose to give him." Note the following anecdote of Sun Pin, a

descendent of Sun Wu: In 341 B.C., the Ch’i State being at war with

Wei, sent T’ien Chi and Sun Pin against the general P’ang Chuan, who

happened to be a deadly personal enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The

Ch’i State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary

despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account." Accordingly,

when the army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he gave orders

to show 100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and the

night after only 20,000. P’ang Chuan pursued them hotly, saying to

himself: "I knew these men of Ch’i were cowards: their numbers have

already fallen away by more than half." In his retreat, Sun Pin came to

a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers would reach

after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon

it the words: "Under this tree shall P’ang Chuan die." Then, as night

began to fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by,

with orders to shoot directly if they saw a light. Later on, P’ang

Chuan arrived at the spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in

order to read what was written on it. His body was immediately riddled

by a volley of arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion. [The

above is Tu Mu’s version of the story; the *Shih Chi*, less

dramatically but probably with more historical truth, makes P’ang Chuan

cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of

his army.] ]

He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.

20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body

of picked men he lies in wait for him.

[With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, "He lies in

wait with the main body of his troops."]

21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and

does not require too much from individuals.

[Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his army in the

bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each

men according to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from

the untalented."]

Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilise combined

energy.

22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it

were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or

stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a

slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped,

to go rolling down.

[Ts’au Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent power."]

23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum

of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So

much on the subject of energy.

[The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu’s opinion, is the paramount

importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. "Great

results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with small forces."]

[Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows:

"Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the

defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect

methods. The good general acquaints himself first with the theory of

attack and defence, and then turns his attention to direct and indirect

methods. He studies the art of varying and combining these two methods

before proceeding to the subject of weak and strong points. For the use

of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and defence, and the

perception of weak and strong points depends again on the above

methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter

on Energy."]

1. Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of

the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field

and has to hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted.

2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but

does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.

[One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own terms or

fights not at all. [1] ]

3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach

of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible

for the enemy to draw near.

[In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he

will strike at some important point which the enemy will have to

defend.]

4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;

[This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- Ch’en’s

interpretation of I. § 23.]

if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped,

he can force him to move.

5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march

swiftly to places where you are not expected.

6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches

through country where the enemy is not.

[Ts’ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. like "a bolt

from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are

defended, attack in unexpected quarters."]

7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack

places which are undefended.

[Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that is to say,

where the general is lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit;

where the walls are not strong enough, or the precautions not strict

enough; where relief comes too late, or provisions are too scanty, or

the defenders are variance amongst themselves."]

You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions

that cannot be attacked.

[*I.e.*, where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There

is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later

clause. Tu Mu, Ch’en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch’en assume the meaning to be:

"In order to make your defence quite safe, you must defend *even* those

places that are not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much

more, then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the

clause balances less well with the preceding—always a consideration in

the highly antithetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang

Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in saying: "He who is

skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven [see

IV. § 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard against him. This

being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the

enemy cannot defend…. He who is skilled in defence hides in the most

secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to

estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold

are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."]

8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not

know what to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does

not know what to attack.

[An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.]

9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be

invisible, through you inaudible;

[Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of course with

reference to the enemy.]

and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.

10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the

enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your

movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.

11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even

though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we

need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.

[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line

of communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return;

if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign

himself." It is clear that Sun Tzŭ, unlike certain generals in the late

Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.]

12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging

us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the

ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in

his way.

[This extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia

Lin: "even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." Li

Ch’uan says: "we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and

Tu Mu finally clinches the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes—one

of Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying Yang-p’ing and about to be attacked

by Ssu-ma I, suddenly struck his colors, stopped the beating of the

drums, and flung open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in

sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding had the

intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew off

his army and retreated. What Sun Tzŭ is advocating here, therefore, is

nothing more nor less than the timely use of "bluff."]

13. By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible

ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must

be divided.

[The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu (after Mei

Yao-ch’en) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy’s dispositions are

visible, we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own dispositions

being kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in

order to guard against attack from every quarter."]

14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up

into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate

parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few.

15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior

one, our opponents will be in dire straits.

16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then

the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several

different points;

[Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant’s victories by

saying that "while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering

what he was going to do, *he* was thinking most of what he was going to

do himself."]

and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers

we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.

17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear;

should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he

strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his

right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere,

he will everywhere be weak.

[In Frederick the Great’s *Instructions to his Generals* we read: "A

defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those

generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every

point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession,

having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow,

and acquiesce in small misfortunes to avoid greater."]

18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible

attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make

these preparations against us.

[The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson’s words, is "to compel the

enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force

against each fraction in turn."]

19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may

concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

[What Sun Tzŭ evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of

distances and that masterly employment of strategy which enable a

general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and rapid march,

and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the right spot and the

right hour in order to confront the enemy in overwhelming strength.

Among many such successful junctions which military history records,

one of the most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of Blucher

just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.]

20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be

impotent to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour the

left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the

van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything

under a hundred *li* apart, and even the nearest are separated by

several *li*!

[The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision,

but the mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an

army advancing towards a given rendezvous in separate columns, each of

which has orders to be there on a fixed date. If the general allows the

various detachments to proceed at haphazard, without precise

instructions as to the time and place of meeting, the enemy will be

able to annihilate the army in detail. Chang Yu’s note may be worth

quoting here: "If we do not know the place where our opponents mean to

concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our unity will

be forfeited through our preparations for defence, and the positions we

hold will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall

be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual support

will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there

is any great distance between the foremost and hindmost divisions of

the army."]

21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own

in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory.

I say then that victory can be achieved.

[Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states ended

in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien and its

incorporation in Yüeh. This was doubtless long after Sun Tzŭ’s death.

With his present assertion compare IV. § 4. Chang Yu is the only one to

point out the seeming discrepancy, which he thus goes on to explain:

"In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it is said, ‘One may *know*

how to conquer without being able to *do* it,’ whereas here we have the

statement that ‘victory’ can be achieved.’ The explanation is, that in

the former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under

discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot

make certain of beating him. But the present passage refers

particularly to the soldiers of Yüeh who, according to Sun Tzŭ’s

calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place of the

impending struggle. That is why he says here that victory can be

achieved."]

22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from

fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of

their success.

[An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know beforehand all

plans conducive to our success and to the enemy’s failure."

23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity.

[Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by the enemy

on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether his

policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances the action of Cho-ku

Liang, who sent the scornful present of a woman’s head-dress to Ssu-ma

I, in order to goad him out of his Fabian tactics.]

Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.

24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may

know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.

[Cf. IV. § 6.]

25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain

is to conceal them;

[The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. Concealment is

perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see *supra* § 9) as "showing

no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your

brain.]

conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the

subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.

[Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and capable

officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us."]

26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own

tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.

27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can

see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.

[*I.e.*, everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they

cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has

preceded the battle.]

28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but

let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.

[As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root-principle

underlying victory, but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite in

number." With this compare Col. Henderson: "The rules of strategy are

few and simple. They may be learned in a week. They may be taught by

familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams. But such knowledge will no

more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon than a knowledge of

grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."]

29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural

course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.

30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what

is weak.

[Like water, taking the line of least resistance.]

31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over

which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the

foe whom he is facing.

32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare

there are no constant conditions.

33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and

thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.

34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always

equally predominant;

[That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate alternately."]

the four seasons make way for each other in turn.

[Literally, "have no invariable seat."]

There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and

waxing.

[Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the

want of fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in Nature.

The comparison is not very happy, however, because the regularity of

the phenomena which Sun Tzŭ mentions is by no means paralleled in war.]

II, p. 490.

1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the

sovereign.

2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend

and harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.

["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and confidence between

the higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;" and he

quotes a saying of Wu Tzŭ (chap. 1 ad init.): "Without harmony in the

State, no military expedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the

army, no battle array can be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzŭ

is represented as saying to Wu Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are

waging war should get rid of all the domestic troubles before

proceeding to attack the external foe."]

3. After that, comes tactical manœuvering, than which there is nothing

more difficult.

[I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Ts’ao

Kung, who says: "From the time of receiving the sovereign’s

instructions until our encampment over against the enemy, the tactics

to be pursued are most difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or

manœuvers can hardly be said to begin until the army has sallied forth

and encamped, and Ch’ien Hao’s note gives color to this view: "For

levying, concentrating, harmonizing and entrenching an army, there are

plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes when we

engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes that "the great

difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing favourable

position."]

The difficulty of tactical manœuvering consists in turning the devious

into the direct, and misfortune into gain.

[This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and somewhat

enigmatical expressions of which Sun Tzŭ is so fond. This is how it is

explained by Ts’ao Kung: "Make it appear that you are a long way off,

then cover the distance rapidly and arrive on the scene before your

opponent." Tu Mu says: "Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss

and leisurely while you are dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih

gives a slightly different turn: "Although you may have difficult

ground to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter this is a

drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of

movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the two

famous passages across the Alps—that of Hannibal, which laid Italy at

his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later, which

resulted in the great victory of Marengo.]

4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy

out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the

goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of *deviation*.

[Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the

town of O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch’in army. The King of

Chao first consulted Lien P’o on the advisability of attempting a

relief, but the latter thought the distance too great, and the

intervening country too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then turned

to Chao She, who fully admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but

finally said: "We shall be like two rats fighting in a whole—and the

pluckier one will win!" So he left the capital with his army, but had

only gone a distance of 30 *li* when he stopped and began throwing up

entrenchments. For 28 days he continued strengthening his

fortifications, and took care that spies should carry the intelligence

to the enemy. The Ch’in general was overjoyed, and attributed his

adversary’s tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was in the

Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory. But the spies

had no sooner departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for

two days and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such

astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding position

on the "North hill" before the enemy had got wind of his movements. A

crushing defeat followed for the Ch’in forces, who were obliged to

raise the siege of O-yu in all haste and retreat across the border.]

5. Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined

multitude, most dangerous.

[I adopt the reading of the *T’ung Tien*, Cheng Yu-hsien and the _T’u

Shu_, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required in order to

make sense. The commentators using the standard text take this line to

mean that manœuvers may be profitable, or they may be dangerous: it all

depends on the ability of the general.]

6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an

advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other

hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice

of its baggage and stores.

[Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese

commentators, who paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own rendering

without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is some deep-seated

corruption in the text. On the whole, it is clear that Sun Tzŭ does not

approve of a lengthy march being undertaken without supplies. Cf.

infra, § 11.]

7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make

forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual

distance at a stretch,

[The ordinary day’s march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 *li*; but on one

occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Ts’ao Ts’ao is said to have covered

the incredible distance of 300 *li* within twenty-four hours.]

doing a hundred *li* in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all

your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.

8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind,

and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its

destination.

[The moral is, as Ts’ao Kung and others point out: Don’t march a

hundred *li* to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without

impedimenta. Manœuvers of this description should be confined to short

distances. Stonewall Jackson said: "The hardships of forced marches are

often more painful than the dangers of battle." He did not often call

upon his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was only when he

intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he

sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ]

9. If you march fifty *li* in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will

lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will

reach the goal.

[Literally, "the leader of the first division will be *torn away*."]

10. If you march thirty *li* with the same object, two-thirds of your

army will arrive.

[In the *T’ung Tien* is added: "From this we may know the difficulty of

manœuvering."]

11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost;

without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.

[I think Sun Tzŭ meant "stores accumulated in dépôts." But Tu Yu says

"fodder and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in general," and Wang Hsi

says "fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc."]

12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the

designs of our neighbours.

13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar

with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls

and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we

make use of local guides.

[§§. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. § 52.]

15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed.

[In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to

the numerical strength of his troops, took a very prominent position.

Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained.

16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by

circumstances.

17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind,

[The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift

but, as Mei Yao-ch’en points out, "invisible and leaves no tracks."]

your compactness that of the forest.

[Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When slowly marching,

order and ranks must be preserved"—so as to guard against surprise

attacks. But natural forest do not grow in rows, whereas they do

generally possess the quality of density or compactness.]

18. In raiding and plundering be like fire,

[Cf. *Shih Ching*, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire which no man

can check."]

in immovability like a mountain.

[That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to

dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice

you into a trap.]

19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you

move, fall like a thunderbolt.

[Tu Yu quotes a saying of T’ai Kung which has passed into a proverb:

"You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the

lighting—so rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should be made so

quickly that it cannot be parried.]

20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst

your men;

[Sun Tzŭ wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by

insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may

afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.]

when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the

benefit of the soldiery.

[Ch’en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow

and plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the

lands they invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out

some of their most memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that

of Pan Ch’ao who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years,

those of Fu-k’ang-an and Tso Tsung-t’ang.]

21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.

[Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzŭ as saying that we must not break camp

until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy and the

cleverness of the opposing general. Cf. the "seven comparisons" in I. §

13.]

22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation.

[See *supra*, §§ 3, 4.]

Such is the art of manœuvering.

[With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But

there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an

earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the time when

Sun Tzŭ wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different

from that of Sun Tzŭ himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to

its genuineness.]

23. The Book of Army Management says:

[It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give

us any information about this work. Mei Yao- Ch’en calls it "an ancient

military classic," and Wang Hsi, "an old book on war." Considering the

enormous amount of fighting that had gone on for centuries before Sun

Tzŭ’s time between the various kingdoms and principalities of China, it

is not in itself improbable that a collection of military maxims should

have been made and written down at some earlier period.]

On the field of battle,

[Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.]

the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of

gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence

the institution of banners and flags.

24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and

eyes of the host may be focussed on one particular point.

[Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the

same object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be

like those of a single man."!]

25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either

for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone.

[Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who advance

against orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a

story in this connection of Wu Ch’i, when he was fighting against the

Ch’in State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of

matchless daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the

enemy, and returned to camp. Wu Ch’i had the man instantly executed,

whereupon an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying: "This man was a

good soldier, and ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch’i replied: "I

fully believe he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he

acted without orders."]

This is the art of handling large masses of men.

26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums,

and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing

the ears and eyes of your army.

[Ch’en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi’s night ride to Ho-yang at the head

of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with torches,

that though the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a large army, he did not

dare to dispute their passage.]

27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;

["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade

all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be

irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy’s soldiers will be keenest

when they have newly arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our cue

not to fight at once, but to wait until their ardor and enthusiasm have

worn off, and then strike. It is in this way that they may be robbed of

their keen spirit." Li Ch’uan and others tell an anecdote (to be found

in the *Tso Chuan*, year 10, § 1) of Ts’ao Kuei, a protege of Duke

Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Ch’i, and the duke was

about to join battle at Ch’ang-cho, after the first roll of the enemy’s

drums, when Ts’ao said: "Not just yet." Only after their drums had

beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack. Then they

fought, and the men of Ch’i were utterly defeated. Questioned

afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts’ao Kuei

replied: "In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the first

roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is

already on the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I

attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence

our victory." Wu Tzŭ (chap. 4) puts "spirit" first among the "four

important influences" in war, and continues: "The value of a whole

army—a mighty host of a million men—is dependent on one man alone: such

is the influence of spirit!"]

a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.

[Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general’s most important

asset. It is the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and

to inspire courage into the panic-stricken." The great general Li Ching

(A.D. 571-649) has a saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in

assaulting walled cities or striking at an army in battle array; it

must include the art of assailing the enemy’s mental equilibrium."]

28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning;

[Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle

of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting,

whereas Hannibal’s men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy, XXI,

liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.]

by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent

only on returning to camp.

29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is

keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This

is the art of studying moods.

30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and

hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession.

31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait

at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while

the enemy is famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.

32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect

order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident

array:—this is the art of studying circumstances.

33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor

to oppose him when he comes downhill.

34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers

whose temper is keen.

35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy.

[Li Ch’uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor,

take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been

poisoned by the enemy. Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu carefully point out that

the saying has a wider application.]

Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

[The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by

saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to

the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too

dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yu quotes the words of Han

Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who hath his desire and returneth

homewards." A marvelous tale is told of Ts’ao Ts’ao’s courage and

resource in ch. 1 of the *San Kuo Chi*, In 198 A.D., he was besieging

Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to

cutting off Ts’ao’s retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off his

troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who were

guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself.

In this desperate plight Ts’ao waited until nightfall, when he bored a

tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As soon as the

whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on his rear, while

Ts’ao himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were

thrown into confusion and annihilated. Ts’ao Ts’ao said afterwards:

"The brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and brought me to

battle in a desperate position: hence I knew how to overcome them."]

36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.

[This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The

object, as Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe that there is a road

to safety, and thus prevent his fighting with the courage of despair."

Tu Mu adds pleasantly: "After that, you may crush him."]

Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

[Ch’en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when brought to bay

will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: "If your adversary has

burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake

all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho

Shih illustrates the meaning by a story taken from the life of

Yen-ch’ing. That general, together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was

surrounded by a vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D.

The country was bare and desert-like, and the little Chinese force was

soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells they bored ran dry,

and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the

moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch’ing

exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better to die for our country

than to go with fettered hands into captivity!" A strong gale happened

to be blowing from the northeast and darkening the air with dense

clouds of sandy dust. To Chung-wei was for waiting until this had

abated before deciding on a final attack; but luckily another officer,

Li Shou-cheng by name, was quicker to see an opportunity, and said:

"They are many and we are few, but in the midst of this sandstorm our

numbers will not be discernible; victory will go to the strenuous

fighter, and the wind will be our best ally." Accordingly, Fu

Yen-ch’ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his

cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to

safety.]

37. Such is the art of warfare.

(Longmans, 1907), p. 29.

[The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzŭ does

not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us

(V §§ 6-11) that such deflections from the ordinary course are

practically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang Hsi,

who says that "Nine" stands for an indefinitely large number. "All it

means is that in warfare we ought to vary our tactics to the utmost

degree…. I do not know what Ts’ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out

to be, but it has been suggested that they are connected with the Nine

Situations" - of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by Chang Yu. The

only other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost—a

supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends some

weight.]

1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the

sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces.

[Repeated from VII. § 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may

have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to

the chapter.]

2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high

roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in

dangerously isolated positions.

[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the

beginning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43. q.v.). Chang Yu

defines this situation as being situated across the frontier, in

hostile territory. Li Ch’uan says it is "country in which there are no

springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin,

"one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by which to

advance."]

In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate

position, you must fight.

3. There are roads which must not be followed,

["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch’uan,

"where an ambush is to be feared."]

armies which must be not attacked,

[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be

attacked." Ch’en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a rival

advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from

attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men’s strength."]

towns which must not be besieged,

[Cf. III. § 4 Ts’ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own

experience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the

city of Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the

heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the

subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities.

Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be

held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble." Hsun Ying, when

urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is small and

well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will be no great feat

of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock." In

the seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war.

It was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches,

countermarches and manœuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste

men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a

province." [1] ]

positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which

must not be obeyed.

[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for

authority, and Wei Liao Tzŭ (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim:

"Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a

military commander is the negation of civil order!" The unpalatable

fact remains, however, that even Imperial wishes must be subordinated

to military necessity.]

4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany

variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.

5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted

with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn

his knowledge to practical account.

[Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only

securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in

every possible way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of ground is

characterized by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a

certain variability of plan. How it is possible to turn these natural

features to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented by

versatility of mind?"]

6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying

his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will

fail to make the best use of his men.

[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally

advantageous lines of action, namely: "if a certain road is short, it

must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a

town is in a parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can

be stormed, it must be attempted; and if consistent with military

operations, the ruler’s commands must be obeyed." But there are

circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these advantages.

For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but if

he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has

laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may

be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely

to fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so on.]

7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of

disadvantage will be blended together.

["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says

Ts’ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your

mind."]

8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may

succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.

[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must

not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the

enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into

our calculations."]

9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always

ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from

misfortune.

[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position,

I must consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure me, but also my

own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels

these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in

liberating myself…. For instance; if I am surrounded by the enemy and

only think of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will

incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to

encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the

advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy’s toils." See the

story of Ts’ao Ts’ao, VII. § 35, note.]

10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;

[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of

which would only occur to the Oriental mind:—"Entice away the enemy’s

best and wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors.

Introduce traitors into his country, that the government policy may be

rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension

between the ruler and his ministers. By means of every artful

contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his

treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into

excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely

women." Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of

Sun Tzŭ here: "Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer

injury, and he will submit of his own accord."]

and make trouble for them,

[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble

should be made for the enemy affecting their "possessions," or, as we

might say, "assets," which he considers to be "a large army, a rich

exchequer, harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfillment of

commands." These give us a whip-hand over the enemy.]

and keep them constantly engaged;

[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent them from

having any rest."]

hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.

[Meng Shih’s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use

of: "cause them to forget *pien* (the reasons for acting otherwise than

on their first impulse), and hasten in our direction."]

11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the

enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the

chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made

our position unassailable.

12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1)

Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

["Bravery without forethought," as Ts’ao Kung analyzes it, which causes

a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an

opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered with brute force, but

may be lured into an ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, chap. IV. ad init.:

"In estimating the character of a general, men are wont to pay

exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only one

out of many qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave

man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without

any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned." Ssu-ma Fa,

too, makes the incisive remark: "Simply going to one’s death does not

bring about victory."]

(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;

[Ts’ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as "cowardice" as

being of the man "whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an

advantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick to flee at the sight of

danger." Meng Shih gives the closer paraphrase "he who is bent on

returning alive," this is, the man who will never take a risk. But, as

Sun Tzŭ knew, nothing is to be achieved in war unless you are willing

to take risks. T’ai Kung said: "He who lets an advantage slip will

subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu

pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle

with him at the island of Ch’eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered only a

few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. But Huan

Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should be be

overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so

that he might escape, if necessary, at a moment’s notice. The natural

result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers was utterly

quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack from windward with

fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be first in the fray,

Huan Hsuan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled

for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a somewhat

similar story of Chao Ying-ch’i, a general of the Chin State who during

a battle with the army of Ch’u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness

for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get

across.]

(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;

[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei,

Teng Ch’iang and others shut himself up behind his walls and refused to

fight. Teng Ch’iang said: "Our adversary is of a choleric temper and

easily provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls,

then he will grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to

battle, it is doomed to be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao

Hsiang came out to fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy’s

pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.]

(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame;

This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect

in a general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an exaggerated

sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung

by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’en truly observes, though

somewhat paradoxically: "The seeker after glory should be careless of

public opinion."]

(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and

trouble.

[Here again, Sun Tzŭ does not mean that the general is to be careless

of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is the danger

of sacrificing any important military advantage to the immediate

comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy, because in the long

run the troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the

prolongation of the war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken

feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered

city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his

military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated

efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many

strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the end,

relief came through the very man who started out with the distinct

resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to

sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one of our generals who

failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I remember, to

defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his men."

By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of

Sun Tzŭ’s mouth.]

13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the

conduct of war.

14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will

surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a

subject of meditation.

[The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in § 1

than by this heading.]

1. Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and

observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in

the neighbourhood of valleys.

[The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to

supplies of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 3: "Abide not in natural

ovens," i.e. "the openings of valleys." Chang Yu tells the following

anecdote: Wu-tu Ch’iang was a robber captain in the time of the Later

Han, and Ma Yuan was sent to exterminate his gang. Ch’iang having found

a refuge in the hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but

seized all the favourable positions commanding supplies of water and

forage. Ch’iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of

provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did not

know the advantage of keeping in the neighbourhood of valleys."]

2. Camp in high places,

[Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the

surrounding country.]

facing the sun.

[Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch’en Hao "facing east."

Cf. infra, §§ 11, 13.

Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.

3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.

["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts’ao

Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your

evolutions." The *T’ung Tien* reads, "If *the enemy* crosses a river,"

etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is almost certainly an

interpolation.]

4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not

advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army

get across, and then deliver your attack.

[Li Ch’uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over Lung Chu

at the Wei River. Turning to the *Ch’ien Han Shu*, ch. 34, fol. 6

verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were

drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered

his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand and construct

a dam higher up. Then, leading half his army across, he attacked Lung

Chu; but after a time, pretending to have failed in his attempt, he

hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was much elated by this

unlooked-for success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han Hsin was

really a coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his

turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus

releasing a great volume of water, which swept down and prevented the

greater portion of Lung Chu’s army from getting across. He then turned

upon the force which had been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chu

himself being amongst the slain. The rest of the army, on the further

bank, also scattered and fled in all directions.]

5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader

near a river which he has to cross.

[For fear of preventing his crossing.]

6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun.

[See *supra*, § 2. The repetition of these words in connection with

water is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note: "Said either of troops

marshalled on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself;

in either case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing

the sun." The other commentators are not at all explicit.]

Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.

[Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp on

the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the

sluices and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that

‘in river warfare we must not advance against the stream,’ which is as

much as to say that our fleet must not be anchored below that of the

enemy, for then they would be able to take advantage of the current and

make short work of us." There is also the danger, noted by other

commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be

carried down to us.]

So much for river warfare.

7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over

them quickly, without any delay.

[Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage,

and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to

attack.]

8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass

near you, and get your back to a clump of trees.

[Li Ch’uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous

where there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they will serve to protect

the rear.]

So much for operations in salt-marshes.

9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with

rising ground to your right and on your rear,

[Tu Mu quotes T’ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a stream or a

marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right."]

so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for

campaigning in flat country.

10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge

[Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes,

and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon’s "Military Maxims," no. 1.]

which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns.

[Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch’en asks, with some

plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as nothing is known

of Huang Ti having conquered four other Emperors. The *Shih Chi* (ch. 1

ad init.) speaks only of his victories over Yen Ti and Ch’ih Yu. In the

*Liu T’ao* it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified

the Empire." Ts’ao Kung’s explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was

the first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, each of

whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li

Ch’uan tells us that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who

received it from his Minister Feng Hou.]

11. All armies prefer high ground to low,

["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch’en, "is not only more agreeable and

salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low

ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for

fighting."]

and sunny places to dark.

12. If you are careful of your men,

[Ts’ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where you can turn

out your animals to graze."]

and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every

kind,

[Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak

of illness."]

and this will spell victory.

13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the

slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of

your soldiers and utilise the natural advantages of the ground.

14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you

wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it

subsides.

15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running

between, deep natural hollows,

The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks,

with pools of water at the bottom."]

confined places,

[Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded by

precipices on three sides—easy to get into, but hard to get out of."]

tangled thickets,

[Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that spears

cannot be used."]

quagmires

[Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be impassable

for chariots and horsemen."]

and crevasses,

[Defined by Mei Yao-ch’en as "a narrow difficult way between beetling

cliffs." Tu Mu’s note is "ground covered with trees and rocks, and

intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague, but

Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass, and

Chang Yu takes much the same view. On the whole, the weight of the

commentators certainly inclines to the rendering "defile." But the

ordinary meaning of the Chinese in one place is "a crack or fissure"

and the fact that the meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the sentence

indicates something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun

Tzŭ is here speaking of crevasses.]

should be left with all possible speed and not approached.

16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to

approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on

his rear.

17. If in the neighbourhood of your camp there should be any hilly

country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with

reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed

out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious

spies are likely to be lurking.

[Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard against traitors

who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out our weaknesses and

overhearing our instructions."]

18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on

the natural strength of his position.

[Here begin Sun Tzŭ’s remarks on the reading of signs, much of which is

so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual like Gen.

Baden-Powell’s "Aids to Scouting."]

19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious

for the other side to advance.

[Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to

dislodge us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, "and tried to

force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and there would be less

probability of our responding to the challenge."]

20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a

bait.

21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is

advancing.

[Ts’ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and

Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to climb high places and

observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are

moving and shaking, he may know that they are being cut down to clear a

passage for the enemy’s march."]

The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means

that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.

[Tu Yu’s explanation, borrowed from Ts’ao Kung’s, is as follows: "The

presence of a number of screens or sheds in the midst of thick

vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit,

has constructed these hiding-places in order to make us suspect an

ambush." It appears that these "screens" were hastily knotted together

out of any long grass which the retreating enemy happened to come

across.]

22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade.

[Chang Yu’s explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying

along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers

are in ambush at the spot beneath."]

Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming.

23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of

chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area,

it betokens the approach of infantry.

["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat

exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators explain the phenomenon

by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier than men, raise more

dust, and also follow one another in the same wheel-track, whereas

foot-soldiers would be marching in ranks, many abreast. According to

Chang Yu, "every army on the march must have scouts some way in

advance, who on sighting dust raised by the enemy, will gallop back and

report it to the commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: "As you

move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar

for the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds getting

up, glitter of arms, etc." [1] ]

When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties

have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and

fro signify that the army is encamping.

[Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defences for a cantonment, light

horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak

and strong points all along its circumference. Hence the small quantity

of dust and its motion."]

24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is

about to advance.

["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their object

is to make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack

us." Chang Yu alludes to the story of T’ien Tan of the Ch’i-mo against

the Yen forces, led by Ch’i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the *Shih Chi* we read:

"T’ien Tan openly said: ‘My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off

the noses of their Ch’i prisoners and place them in the front rank to

fight against us; that would be the undoing of our city.’ The other

side being informed of this speech, at once acted on the suggestion;

but those within the city were enraged at seeing their

fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they should

fall into the enemy’s hands, were nerved to defend themselves more

obstinately than ever. Once again T’ien Tan sent back converted spies

who reported these words to the enemy: "What I dread most is that the

men of Yen may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by

inflicting this indignity on our forefathers cause us to become

faint-hearted.’ Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and

burned the corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo,

witnessing the outrage from the city-walls, wept passionately and were

all impatient to go out and fight, their fury being increased tenfold.

T’ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for any enterprise.

But instead of a sword, he himself took a mattock in his hands, and

ordered others to be distributed amongst his best warriors, while the

ranks were filled up with their wives and concubines. He then served

out all the remaining rations and bade his men eat their fill. The

regular soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were

manned with the old and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys

were dispatched to the enemy’s camp to arrange terms of surrender,

whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T’ien Tan also collected

20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the wealthy citizens

of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the prayer that, when the

town capitulated, he would not allow their homes to be plundered or

their women to be maltreated. Ch’i Chieh, in high good humor, granted

their prayer; but his army now became increasingly slack and careless.

Meanwhile, T’ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked them with

pieces of red silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored

stripes, and fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased

rushes on their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the

rushes, and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had

pierced in the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked

warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously into the

enemy’s camp where they caused the utmost confusion and dismay; for

their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their

bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with whom

they came into contact. In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up

with gags in their mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At

the same moment a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those

that remained behind making as much noise as possible by banging drums

and hammering on bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed

by the uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly

pursued by the men of Ch’i, who succeeded in slaying their general Ch’i

Chien…. The result of the battle was the ultimate recovery of some

seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch’i State."]

Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that

he will retreat.

25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on

the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle.

26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.

[The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch’uan indicates "a treaty confirmed

by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, on the other hand,

simply say "without reason," "on a frivolous pretext."]

27. When there is much running about

[Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental

banner.]

and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has

come.

28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure.

29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint

from want of food.

30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves,

the army is suffering from thirst.

[As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole army from the

behavior of a single man."]

31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to

secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.

32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied.

[A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch’en Hao says,

the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.]

Clamour by night betokens nervousness.

33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is

weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If

the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary.

[Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the officers of an

army are angry with their general, it means that they are broken with

fatigue" owing to the exertions which he has demanded from them.]

34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for

food,

[In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on grain and

the horses chiefly on grass.]

and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires,

showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know that

they are determined to fight to the death.

[I may quote here the illustrative passage from the *Hou Han Shu*, ch.

71, given in abbreviated form by the *P’ei Wen Yun Fu:* "The rebel Wang

Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Ch’en- ts’ang, and Huang-fu

Sung, who was in supreme command, and Tung Cho were sent out against

him. The latter pressed for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear

to his counsel. At last the rebels were utterly worn out, and began to

throw down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was not advancing to

the attack, but Cho said: ‘It is a principle of war not to pursue

desperate men and not to press a retreating host.’ Sung answered: ‘That

does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a jaded army, not a

retreating host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a disorganized

multitude, not a band of desperate men.’ Thereupon he advances to the

attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo

being slain."]

35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in

subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file.

36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his

resources;

[Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always

a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good

temper.]

too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.

[Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity

is necessary to keep the men to their duty.]

37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s

numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.

[I follow the interpretation of Ts’ao Kung, also adopted by Li Ch’uan,

Tu Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set forth by Tu Yu, Chia

Lin, Mei Tao-ch’en and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first

tyrannical towards his men, and then in terror lest they should mutiny,

etc." This would connect the sentence with what went before about

rewards and punishments.]

38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign

that the enemy wishes for a truce.

[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be sending hostages,

it is a sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because

their strength is exhausted or for some other reason." But it hardly

needs a Sun Tzŭ to draw such an obvious inference.]

39. If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a

long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again,

the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.

[Ts’ao Kung says a manœuver of this sort may be only a ruse to gain

time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.]

40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply

sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made.

[Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, *cheng* tactics and

frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.]

What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength,

keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements.

[This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in

squeezing very good sense out of it. I follow Li Ch’uan, who appears to

offer the simplest explanation: "Only the side that gets more men will

win." Fortunately we have Chang Yu to expound its meaning to us in

language which is lucidity itself: "When the numbers are even, and no

favourable opening presents itself, although we may not be strong enough

to deliver a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst

our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces and

keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the victory. But

we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us." He then quotes

from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 3: "The nominal strength of mercenary troops may

be 100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that

figure."]

41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is

sure to be captured by them.

[Ch’en Hao, quoting from the *Tso Chuan*, says: "If bees and scorpions

carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even a puny opponent,

then, should not be treated with contempt."]

42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you,

they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be

practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you,

punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless.

43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with

humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline.

[Yen Tzŭ [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil virtues

endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in

awe." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4 init.: "The ideal commander unites culture with

a warlike temper; the profession of arms requires a combination of

hardness and tenderness."]

This is a certain road to victory.

44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army

will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.

45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his

orders being obeyed,

[Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show kindly

confidence in his men and also make his authority respected, so that

when they come to face the enemy, orders may be executed and discipline

maintained, because they all trust and look up to him." What Sun Tzŭ

has said in § 44, however, would lead one rather to expect something

like this: "If a general is always confident that his orders will be

carried out," etc."]

the gain will be mutual.

[Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men under his

command, and the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus the

gain is mutual." He quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch.

4: "The art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders

and not to be swayed by petty doubts." Vacillation and fussiness are

the surest means of sapping the confidence of an army.]

[Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1-13, deals with

"terrain," the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six

calamities" are discussed in §§ 14-20, and the rest of the chapter is

again a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less interesting,

perhaps, on that account.]

1. Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1)

Accessible ground;

[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "plentifully provided with roads and means of

communications."]

(2) entangling ground;

[The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing into which you

become entangled."]

(3) temporising ground;

[Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."]

(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great

distance from the enemy.

[It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this

classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in the

Chinaman’s unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as

the above.]

2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called

*accessible*.

3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in

occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of

supplies.

[The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu says,

"not to allow the enemy to cut your communications." In view of

Napoleon’s dictum, "the secret of war lies in the communications," [1]

we could wish that Sun Tzŭ had done more than skirt the edge of this

important subject here and in I. § 10, VII. § 11. Col. Henderson says:

"The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an

army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist who

finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death, and his

own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s movements,

and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander

whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false

position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his

plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated detachments,

and to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he has not had time

to prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary failure, but will

entail the ruin or surrender of his whole army." [2]

Then you will be able to fight with advantage.

4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called

*entangling*.

5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may

sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your

coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible,

disaster will ensue.

6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the

first move, it is called *temporising* ground.

[Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the

situation remains at a deadlock."]

7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an

attractive bait,

[Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to flee." But

this is only one of the lures which might induce us to quit our

position.]

it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus

enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come

out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.

8. With regard to *narrow passes*, if you can occupy them first, let

them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.

[Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie with us, and

by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall have the enemy at our

mercy."]

9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after

him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly

garrisoned.

10. With regard to *precipitous heights*, if you are beforehand with

your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there

wait for him to come up.

[Ts’ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing heights and

defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated by the enemy."

[For the enunciation of the grand principle alluded to, see VI. § 2].

Chang Yu tells the following anecdote of P’ei Hsing-chien (A.D.

619-682), who was sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic

tribes. "At night he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been

completely fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders

that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was

highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the

extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P’ei Hsing-chien,

however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as

quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which

flooded their former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve

feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight, and owned

that they had been in the wrong. ‘How did you know what was going to

happen?’ they asked. P’ei Hsing-chien replied: ‘From this time forward

be content to obey orders without asking unnecessary questions.’ From

this it may be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that high and sunny places

are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are

immune from disastrous floods."]

11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but

retreat and try to entice him away.

[The turning point of Li Shih-min’s campaign in 621 A.D. against the

two rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang Shih-ch’ung, Prince of

Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou

Chien-te persisted in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was

defeated and taken prisoner. See *Chiu T’ang Shu*, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso,

and also ch. 54.]

12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the

strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a

battle,

[The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long and

wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we should be

exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen."]

and fighting will be to your disadvantage.

13. These six are the principles connected with Earth.

[Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. §

8.]

The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to

study them.

14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from

natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible.

These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5)

disorganisation; (6) rout.

15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against

another ten times its size, the result will be the *flight* of the

former.

16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too

weak, the result is *insubordination*.

[Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T’ien Pu [*Hsin T’ang Shu*, ch. 148],

who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against

Wang T’ing-ts’ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers

treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority

by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T’ien

Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some

months had passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops

turned tail and dispersed in every direction. After that, the

unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat.]

When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the

result is *collapse*.

[Ts’ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to press on, the

common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."]

17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on

meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of

resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is

in a position to fight, the result is *ruin*.

[Wang Hsi’s note is: "This means, the general is angry without cause,

and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate

officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of

ruin upon his head."]

18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are

not clear and distinct;

[Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his orders with

decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves

are made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds

about doing their duty." General Baden-Powell says, italicizing the

words: "The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men

lies in one nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions they

receive." [3] Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: "the most fatal defect in a

military leader is difference; the worst calamities that befall an army

arise from hesitation."]

when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men,

[Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular routine."]

and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is

utter *disorganisation*.

19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an

inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment

against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the

front rank, the result must be a *rout*.

[Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and continues:

"Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be

appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the

resolution of our own men and to demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi

ordines of Caesar ("De Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).]

20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully

noted by the general who has attained a responsible post.

[See *supra*, § 13.]

21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally;

[Ch’en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to

those connected with ground."]

but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of

victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and

distances, constitutes the test of a great general.

22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into

practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises

them, will surely be defeated.

23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even

though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory,

then you must not fight even at the ruler’s bidding.

[Cf. VIII. § 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch’in dynasty, who is said

to have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have written the _San

Lueh_, has these words attributed to him: "The responsibility of

setting an army in motion must devolve on the general alone; if advance

and retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will

hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened

monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their country’s

cause [lit., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This means that

"in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military

commander must be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying: "Decrees

from the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."]

24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without

fearing disgrace,

[It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for

a soldier is to retreat.]

whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for

his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.

[A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior."

Such a man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer punishment, would

not regret his conduct."]

25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you

into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and

they will stand by you even unto death.

[Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging picture

of the famous general Wu Ch’i, from whose treatise on war I have

frequently had occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate the

same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a

horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations

wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship with his men. One of his

soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch’i himself sucked out

the virus. The soldier’s mother, hearing this, began wailing and

lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: ‘Why do you cry? Your son is

only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has

sucked the poison from his sore.’ The woman replied, ‘Many years ago,

Lord Wu performed a similar service for my husband, who never left him

afterwards, and finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And

now that he has done the same for my son, he too will fall fighting I

know not where.’" Li Ch’uan mentions the Viscount of Ch’u, who invaded

the small state of Hsiao during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to

him: "Many of the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold." So he

made a round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and

straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined with

floss silk.]

26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority

felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable,

moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to

spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose.

[Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers afraid of you,

they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of

stern military discipline which occurred in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was

occupying the town of Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his

army not to molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them by

force. Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner, who

happened to be a fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat

belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation

helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng considered that the

fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be allowed to

palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered his

summary execution, the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did

so. This act of severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from

that time forth even articles dropped in the highway were not picked

up.]

27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are

unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway

towards victory.

[That is, Ts’ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."]

28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that

our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway

towards victory.

[Cf. III. § 13 (1).]

29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our

men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of

the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only

halfway towards victory.

30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered;

once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.

[The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures

so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move

recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, he makes no

mistakes."]

31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your

victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you

may make your victory complete.

[Li Ch’uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three things—the

affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of

earth—, victory will invariably crown your battles."]

1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground:

(1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4)

open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground;

(7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.

2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive

ground.

[So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious

to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity

afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction. "In their

advance," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack the valor of desperation, and

when they retreat, they will find harbors of refuge."]

3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great

distance, it is facile ground.

[Li Ch’uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for retreating,"

and the other commentators give similar explanations. Tu Mu remarks:

"When your army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and

bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that you have no

hankering after home."]

4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either

side, is contentious ground.

[Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." Ts’ao Kung

says: "ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the

strong," such as "the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch’uan. Thus,

Thermopylae was of this classification because the possession of it,

even for a few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in

check and thus gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. V. ad init.:

"For those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is

nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu Kuang was returning from

his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far

as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of Liang-chou,

taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch’in, plotted

against him and was for barring his way into the province. Yang Han,

governor of Kao-ch’ang, counseled him, saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from

his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and

mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we

shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a different plan.

Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass,

thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are

prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without moving. Or

if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, we could make a

stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning and

resource of Tzŭ-fang himself would be expended in vain against the

enormous strength of these two positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act

on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.]

5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.

[There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective for this

type of ground. Ts’ao Kung says it means "ground covered with a network

of roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih suggested: "ground on which

intercommunication is easy."]

6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,

[Ts’au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a

third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih instances the small

principality of Cheng, which was bounded on the north-east by Ch’i, on

the west by Chin, and on the south by Ch’u.]

so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command,

[The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most

of them to become his allies.]

is ground of intersecting highways.

7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country,

leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground.

[Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has reached

such a point, its situation is serious."]

8. Mountain forests,

[Or simply "forests."]

rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse:

this is difficult ground.

9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can

only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy

would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in

ground.

10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting

without delay, is desperate ground.

[The situation, as pictured by Ts’ao Kung, is very similar to the

"hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer possible: "A

lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible,

retreat blocked." Ch’en Hao says: "to be on ‘desperate ground’ is like

sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu Mu

quotes from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus

entrapped: "Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the aid

of local guides:—it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy’s

mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so

perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots

carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, no

choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is time to

range our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy is overwhelming

strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take

a breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a

pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none of us

has a moment’s respite. If we simply maintain our ground, whole days

and months will crawl by; the moment we make a move, we have to sustain

the enemy’s attacks on front and rear. The country is wild, destitute

of water and plants; the army is lacking in the necessaries of life,

the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, all the resources of

strength and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single man

defending it can check the onset of ten thousand; all means of offense

in the hands of the enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited by

ourselves:—in this terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant

soldiers and the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with

the slightest effect?" Students of Greek history may be reminded of the

awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the Athenians

under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].]

11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt

not. On contentious ground, attack not.

[But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous

position first. So Ts’ao Kung. Li Ch’uan and others, however, suppose

the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, sot that

it would be sheer madness to attack. In the *Sun Tzŭ Hsu Lu*, when the

King of Wu inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzŭ replies:

"The rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession

have the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is

secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by

pretending to flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash

for other places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and

raise a dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your best

troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will

sally forth to the rescue."]

12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way.

[Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking

force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations available

here. I follow that of Chang Yu. The other is indicated in Ts’ao Kung’s

brief note: "Draw closer together"—i.e., see that a portion of your own

army is not cut off.]

On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.

[Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighbouring states."]

13. On serious ground, gather in plunder.

[On this, Li Ch’uan has the following delicious note: "When an army

penetrates far into the enemy’s country, care must be taken not to

alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han

Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch’in territory was marked by no

violation of women or looting of valuables. [Nota bene: this was in 207

B.C., and may well cause us to blush for the Christian armies that

entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the

present passage, then, I think that the true reading must be, not

‘plunder,’ but ‘do not plunder.’" Alas, I fear that in this instance

the worthy commentator’s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least,

has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on ‘serious ground,’

there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no possibility

of retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted resistance by

bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the

enemy."]

In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.

[Or, in the words of VIII. § 2, "do not encamp.]

14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.

[Ts’au Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual artifice;" and Tu Yu

amplifies this by saying: "In such a position, some scheme must be

devised which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in

deluding the enemy, the peril may be escaped." This is exactly what

happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the

mountains on the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by

the dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his

foes was remarkably like that which T’ien Tan had also employed with

success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24, note.] When night came

on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and

set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the

mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The

strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and

discomfited the Romans that they withdrew from their position, and

Hannibal’s army passed safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III.

93, 94; Livy, XXII. 16 17.]

On desperate ground, fight.

[For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your might, there is

a chance of life; where as death is certain if you cling to your

corner."]

15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a

wedge between the enemy’s front and rear;

[More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch with each

other."]

to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to

hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from

rallying their men.

16. When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from

concentrating; even when their forces were united, they managed to keep

them in disorder.

17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when

otherwise, they stopped still.

[Mei Yao-ch’en connects this with the foregoing: "Having succeeded in

thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure

any advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained,

they would remain where they were."]

18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly

array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin

by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be

amenable to your will."

[Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzŭ had in mind. Ts’ao Kung thinks it

is "some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending." Tu Mu

says: "The three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the

accomplishment of which his success depends, are: (1) to capture our

favourable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard

his own communications." Our object then must be to thwart his plans in

these three directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf. III. § 3.] By

boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the other

side on the defensive.]

19. Rapidity is the essence of war:

[According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading principles in

warfare," and he adds: "These are the profoundest truths of military

science, and the chief business of the general." The following

anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the importance attached to speed by

two of China’s greatest generals. In 227 A.D., Meng Ta, governor of

Hsin-ch’eng under the Wei Emperor Wen Ti, was meditating defection to

the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko

Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was then

military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta’s treachery, he

at once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having

previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import.

Ssu-ma’s officers came to him and said: "If Meng Ta has leagued himself

with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly investigated before we

make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta is an unprincipled man, and we

ought to go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and

before he has thrown off the mask." Then, by a series of forced

marches, be brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch’eng with in a

space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to

Chu-ko Liang: "Wan is 1200 *li* from here. When the news of my revolt

reaches Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it

will be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time

my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to come

himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are not worth

troubling about." The next letter, however, was filled with

consternation: "Though only eight days have passed since I threw off my

allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. What miraculous

rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin- ch’eng had fallen and Meng

Ta had lost his head. [See *Chin Shu*, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li

Ching was sent from K’uei-chou in Ssu-ch’uan to reduce the successful

rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern Ching-chou

Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, Hsiao

Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down

through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. But Li Ching

embarked his army without loss of time, and was just about to start

when the other generals implored him to postpone his departure until

the river was in a less dangerous state for navigation. Li Ching

replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is of paramount

importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time to

strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army

together. If we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we

shall appear before his capital with startling suddenness, like the

thunder which is heard before you have time to stop your ears against

it. [See VII. § 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if

he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in

such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. Thus the full

fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as he predicted, and

Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people

should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of death.]

take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected

routes, and attack unguarded spots.

20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading

force: The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be

the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail

against you.

21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with

food.

[Cf. *supra*, § 13. Li Ch’uan does not venture on a note here.]

22. Carefully study the well-being of your men,

[For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, give them

plenty of food and drink, and look after them generally."]

and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your

strength.

[Ch’en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the famous

general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the

success of the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch’u State, where a

universal levy was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the

temper of his troops, he declined all invitations to fight and remained

strictly on the defensive. In vain did the Ch’u general try to force a

battle: day after day Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not

come out, but devoted his whole time and energy to winning the

affection and confidence of his men. He took care that they should be

well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for

bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them

into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had elapsed, he told

off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing themselves.

The answer was, that they were contending with one another in putting

the weight and long-jumping. When Wang Chien heard that they were

engaged in these athletic pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been

strung up to the required pitch and that they were now ready for

fighting. By this time the Ch’u army, after repeating their challenge

again and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch’in

general immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in the

battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly

afterwards, the whole of Ch’u was conquered by Ch’in, and the king

Fu-ch’u led into captivity.]

Keep your army continually on the move,

[In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has

struck me, however, that the true reading might be "link your army

together."]

and devise unfathomable plans.

23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and

they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is

nothing they may not achieve.

[Chang Yu quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 3): "If one man were to

run amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to

get our of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had courage

and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a

desperado and a man who sets some value on his life do not meet on even

terms."]

Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.

[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, they will

surely exert their united strength to get out of it."]

24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there

is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart

of a hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no

help for it, they will fight hard.

25. Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be

constantly on the *qui vive;* without waiting to be asked, they will do

your will;

[Literally, "without asking, you will get."]

without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders,

they can be trusted.

26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious

doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared.

[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate

into cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes

Huang Shih-kung: "‘Spells and incantations should be strictly

forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into the

fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers’ minds should be seriously

perturbed.’ The meaning is," he continues, "that if all doubts and

scruples are discarded, your men will never falter in their resolution

until they die."]

27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because

they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it

is not because they are disinclined to longevity.

[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and long life are

things for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they

burn or fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not

that they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzŭ

is slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the

general to see that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not

thrown in their way.]

28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep,

[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to indicate more

genuine grief than tears alone.]

those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting

the tears run down their cheeks.

[Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts’ao Kung says, "all

have embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We may remember that

the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their

emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful parting at the I River

between Ching K’o and his friends, when the former was sent to attempt

the life of the King of Ch’in (afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C.

The tears of all flowed down like rain as he bade them farewell and

uttered the following lines: "The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the

burn; Your champion is going—Not to return." [1] ]

But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage

of a Chu or a Kuei.

[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State and

contemporary with Sun Tzŭ himself, who was employed by Kung-tzu Kuang,

better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his sovereign Wang Liao with

a dagger which he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a

banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, but was immediately hacked to

pieces by the king’s bodyguard. This was in 515 B.C. The other hero

referred to, Ts’ao Kuei (or Ts’ao Mo), performed the exploit which has

made his name famous 166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice

defeated by Ch’i, and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering

a large slice of territory, when Ts’ao Kuei suddenly seized Huan Kung,

the Duke of Ch’i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a dagger

against his chest. None of the duke’s retainers dared to move a muscle,

and Ts’ao Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, declaring the Lu

was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and a weaker

state. Huan Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent,

whereupon Ts’ao Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his

place amid the terrified assemblage without having so much as changed

color. As was to be expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate

the bargain, but his wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him

the impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold

stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three pitched

battles.]

29. The skilful tactician may be likened to the *shuai-jan*. Now the

*shuai-jan* is a snake that is found in the Ch‘ang mountains.

["*Shuai-jan*" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in question

was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through

this passage, the term in the Chinese has now come to be used in the

sense of "military manœuvers."]

Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its

tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and

you will be attacked by head and tail both.

30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the *shuai-jan*,

[That is, as Mei Yao-ch’en says, "Is it possible to make the front and

rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as

though they were part of a single living body?"]

I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are

enemies;

[Cf. VI. § 21.]

yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a

storm, they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand

helps the right.

[The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time of

common peril, how much more should two parts of the same army, bound

together as they are by every tie of interest and fellow-feeling. Yet

it is notorious that many a campaign has been ruined through lack of

cooperation, especially in the case of allied armies.]

31. Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of

horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground.

[These quaint devices to prevent one’s army from running away recall

the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the

battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one

spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzŭ, to

render flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed

unless your men have tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a

spirit of sympathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which can be

learned from the *shuai-jan*.]

32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard

of courage which all must reach.

[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of]

one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it

follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be

of the same quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain

standard. Wellington’s seemingly ungrateful description of his army at

Waterloo as "the worst he had ever commanded" meant no more than that

it was deficient in this important particular—unity of spirit and

courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept

those troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the

day.]

33. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question

involving the proper use of ground.

[Mei Yao-ch’en’s paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the differences

of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilize

accidental features of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted in

strong positions, will hold out as long as better troops on more

exposed terrain. The advantage of position neutralizes the inferiority

in stamina and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With all respect to the

text books, and to the ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to

think that the study of ground is often overlooked, and that by no

means sufficient importance is attached to the selection of positions…

and to the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are

defending or attacking, from the proper utilization of natural

features." [2] ]

34. Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were

leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.

[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with which he does

it."]

35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure

secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.

36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports

and appearances,

[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."]

and thus keep them in total ignorance.

[Ts’ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The troops must

not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning; they may only

rejoice with you over their happy outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and

surprise the enemy," is one of the first principles in war, as had been

frequently pointed out. But how about the other process—the

mystification of one’s own men? Those who may think that Sun Tzŭ is

over-emphatic on this point would do well to read Col. Henderson’s

remarks on Stonewall Jackson’s Valley campaign: "The infinite pains,"

he says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most

trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his

thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pronounced useless"—etc.

etc. [3] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47 of the _Hou Han

Shu_, "Pan Ch’ao took the field with 25,000 men from Khotan and other

Central Asian states with the object of crushing Yarkand. The King of

Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief commander to succour the place

with an army drawn from the kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t’ou,

totaling 50,000 men. Pan Ch’ao summoned his officers and also the King

of Khotan to a council of war, and said: ‘Our forces are now

outnumbered and unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan,

then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a different

direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route,

and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the

evening drum has sounded and then start.’ Pan Ch’ao now secretly

released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha

was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set

off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch’ao’s retreat

in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode eastward with 8000 horse in

order to intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch’ao knew that

the two chieftains had gone, he called his divisions together, got them

well in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand,

as it lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion,

and were closely pursued by Pan Ch’ao. Over 5000 heads were brought

back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and

cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating,

Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From

that time forward, Pan Ch’ao’s prestige completely overawed the

countries of the west." In this case, we see that the Chinese general

not only kept his own officers in ignorance of his real plans, but

actually took the bold step of dividing his army in order to deceive

the enemy.]

37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans,

[Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same stratagem twice.]

he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.

[Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The axiom, that war

is based on deception, does not apply only to deception of the enemy.

You must deceive even your own soldiers. Make them follow you, but

without letting them know why."]

By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the

enemy from anticipating his purpose.

38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has

climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He

carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand.

[Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. § 15), that is, takes some

decisive step which makes it impossible for the army to return—like

Hsiang Yu, who sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch’en Hao,

followed by Chia Lin, understands the words less well as "puts forth

every artifice at his command."]

39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd

driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and

none knows whither he is going.

[Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to advance or

retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and

conquering."]

40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the

business of the general.

[Sun Tzŭ means that after mobilization there should be no delay in

aiming a blow at the enemy’s heart. Note how he returns again and again

to this point. Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was

no doubt a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the

armies of today.]

41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground;

[Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting the rules

for the nine varieties of ground."]

the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental

laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be

studied.

42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that

penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means

dispersion.

[Cf. *supra*, § 20.]

43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across

neighbourhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground.

[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. § 2, but it does not

figure among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities in chap. X.

One’s first impulse would be to translate it distant ground," but this,

if we can trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here.

Mei Yao-ch’en says it is "a position not far enough advanced to be

called ‘facile,’ and not near enough to home to be ‘dispersive,’ but

something between the two." Wang Hsi says: "It is ground separated from

home by an interjacent state, whose territory we have had to cross in

order to reach it. Hence, it is incumbent on us to settle our business

there quickly." He adds that this position is of rare occurrence, which

is the reason why it is not included among the Nine Situations.]

When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is

one of intersecting highways.

44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground.

When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground.

45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow

passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of

refuge at all, it is desperate ground.

46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity

of purpose.

[This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the

defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. *supra*, § 11.]

On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between

all parts of my army.

[As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible

contingencies: "(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden

attack on the part of the enemy." Cf. VII. § 17. Mei Yao-ch’en says:

"On the march, the regiments should be in close touch; in an

encampment, there should be continuity between the fortifications."]

47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.

[This is Ts’ao Kung’s interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, saying: "We

must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach

the goal." That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way

apart. Mei Yao-ch’en offers another equally plausible explanation:

"Supposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we

are behind him, we should advance with all speed in order to dispute

its possession." Ch’en Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy

has had time to select his own ground, quotes VI. § 1, where Sun Tzŭ

warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of the

situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is a favourable

position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to

occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to make

a fight for it, you may fall quickly on their rear with your main body,

and victory will be assured." It was thus, he adds, that Chao She beat

the army of Ch’in. (See p. 57.)]

48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On

ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances.

49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of

supplies.

[The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as

one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.]

On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.

50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat.

[Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend the position,

whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy’s

lines." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "in order to make my soldiers fight with

desperation." Wang Hsi says, "fearing lest my men be tempted to run

away." Tu Mu points out that this is the converse of VII. § 36, where

it is the enemy who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards

Emperor and canonized as Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great army under

Erh-chu Chao and others. His own force was comparatively small,

consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot. The

lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, gaps

being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of trying to

escape, actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets

himself by driving into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped

together. As soon as his officers and men saw that there was nothing

for it but to conquer or die, their spirits rose to an extraordinary

pitch of exaltation, and they charged with such desperate ferocity that

the opposing ranks broke and crumbled under their onslaught.]

On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness

of saving their lives.

Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores

and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and

make it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to

the death." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The only chance of life lies in giving

up all hope of it." This concludes what Sun Tzŭ has to say about

"grounds" and the "variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the

passages which bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be

struck by the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is

treated. Sun Tzŭ begins abruptly in VIII. § 2 to enumerate "variations"

before touching on "grounds" at all, but only mentions five, namely

nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is not included

in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier portion

of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six

variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again, though

the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next

chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par

excellence, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us down

to § 14. In §§ 43-45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2,

8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed

in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated once

more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and 7,

being different from those previously given. Though it is impossible to

account for the present state of Sun Tzŭ’s text, a few suggestive facts

maybe brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title,

should deal with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is

an abnormally short chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds.

Several of these are defined twice over, besides which there are two

distinct lists of the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the

chapter is disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX.

I do not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the

general conclusion that Sun Tzŭ’s work cannot have come down to us in

the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII is obviously defective

and probably out of place, while XI seems to contain matter that has

either been added by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.]

51. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate

resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself,

and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger.

[Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch’ao’s devoted followers in 73

A.D. The story runs thus in the *Hou Han Shu*, ch. 47: "When Pan Ch’ao

arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country, received him at

first with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his

behavior underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss and negligent.

Pan Ch’ao spoke about this to the officers of his suite: ‘Have you

noticed,’ he said, ‘that Kuang’s polite intentions are on the wane?

This must signify that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians,

and that consequently he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with

which side to throw in his lot. That surely is the reason. The truly

wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they have come to

pass; how much more, then, those that are already manifest!’ Thereupon

he called one of the natives who had been assigned to his service, and

set a trap for him, saying: ‘Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu

who arrived some day ago?’ The man was so taken aback that between

surprise and fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch’ao,

keeping his informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a

general gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began

drinking with them. When the wine had mounted into their heads a

little, he tried to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them

thus: ‘Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated region,

anxious to achieve riches and honour by some great exploit. Now it

happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no arrived in this kingdom

only a few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy

extended towards us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this

envoy prevail upon him to seize our party and hand us over to the

Hsiung-no, our bones will become food for the wolves of the desert.

What are we to do?’ With one accord, the officers replied: ‘Standing as

we do in peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life

and death.’ For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. § 1,

note.]

52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are

acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the

march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains

and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We

shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make

use of local guides.

[These three sentences are repeated from VII. §§ 12-14—in order to

emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to

regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the

following words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzŭ might have added

that there is always the risk of going wrong, either through their

treachery or some misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13):

Hannibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the

neighbourhood of Casinum, where there was an important pass to be

occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of

Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of

Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in that

direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had almost

arrived.]

53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles

does not befit a warlike prince.

54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship

shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He

overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining

against him.

[Mei Tao-ch’en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so

much affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a powerful state, if you

can divide her forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you

have a superiority in strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you

overawe the enemy, the neighbouring states will be frightened; and if

the neighbouring states are frightened, the enemy’s allies will be

prevented from joining her." The following gives a stronger meaning:

"If the great state has once been defeated (before she has had time to

summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and refrain

from massing their forces." Ch’en Hao and Chang Yu take the sentence in

quite another way. The former says: "Powerful though a prince may be,

if he attacks a large state, he will be unable to raise enough troops,

and must rely to some extent on external aid; if he dispenses with

this, and with overweening confidence in his own strength, simply tries

to intimidate the enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his

view thus: "If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will

be discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case) our

display of military force is inferior by half to that of the enemy, the

other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join us."]

55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor

does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret

designs, keeping his antagonists in awe.

[The train of thought, as said by Li Ch’uan, appears to be this: Secure

against a combination of his enemies, "he can afford to reject

entangling alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his

prestige enable him to dispense with external friendships."]

Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms.

[This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch’in State

became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which

the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final

triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yu, following up his previous note,

thinks that Sun Tzŭ is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded

selfishness and haughty isolation.]

56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule,

[Wu Tzŭ (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly rewarded and

retreat be heavily punished."]

issue orders

[Literally, "hang" or post up."]

without regard to previous arrangements;

["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The general meaning is

made clear by Ts’ao Kung’s quotation from the *Ssu-ma Fa:* "Give

instructions only on sighting the enemy; give rewards when you see

deserving deeds." Ts’ao Kung’s paraphrase: "The final instructions you

give to your army should not correspond with those that have been

previously posted up." Chang Yu simplifies this into "your arrangements

should not be divulged beforehand." And Chia Lin says: "there should be

no fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not only is there danger in

letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates the entire

reversal of them at the last moment.]

and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do

with but a single man.

[Cf. *supra*, § 34.]

57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know

your design.

[Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your reasons for

any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no

reasons" for his decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a

general than to a judge.]

When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them

nothing when the situation is gloomy.

58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it

into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety.

[These words of Sun Tzŭ were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation of

the tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already

alluded to on p. 28. In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao,

and halted ten miles from the mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the

enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body

of 2000 light cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red

flag. Their instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles

and keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men of Chao see me in

full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their fortifications

and give chase. This must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck down

the Chao standards and set up the red banners of Han in their stead."

Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: "Our adversary holds a

strong position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until he

sees the standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I

should turn back and escape through the mountains." So saying, he first

of all sent out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them

to form in line of battle with their backs to the River Ti. Seeing this

manœuver, the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter. By this time

it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the generalissimo’s

flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was immediately

engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some time;

until at length Han Hsin and his colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and

banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where

another fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them

and to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but

the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was

fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the

2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of Chao

following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted walls,

tore up the enemy’s flags and replaced them by those of Han. When the

Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight of these red flags

struck them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in and

overpowered their king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort of

their leader to stay the panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell on

them from both sides and completed the rout, killing a number and

capturing the rest, amongst whom was King Ya himself…. After the

battle, some of Han Hsin’s officers came to him and said: "In the _Art

of War_ we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a

river or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun

Tzŭ and T’ai Kung. See IX § 9, and note.] You, on the contrary, ordered

us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under these

conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?" The general

replied: "I fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with

sufficient care. Is it not written there: ‘Plunge your army into

desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place it in deadly

peril and it will survive’? Had I taken the usual course, I should

never have been able to bring my colleague round. What says the

Military Classic—‘Swoop down on the market-place and drive the men off

to fight.’ [This passage does not occur in the present text of Sun

Tzŭ.] If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were

obliged to fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow

his own discretion, there would have been a general *débandade*, and it

would have been impossible to do anything with them." The officers

admitted the force of his argument, and said: "These are higher tactics

than we should have been capable of." [See *Ch’ien Han Shu*, ch. 34,

ff. 4, 5.] ]

59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is

capable of striking a blow for victory.

[Danger has a bracing effect.]

60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves

to the enemy’s purpose.

[Ts’ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"—by an appearance of yielding and

falling in with the enemy’s wishes. Chang Yu’s note makes the meaning

clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on to do

so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out

his intention." The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous

before we deliver our attack.]

61. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank,

[I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the enemy in

one direction." Ts’ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers and make for the

enemy." But such a violent displacement of characters is quite

indefensible.]

we shall succeed in the long run

[Literally, "after a thousand *li*."]

in killing the commander-in-chief.

[Always a great point with the Chinese.]

62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning.

63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier

passes, destroy the official tallies,

[These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued as

a permit or passport by the official in charge of a gate. Cf. the

"border-warden" of *Lun Yu* III. 24, who may have had similar duties.

When this half was returned to him, within a fixed period, he was

authorized to open the gate and let the traveler through.]

and stop the passage of all emissaries.

[Either to or from the enemy’s country.]

64. Be stern in the council-chamber,

[Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the

sovereign.]

so that you may control the situation.

[Mei Yao-ch’en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take the

strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations.]

65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.

66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,

[Cf. *supra*, § 18.]

and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.

[Ch’en Hao’s explanation: "If I manage to seize a favourable position,

but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the advantage thus obtained

cannot be turned to any practical account. He who intends therefore, to

occupy a position of importance to the enemy, must begin by making an

artful appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him

into going there as well." Mei Yao-ch’en explains that this "artful

appointment" is to be made through the medium of the enemy’s own spies,

who will carry back just the amount of information that we choose to

give them. Then, having cunningly disclosed our intentions, "we must

manage, though starting after the enemy, to arrive before him (VII. §

4). We must start after him in order to ensure his marching thither; we

must arrive before him in order to capture the place without trouble.

Taken thus, the present passage lends some support to Mei Yao-ch’en’s

interpretation of § 47.]

67. Walk in the path defined by rule,

[Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, and this

cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons." It is

unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight authority, for the

sense yielded is certainly much more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we

know, according to the veterans of the old school whom he defeated, won

his battles by violating every accepted canon of warfare.]

and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive

battle.

[Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy’s tactics until a favourable

opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall

prove decisive."]

68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy

gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running

hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you.

[As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly

appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzŭ was thinking only of its

speed. The words have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy

as quickly as an escaping hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.]

[Rather more than half the chapter (§§ 1-13) is devoted to the subject

of fire, after which the author branches off into other topics.]

1. Sun Tzŭ said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first

is to burn soldiers in their camp;

[So Tu Mu. Li Ch’uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill the

soldiers" (when they try to escape from the flames). Pan Ch’ao, sent on

a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see XI. § 51, note],

found himself placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an

envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In

consultation with his officers, he exclaimed: "Never venture, never

win! [1] The only course open to us now is to make an assault by fire

on the barbarians under cover of night, when they will not be able to

discern our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate

them completely; this will cool the King’s courage and cover us with

glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.’ The officers all

replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the

Intendant. Pan Ch’ao then fell into a passion: ‘It is today,’ he cried,

‘that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum

civilian, who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and

everything will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy

fate for valiant warriors.’ All then agreed to do as he wished.

Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly

made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the

time. Pan Ch’ao ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide behind

the enemy’s barracks, it being arranged that when they saw flames shoot

up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. The

rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade

at the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the

windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose

on the front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in

frantic disorder. Pan Ch’ao slew three of them with his own hand, while

his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his suite.

The remainder, more than a hundred in all, perished in the flames. On

the following day, Pan Ch’ao, divining his thoughts, said with uplifted

hand: ‘Although you did not go with us last night, I should not think,

Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.’ This satisfied Kuo Hsun,

and Pan Ch’ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the

head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and

trembling, which Pan Ch’ao took steps to allay by issuing a public

proclamation. Then, taking the king’s sons as hostage, he returned to

make his report to Tou Ku." *Hou Han Shu*, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ]

the second is to burn stores;

[Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to subdue the

rebellious population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng recommended Wen Ti of the

Sui dynasty to make periodical raids and burn their stores of grain, a

policy which in the long run proved entirely successful.]

the third is to burn baggage-trains;

[An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao’s wagons and

impedimenta by Ts’ao Ts’ao in 200 A.D.]

the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines;

[Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and "magazines" are

the same. He specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and

clothing. Cf. VII. § 11.]

the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.

[Tu Yu says in the *T’ung Tien:* "To drop fire into the enemy’s camp.

The method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows

alight by dipping them into a brazier, and then shoot them from

powerful crossbows into the enemy’s lines."]

2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available.

[T’sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy’s camp" are referred to.

But Ch’en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: "We must have

favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us."

Chia Lin says: "We must avail ourselves of wind and dry weather."]

the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness.

[Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable matter,

reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have the material

cause. Chang Yu says: "vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting

fires."]

3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special

days for starting a conflagration.

4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days

are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the

Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar;

[These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the

Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius,

Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.]

for these four are all days of rising wind.

5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible

developments:

6. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once

with an attack from without.

7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain

quiet, bide your time and do not attack.

[The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into

confusion. If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is

ready to receive us. Hence the necessity for caution.]

8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it

up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are.

[Ts’ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but if you find

the difficulties too great, retire."]

9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do

not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a

favourable moment.

[Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire

breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of

incendiaries) inside the enemy’s camp. "But," he continues, "if the

enemy is settled in a waste place littered with quantities of grass, or

if he has pitched his camp in a position which can be burnt out, we

must carry our fire against him at any seasonable opportunity, and not

await on in hopes of an outbreak occurring within, for fear our

opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation, and

thus render our own attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling once

baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking

advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese

general’s camp, but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation in

the neighbourhood had already been burnt down. On the other hand,

Po-ts’ai, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in

184 A.D. through his neglect of this simple precaution. "At the head of

a large army he was besieging Ch’ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu

Sung. The garrison was very small, and a general feeling of nervousness

pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and

said: "In war, there are various indirect methods of attack, and

numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator here quotes Sun

Tzŭ, V. §§ 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched their camp in the

midst of thick grass which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we

set fire to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic, and we can

make a sortie and attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the

achievement of T’ien Tan.’ [See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong

breeze sprang up; so Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind

reeds together into torches and mount guard on the city walls, after

which he sent out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way

through the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells.

Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, and

Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which threw the

rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." [*Hou Han Shu*,

ch. 71.]

]

]

]

]

]

10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from

the leeward.

[Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, the enemy will

retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he

will fight desperately, which will not conduce to your success." A

rather more obvious explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in

the east, begin burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the

attack yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side,

and then attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your

enemy."]

11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze

soon falls.

[Cf. Lao Tzŭ’s saying: "A violent wind does not last the space of a

morning." (*Tao Te Ching*, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch’en and Wang Hsi say:

"A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak.

This is what happens as a general rule." The phenomenon observed may be

correct enough, but how this sense is to be obtained is not apparent.]

12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be

known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the

proper days.

[Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of the stars,

and watch for the days on which wind will rise, before making our

attack with fire." Chang Yu seems to interpret the text differently:

"We must not only know how to assail our opponents with fire, but also

be on our guard against similar attacks from them."]

13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence;

those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of

strength.

14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of

all his belongings.

[Ts’ao Kung’s note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy’s road or

divide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores." Water

can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of

fire. This is the reason, Chang Yu concludes, why the former is

dismissed in a couple of sentences, whereas the attack by fire is

discussed in detail. Wu Tzŭ (ch. 4) speaks thus of the two elements:

"If an army is encamped on low-lying marshy ground, from which the

water cannot run off, and where the rainfall is heavy, it may be

submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in wild marsh lands

thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent

gales, it may be exterminated by fire."]

15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed

in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the

result is waste of time and general stagnation.

[This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzŭ. Ts’ao Kung

says: "Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single day."

And Tu Mu: "If you do not take opportunity to advance and reward the

deserving, your subordinates will not carry out your commands, and

disaster will ensue." For several reasons, however, and in spite of the

formidable array of scholars on the other side, I prefer the

interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch’en alone, whose words I will

quote: "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in their battles and

assaults must seize the favourable moments when they come and not shrink

on occasion from heroic measures: that is to say, they must resort to

such means of attack of fire, water and the like. What they must not

do, and what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold to the

advantages they have got."]

16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead;

the good general cultivates his resources.

[Tu Mu quotes the following from the *San Lueh*, ch. 2: "The warlike

prince controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them together by

good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays,

there will be disruption; if rewards are deficient, commands will not

be respected."]

17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless

there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is

critical.

[Sun Tzŭ may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes so

far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the *Tao Te Ching*,

ch. 69. "I dare not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the

defensive; I dare not advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."]

18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own

spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique.

19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where

you are.

[This is repeated from XI. § 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an

interpolation, for it is evident that § 20 ought to follow immediately

on § 18.]

20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by

content.

21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again

into being;

[The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this saying.]

nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.

22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full

of caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army

intact.

tiger’s cubs."

1. Sun Tzŭ said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching

them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on

the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a

thousand ounces of silver.

[Cf. II. §§ 1, 13, 14.]

There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down

exhausted on the highways.

[Cf. *Tao Te Ching*, ch. 30: "Where troops have been quartered,

brambles and thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be

reminded of the saying: ‘On serious ground, gather in plunder.’ Why

then should carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the

highways?—The answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts of

munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the

injunction to ‘forage on the enemy’ only means that when an army is

deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided

against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn,

we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow of

supplies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts where

provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be dispensed

with."]

As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their

labor.

[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough-tail." The

allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, each

consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated

on behalf of the State by the tenants of the other eight. It was here

also, so Tu Mu tells us, that their cottages were built and a well

sunk, to be used by all in common. [See II. § 12, note.] In time of

war, one of the families had to serve in the army, while the other

seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men

(reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of

700,000 families would be affected.]

2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the

victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in

ignorance of the enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the

outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honours and emoluments,

["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect

of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned

at this point.]

is the height of inhumanity.

[Sun Tzŭ’s agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting to

the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which

war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of

the enemy’s condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a

war may drag on for years. The only way to get this information is to

employ spies, and it is impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless

they are properly paid for their services. But it is surely false

economy to grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose,

when every day that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum.

This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor, and hence Sun

Tzŭ concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a

crime against humanity.]

3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his

sovereign, no master of victory.

[This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the

national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C.,

these memorable words were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Ch’u State:

"The [Chinese] character for ‘prowess’ is made up of [the characters

for] ‘to stay’ and ‘a spear’ (cessation of hostilities). Military

prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in of

weapons, the preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm

establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people,

putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."]

4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike

and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is

*foreknowledge*.

[That is, knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, and what he means to

do.]

5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be

obtained inductively from experience,

[Tu Mu’s note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be gained by

reasoning from other analogous cases."]

nor by any deductive calculation.

[Li Ch’uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance and

magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human

actions cannot be so calculated."]

6. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from

other men.

[Mei Yao-ch’en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of the

spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural

science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe

can be verified by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an

enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies alone."]

7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local

spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5)

surviving spies.

8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the

secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It

is the sovereign’s most precious faculty.

[Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry

leaders, had officers styled ‘scout masters,’ whose business it was to

collect all possible information regarding the enemy, through scouts

and spies, etc., and much of his success in war was traceable to the

previous knowledge of the enemy’s moves thus gained." [1] ]

9. Having *local spies* means employing the services of the inhabitants

of a district.

[Tu Mu says: "In the enemy’s country, win people over by kind

treatment, and use them as spies."]

10. Having *inward spies*, making use of officials of the enemy.

[Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good service in

this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office, criminals

who have undergone punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy

for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or

who have been passed over in the distribution of posts, others who are

anxious that their side should be defeated in order that they may have

a chance of displaying their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who

always want to have a foot in each boat. Officials of these several

kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and bound to one’s

interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will be able to

find out the state of affairs in the enemy’s country, ascertain the

plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the

harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers."

The necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing with "inward

spies," appears from an historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo

Shang, Governor of I-Chou, sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel

Li Hsiung of Shu in his stronghold at P’i. After each side had

experienced a number of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse

to the services of a certain P’o-t’ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to

have him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to Lo

Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to cooperate with him from

inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right moment for

making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in these promises, march

out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po and others at their head

with orders to attack at P’o-t’ai’s bidding. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung’s

general, Li Hsiang, had prepared an ambuscade on their line of march;

and P’o-t’ai, having reared long scaling-ladders against the city

walls, now lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po’s men raced up on seeing the

signal and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while

others were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred

of Lo Shang’s soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whom

was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his forces,

both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy completely."

[This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho Shih got the story

from. It is not given in the biography of Li Hsiung or that of his

father Li T’e, *Chin Shu*, ch. 120, 121.]

11. Having *converted spies*, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and

using them for our own purposes.

[By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from the

enemy’s service, and inducing them to carry back false information as

well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. On the other hand,

Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we pretend not to have detected him, but

contrive to let him carry away a false impression of what is going on.

Several of the commentators accept this as an alternative definition;

but that it is not what Sun Tzŭ meant is conclusively proved by his

subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously (§ 21

sqq.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were used

with conspicuous success: (1) by T’ien Tan in his defence of Chi-mo

(see *supra*, p. 90); (2) by Chao She on his march to O-yu (see p. 57);

and by the wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien P’o was conducting a

defensive campaign against Ch’in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved

of Lien P’o’s cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to

avert a series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to

the reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and

were already in Fan Chu’s pay. They said: "The only thing which causes

Ch’in anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be made general. Lien P’o they

consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be vanquished in the long

run." Now this Chao Kua was a son of the famous Chao She. From his

boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of war and military

matters, until at last he came to believe that there was no commander

in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father was much

disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he

spoke of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if

ever Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of

Chao. This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own

mother and the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed

Lien P’o. Needless to say, he proved no match for the redoubtable Po

Ch’i and the great military power of Ch’in. He fell into a trap by

which his army was divided into two and his communications cut; and

after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, during which the famished

soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and

his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put

to the sword.]

12. Having *doomed spies*, doing certain things openly for purposes of

deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them

to the enemy.

[Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do

things calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led to believe

that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies are

captured in the enemy’s lines, they will make an entirely false report,

and the enemy will take measures accordingly, only to find that we do

something quite different. The spies will thereupon be put to death."

As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released

by Pan Ch’ao in his campaign against Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also

refers to T’ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T’ai Tsung to lull

the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied security, until Li Ching was

able to deliver a crushing blow against him. Chang Yu says that the

Turks revenged themselves by killing T’ang Chien, but this is a

mistake, for we read in both the old and the New T’ang History (ch. 58,

fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and lived on

until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when

sent by the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch’i. He has

certainly more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of

Ch’i, being subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and

infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Li I-chi, ordered the

unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.]

13. *Surviving spies*, finally, are those who bring back news from the

enemy’s camp.

[This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a

regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a man

of keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby

exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed

with physical strength and courage; thoroughly accustomed to all sorts

of dirty work, able to endure hunger and cold, and to put up with shame

and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the following story of Ta’hsi Wu of the

Sui dynasty: "When he was governor of Eastern Ch’in, Shen-wu of Ch’i

made a hostile movement upon Sha-yuan. The Emperor T’ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu]

sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other

men. All three were on horseback and wore the enemy’s uniform. When it

was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet away from the enemy’s camp

and stealthily crept up to listen, until they succeeded in catching the

passwords used in the army. Then they got on their horses again and

boldly passed through the camp under the guise of night-watchmen; and

more than once, happening to come across a soldier who was committing

some breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit a

sound cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible

information about the enemy’s dispositions, and received warm

commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence of their report was

able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."]

14. Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate

relations to be maintained than with spies.

[Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch’en point out that the spy is privileged to enter

even the general’s private sleeping-tent.]

None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should

greater secrecy be preserved.

[Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should be

carried "mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may be quoted

from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them than any previous

commander: "Spies are attached to those who give them most, he who pays

them ill is never served. They should never be known to anybody; nor

should they know one another. When they propose anything very material,

secure their persons, or have in your possession their wives and

children as hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate anything to

them but what is absolutely necessary that they should know. [2] ]

15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive

sagacity.

[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "In order to use them, one must know fact from

falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and

double-dealing." Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more

along the lines of "intuitive perception" and "practical intelligence."

Tu Mu strangely refers these attributes to the spies themselves:

"Before using spies we must assure ourselves as to their integrity of

character and the extent of their experience and skill." But he

continues: "A brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous

than mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate such."

So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the

passage."]

16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and

straightforwardness.

[Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial offers,

you must treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work for

you with all their might."]

17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the

truth of their reports.

[Mei Yao-ch’en says: "Be on your guard against the possibility of spies

going over to the service of the enemy."]

18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of

business.

[Cf. VI. § 9.]

19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is

ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret

was told.

[Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are heard

before [our plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzŭ’s main point in this

passage is: Whereas you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for

letting out the secret," the object of killing the other man is only,

as Ch’en Hao puts it, "to stop his mouth" and prevent news leaking any

further. If it had already been repeated to others, this object would

not be gained. Either way, Sun Tzŭ lays himself open to the charge of

inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man

deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly not have told

the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of him."]

20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to

assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding

out the names of the attendants, the aides-de- camp,

[Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to "those whose

duty it is to keep the general supplied with information," which

naturally necessitates frequent interviews with him.]

the door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must

be commissioned to ascertain these.

[As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of these

important functionaries can be won over by bribery.]

21. The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out,

tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will

become converted spies and available for our service.

22. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we

are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies.

[Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy’s spies we learn the

enemy’s condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the converted spy

into our service, because it is he that knows which of the local

inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of the officials are open to

corruption."]

23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed

spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.

[Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best

be deceived."]

24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used

on appointed occasions.

25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of

the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first

instance, from the converted spy.

[As explained in §§ 22-24. He not only brings information himself, but

makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.]

Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost

liberality.

26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty

[Sun Tzŭ means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name was

changed to Yin by P’an Keng in 1401.

was due to I Chih

[Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman who took part

in Ch’eng T’ang’s campaign against Chieh Kuei.]

who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty

was due to Lü Ya

[Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he

afterwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T’ai Kung, a title

bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on

war, erroneously identified with the *Liu T’ao*.]

who had served under the Yin.

[There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to

introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are

by no means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly

doubt that Sun Tzŭ is holding up I Chih and Lu Ya as illustrious

examples of the converted spy, or something closely analogous. His

suggestion is, that the Hsia and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the

intimate knowledge of their weaknesses and shortcoming which these

former ministers were able to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch’en

appears to resent any such aspersion on these historic names: "I Yin

and Lu Ya," he says, "were not rebels against the Government. Hsia

could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could not

employ the latter, hence Hou employed him. Their great achievements

were all for the good of the people." Ho Shih is also indignant: "How

should two divinely inspired men such as I and Lu have acted as common

spies? Sun Tzŭ’s mention of them simply means that the proper use of

the five classes of spies is a matter which requires men of the highest

mental caliber like I and Lu, whose wisdom and capacity qualified them

for the task. The above words only emphasize this point." Ho Shih

believes then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of their

supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.]

27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who

will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying

and thereby they achieve great results.

[Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which carries a

boat from bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so

reliance on spies, while production of great results, is oft-times the

cause of utter destruction."]

Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an

army’s ability to move.

[Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man without ears or

eyes.]