Thucydides — History of the Peloponnesian War

THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By Thucydides 431 BC

Translated by Richard Crawley

With Permission

to

CONNOP THIRLWALL

Historian of Greece

This Translation of the Work of His

Great Predecessor

is Respectfully Inscribed

by

—The Translator—

CONTENTS

BOOK I

CHAPTER I

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

BOOK II

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VIII

BOOK III

CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER X

CHAPTER XI

BOOK IV

CHAPTER XII

CHAPTER XIII

CHAPTER XIV

BOOK V

CHAPTER XV

CHAPTER XVI

CHAPTER XVII

BOOK VI

CHAPTER XVIII

CHAPTER XIX

CHAPTER XX

BOOK VII

CHAPTER XXI

CHAPTER XXII

CHAPTER XXIII

BOOK VIII

CHAPTER XXIV

CHAPTER XXV

CHAPTER XXVI

CHAPTER I

The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the Commencement of the

Peloponnesian War

Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the

Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning at the moment that it broke

out, and believing that it would be a great war and more worthy of

relation than any that had preceded it. This belief was not without its

grounds. The preparations of both the combatants were in every

department in the last state of perfection; and he could see the rest

of the Hellenic race taking sides in the quarrel; those who delayed

doing so at once having it in contemplation. Indeed this was the

greatest movement yet known in history, not only of the Hellenes, but

of a large part of the barbarian world—I had almost said of mankind.

For though the events of remote antiquity, and even those that more

immediately preceded the war, could not from lapse of time be clearly

ascertained, yet the evidences which an inquiry carried as far back as

was practicable leads me to trust, all point to the conclusion that

there was nothing on a great scale, either in war or in other matters.

For instance, it is evident that the country now called Hellas had in

ancient times no settled population; on the contrary, migrations were

of frequent occurrence, the several tribes readily abandoning their

homes under the pressure of superior numbers. Without commerce, without

freedom of communication either by land or sea, cultivating no more of

their territory than the exigencies of life required, destitute of

capital, never planting their land (for they could not tell when an

invader might not come and take it all away, and when he did come they

had no walls to stop him), thinking that the necessities of daily

sustenance could be supplied at one place as well as another, they

cared little for shifting their habitation, and consequently neither

built large cities nor attained to any other form of greatness. The

richest soils were always most subject to this change of masters; such

as the district now called Thessaly, Boeotia, most of the Peloponnese,

Arcadia excepted, and the most fertile parts of the rest of Hellas. The

goodness of the land favoured the aggrandizement of particular

individuals, and thus created faction which proved a fertile source of

ruin. It also invited invasion. Accordingly Attica, from the poverty of

its soil enjoying from a very remote period freedom from faction, never

changed its inhabitants. And here is no inconsiderable exemplification

of my assertion that the migrations were the cause of there being no

correspondent growth in other parts. The most powerful victims of war

or faction from the rest of Hellas took refuge with the Athenians as a

safe retreat; and at an early period, becoming naturalized, swelled the

already large population of the city to such a height that Attica

became at last too small to hold them, and they had to send out

colonies to Ionia.

There is also another circumstance that contributes not a little to my

conviction of the weakness of ancient times. Before the Trojan war

there is no indication of any common action in Hellas, nor indeed of

the universal prevalence of the name; on the contrary, before the time

of Hellen, son of Deucalion, no such appellation existed, but the

country went by the names of the different tribes, in particular of the

Pelasgian. It was not till Hellen and his sons grew strong in

Phthiotis, and were invited as allies into the other cities, that one

by one they gradually acquired from the connection the name of

Hellenes; though a long time elapsed before that name could fasten

itself upon all. The best proof of this is furnished by Homer. Born

long after the Trojan War, he nowhere calls all of them by that name,

nor indeed any of them except the followers of Achilles from Phthiotis,

who were the original Hellenes: in his poems they are called Danaans,

Argives, and Achaeans. He does not even use the term barbarian,

probably because the Hellenes had not yet been marked off from the rest

of the world by one distinctive appellation. It appears therefore that

the several Hellenic communities, comprising not only those who first

acquired the name, city by city, as they came to understand each other,

but also those who assumed it afterwards as the name of the whole

people, were before the Trojan war prevented by their want of strength

and the absence of mutual intercourse from displaying any collective

action.

Indeed, they could not unite for this expedition till they had gained

increased familiarity with the sea. And the first person known to us by

tradition as having established a navy is Minos. He made himself master

of what is now called the Hellenic sea, and ruled over the Cyclades,

into most of which he sent the first colonies, expelling the Carians

and appointing his own sons governors; and thus did his best to put

down piracy in those waters, a necessary step to secure the revenues

for his own use.

For in early times the Hellenes and the barbarians of the coast and

islands, as communication by sea became more common, were tempted to

turn pirates, under the conduct of their most powerful men; the motives

being to serve their own cupidity and to support the needy. They would

fall upon a town unprotected by walls, and consisting of a mere

collection of villages, and would plunder it; indeed, this came to be

the main source of their livelihood, no disgrace being yet attached to

such an achievement, but even some glory. An illustration of this is

furnished by the honour with which some of the inhabitants of the

continent still regard a successful marauder, and by the question we

find the old poets everywhere representing the people as asking of

voyagers—“Are they pirates?”—as if those who are asked the question

would have no idea of disclaiming the imputation, or their

interrogators of reproaching them for it. The same rapine prevailed

also by land.

And even at the present day many of Hellas still follow the old

fashion, the Ozolian Locrians for instance, the Aetolians, the

Acarnanians, and that region of the continent; and the custom of

carrying arms is still kept up among these continentals, from the old

piratical habits. The whole of Hellas used once to carry arms, their

habitations being unprotected and their communication with each other

unsafe; indeed, to wear arms was as much a part of everyday life with

them as with the barbarians. And the fact that the people in these

parts of Hellas are still living in the old way points to a time when

the same mode of life was once equally common to all. The Athenians

were the first to lay aside their weapons, and to adopt an easier and

more luxurious mode of life; indeed, it is only lately that their rich

old men left off the luxury of wearing undergarments of linen, and

fastening a knot of their hair with a tie of golden grasshoppers, a

fashion which spread to their Ionian kindred and long prevailed among

the old men there. On the contrary, a modest style of dressing, more in

conformity with modern ideas, was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians,

the rich doing their best to assimilate their way of life to that of

the common people. They also set the example of contending naked,

publicly stripping and anointing themselves with oil in their gymnastic

exercises. Formerly, even in the Olympic contests, the athletes who

contended wore belts across their middles; and it is but a few years

since that the practice ceased. To this day among some of the

barbarians, especially in Asia, when prizes for boxing and wrestling

are offered, belts are worn by the combatants. And there are many other

points in which a likeness might be shown between the life of the

Hellenic world of old and the barbarian of to-day.

With respect to their towns, later on, at an era of increased

facilities of navigation and a greater supply of capital, we find the

shores becoming the site of walled towns, and the isthmuses being

occupied for the purposes of commerce and defence against a neighbour.

But the old towns, on account of the great prevalence of piracy, were

built away from the sea, whether on the islands or the continent, and

still remain in their old sites. For the pirates used to plunder one

another, and indeed all coast populations, whether seafaring or not.

The islanders, too, were great pirates. These islanders were Carians

and Phoenicians, by whom most of the islands were colonized, as was

proved by the following fact. During the purification of Delos by

Athens in this war all the graves in the island were taken up, and it

was found that above half their inmates were Carians: they were

identified by the fashion of the arms buried with them, and by the

method of interment, which was the same as the Carians still follow.

But as soon as Minos had formed his navy, communication by sea became

easier, as he colonized most of the islands, and thus expelled the

malefactors. The coast population now began to apply themselves more

closely to the acquisition of wealth, and their life became more

settled; some even began to build themselves walls on the strength of

their newly acquired riches. For the love of gain would reconcile the

weaker to the dominion of the stronger, and the possession of capital

enabled the more powerful to reduce the smaller towns to subjection.

And it was at a somewhat later stage of this development that they went

on the expedition against Troy.

What enabled Agamemnon to raise the armament was more, in my opinion,

his superiority in strength, than the oaths of Tyndareus, which bound

the suitors to follow him. Indeed, the account given by those

Peloponnesians who have been the recipients of the most credible

tradition is this. First of all Pelops, arriving among a needy

population from Asia with vast wealth, acquired such power that,

stranger though he was, the country was called after him; and this

power fortune saw fit materially to increase in the hands of his

descendants. Eurystheus had been killed in Attica by the Heraclids.

Atreus was his mother’s brother; and to the hands of his relation, who

had left his father on account of the death of Chrysippus, Eurystheus,

when he set out on his expedition, had committed Mycenæ and the

government. As time went on and Eurystheus did not return, Atreus

complied with the wishes of the Mycenæans, who were influenced by fear

of the Heraclids—besides, his power seemed considerable, and he had not

neglected to court the favour of the populace—and assumed the sceptre

of Mycenæ and the rest of the dominions of Eurystheus. And so the power

of the descendants of Pelops came to be greater than that of the

descendants of Perseus. To all this Agamemnon succeeded. He had also a

navy far stronger than his contemporaries, so that, in my opinion, fear

was quite as strong an element as love in the formation of the

confederate expedition. The strength of his navy is shown by the fact

that his own was the largest contingent, and that of the Arcadians was

furnished by him; this at least is what Homer says, if his testimony is

deemed sufficient. Besides, in his account of the transmission of the

sceptre, he calls him

Of many an isle, and of all Argos king.

Now Agamemnon’s was a continental power; and he could not have been

master of any except the adjacent islands (and these would not be

many), but through the possession of a fleet.

And from this expedition we may infer the character of earlier

enterprises. Now Mycenæ may have been a small place, and many of the

towns of that age may appear comparatively insignificant, but no exact

observer would therefore feel justified in rejecting the estimate given

by the poets and by tradition of the magnitude of the armament. For I

suppose if Lacedaemon were to become desolate, and the temples and the

foundations of the public buildings were left, that as time went on

there would be a strong disposition with posterity to refuse to accept

her fame as a true exponent of her power. And yet they occupy

two-fifths of Peloponnese and lead the whole, not to speak of their

numerous allies without. Still, as the city is neither built in a

compact form nor adorned with magnificent temples and public edifices,

but composed of villages after the old fashion of Hellas, there would

be an impression of inadequacy. Whereas, if Athens were to suffer the

same misfortune, I suppose that any inference from the appearance

presented to the eye would make her power to have been twice as great

as it is. We have therefore no right to be sceptical, nor to content

ourselves with an inspection of a town to the exclusion of a

consideration of its power; but we may safely conclude that the

armament in question surpassed all before it, as it fell short of

modern efforts; if we can here also accept the testimony of Homer’s

poems, in which, without allowing for the exaggeration which a poet

would feel himself licensed to employ, we can see that it was far from

equalling ours. He has represented it as consisting of twelve hundred

vessels; the Boeotian complement of each ship being a hundred and

twenty men, that of the ships of Philoctetes fifty. By this, I

conceive, he meant to convey the maximum and the minimum complement: at

any rate, he does not specify the amount of any others in his catalogue

of the ships. That they were all rowers as well as warriors we see from

his account of the ships of Philoctetes, in which all the men at the

oar are bowmen. Now it is improbable that many supernumeraries sailed,

if we except the kings and high officers; especially as they had to

cross the open sea with munitions of war, in ships, moreover, that had

no decks, but were equipped in the old piratical fashion. So that if we

strike the average of the largest and smallest ships, the number of

those who sailed will appear inconsiderable, representing, as they did,

the whole force of Hellas. And this was due not so much to scarcity of

men as of money. Difficulty of subsistence made the invaders reduce the

numbers of the army to a point at which it might live on the country

during the prosecution of the war. Even after the victory they obtained

on their arrival—and a victory there must have been, or the

fortifications of the naval camp could never have been built—there is

no indication of their whole force having been employed; on the

contrary, they seem to have turned to cultivation of the Chersonese and

to piracy from want of supplies. This was what really enabled the

Trojans to keep the field for ten years against them; the dispersion of

the enemy making them always a match for the detachment left behind. If

they had brought plenty of supplies with them, and had persevered in

the war without scattering for piracy and agriculture, they would have

easily defeated the Trojans in the field, since they could hold their

own against them with the division on service. In short, if they had

stuck to the siege, the capture of Troy would have cost them less time

and less trouble. But as want of money proved the weakness of earlier

expeditions, so from the same cause even the one in question, more

famous than its predecessors, may be pronounced on the evidence of what

it effected to have been inferior to its renown and to the current

opinion about it formed under the tuition of the poets.

Even after the Trojan War, Hellas was still engaged in removing and

settling, and thus could not attain to the quiet which must precede

growth. The late return of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many

revolutions, and factions ensued almost everywhere; and it was the

citizens thus driven into exile who founded the cities. Sixty years

after the capture of Ilium, the modern Boeotians were driven out of

Arne by the Thessalians, and settled in the present Boeotia, the former

Cadmeis; though there was a division of them there before, some of whom

joined the expedition to Ilium. Twenty years later, the Dorians and the

Heraclids became masters of Peloponnese; so that much had to be done

and many years had to elapse before Hellas could attain to a durable

tranquillity undisturbed by removals, and could begin to send out

colonies, as Athens did to Ionia and most of the islands, and the

Peloponnesians to most of Italy and Sicily and some places in the rest

of Hellas. All these places were founded subsequently to the war with

Troy.

But as the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth became

more an object, the revenues of the states increasing, tyrannies were

by their means established almost everywhere—the old form of government

being hereditary monarchy with definite prerogatives—and Hellas began

to fit out fleets and apply herself more closely to the sea. It is said

that the Corinthians were the first to approach the modern style of

naval architecture, and that Corinth was the first place in Hellas

where galleys were built; and we have Ameinocles, a Corinthian

shipwright, making four ships for the Samians. Dating from the end of

this war, it is nearly three hundred years ago that Ameinocles went to

Samos. Again, the earliest sea-fight in history was between the

Corinthians and Corcyraeans; this was about two hundred and sixty years

ago, dating from the same time. Planted on an isthmus, Corinth had from

time out of mind been a commercial emporium; as formerly almost all

communication between the Hellenes within and without Peloponnese was

carried on overland, and the Corinthian territory was the highway

through which it travelled. She had consequently great money resources,

as is shown by the epithet “wealthy” bestowed by the old poets on the

place, and this enabled her, when traffic by sea became more common, to

procure her navy and put down piracy; and as she could offer a mart for

both branches of the trade, she acquired for herself all the power

which a large revenue affords. Subsequently the Ionians attained to

great naval strength in the reign of Cyrus, the first king of the

Persians, and of his son Cambyses, and while they were at war with the

former commanded for a while the Ionian sea. Polycrates also, the

tyrant of Samos, had a powerful navy in the reign of Cambyses, with

which he reduced many of the islands, and among them Rhenea, which he

consecrated to the Delian Apollo. About this time also the Phocaeans,

while they were founding Marseilles, defeated the Carthaginians in a

sea-fight. These were the most powerful navies. And even these,

although so many generations had elapsed since the Trojan war, seem to

have been principally composed of the old fifty-oars and long-boats,

and to have counted few galleys among their ranks. Indeed it was only

shortly the Persian war, and the death of Darius the successor of

Cambyses, that the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans acquired any

large number of galleys. For after these there were no navies of any

account in Hellas till the expedition of Xerxes; Aegina, Athens, and

others may have possessed a few vessels, but they were principally

fifty-oars. It was quite at the end of this period that the war with

Aegina and the prospect of the barbarian invasion enabled Themistocles

to persuade the Athenians to build the fleet with which they fought at

Salamis; and even these vessels had not complete decks.

The navies, then, of the Hellenes during the period we have traversed

were what I have described. All their insignificance did not prevent

their being an element of the greatest power to those who cultivated

them, alike in revenue and in dominion. They were the means by which

the islands were reached and reduced, those of the smallest area

falling the easiest prey. Wars by land there were none, none at least

by which power was acquired; we have the usual border contests, but of

distant expeditions with conquest for object we hear nothing among the

Hellenes. There was no union of subject cities round a great state, no

spontaneous combination of equals for confederate expeditions; what

fighting there was consisted merely of local warfare between rival

neighbours. The nearest approach to a coalition took place in the old

war between Chalcis and Eretria; this was a quarrel in which the rest

of the Hellenic name did to some extent take sides.

Various, too, were the obstacles which the national growth encountered

in various localities. The power of the Ionians was advancing with

rapid strides, when it came into collision with Persia, under King

Cyrus, who, after having dethroned Croesus and overrun everything

between the Halys and the sea, stopped not till he had reduced the

cities of the coast; the islands being only left to be subdued by

Darius and the Phoenician navy.

Again, wherever there were tyrants, their habit of providing simply for

themselves, of looking solely to their personal comfort and family

aggrandizement, made safety the great aim of their policy, and

prevented anything great proceeding from them; though they would each

have their affairs with their immediate neighbours. All this is only

true of the mother country, for in Sicily they attained to very great

power. Thus for a long time everywhere in Hellas do we find causes

which make the states alike incapable of combination for great and

national ends, or of any vigorous action of their own.

But at last a time came when the tyrants of Athens and the far older

tyrannies of the rest of Hellas were, with the exception of those in

Sicily, once and for all put down by Lacedaemon; for this city, though

after the settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants, it

suffered from factions for an unparalleled length of time, still at a

very early period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from

tyrants which was unbroken; it has possessed the same form of

government for more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of

the late war, and has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs of

the other states. Not many years after the deposition of the tyrants,

the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and the Athenians.

Ten years afterwards, the barbarian returned with the armada for the

subjugation of Hellas. In the face of this great danger, the command of

the confederate Hellenes was assumed by the Lacedaemonians in virtue of

their superior power; and the Athenians, having made up their minds to

abandon their city, broke up their homes, threw themselves into their

ships, and became a naval people. This coalition, after repulsing the

barbarian, soon afterwards split into two sections, which included the

Hellenes who had revolted from the King, as well as those who had aided

him in the war. At the end of the one stood Athens, at the head of the

other Lacedaemon, one the first naval, the other the first military

power in Hellas. For a short time the league held together, till the

Lacedaemonians and Athenians quarrelled and made war upon each other

with their allies, a duel into which all the Hellenes sooner or later

were drawn, though some might at first remain neutral. So that the

whole period from the Median war to this, with some peaceful intervals,

was spent by each power in war, either with its rival, or with its own

revolted allies, and consequently afforded them constant practice in

military matters, and that experience which is learnt in the school of

danger.

The policy of Lacedaemon was not to exact tribute from her allies, but

merely to secure their subservience to her interests by establishing

oligarchies among them; Athens, on the contrary, had by degrees

deprived hers of their ships, and imposed instead contributions in

money on all except Chios and Lesbos. Both found their resources for

this war separately to exceed the sum of their strength when the

alliance flourished intact.

Having now given the result of my inquiries into early times, I grant

that there will be a difficulty in believing every particular detail.

The way that most men deal with traditions, even traditions of their

own country, is to receive them all alike as they are delivered,

without applying any critical test whatever. The general Athenian

public fancy that Hipparchus was tyrant when he fell by the hands of

Harmodius and Aristogiton, not knowing that Hippias, the eldest of the

sons of Pisistratus, was really supreme, and that Hipparchus and

Thessalus were his brothers; and that Harmodius and Aristogiton

suspecting, on the very day, nay at the very moment fixed on for the

deed, that information had been conveyed to Hippias by their

accomplices, concluded that he had been warned, and did not attack him,

yet, not liking to be apprehended and risk their lives for nothing,

fell upon Hipparchus near the temple of the daughters of Leos, and slew

him as he was arranging the Panathenaic procession.

There are many other unfounded ideas current among the rest of the

Hellenes, even on matters of contemporary history, which have not been

obscured by time. For instance, there is the notion that the

Lacedaemonian kings have two votes each, the fact being that they have

only one; and that there is a company of Pitane, there being simply no

such thing. So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of

truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand. On the

whole, however, the conclusions I have drawn from the proofs quoted

may, I believe, safely be relied on. Assuredly they will not be

disturbed either by the lays of a poet displaying the exaggeration of

his craft, or by the compositions of the chroniclers that are

attractive at truth’s expense; the subjects they treat of being out of

the reach of evidence, and time having robbed most of them of

historical value by enthroning them in the region of legend. Turning

from these, we can rest satisfied with having proceeded upon the

clearest data, and having arrived at conclusions as exact as can be

expected in matters of such antiquity. To come to this war: despite the

known disposition of the actors in a struggle to overrate its

importance, and when it is over to return to their admiration of

earlier events, yet an examination of the facts will show that it was

much greater than the wars which preceded it.

With reference to the speeches in this history, some were delivered

before the war began, others while it was going on; some I heard

myself, others I got from various quarters; it was in all cases

difficult to carry them word for word in one’s memory, so my habit has

been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of them

by the various occasions, of course adhering as closely as possible to

the general sense of what they really said. And with reference to the

narrative of events, far from permitting myself to derive it from the

first source that came to hand, I did not even trust my own

impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what

others saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the

most severe and detailed tests possible. My conclusions have cost me

some labour from the want of coincidence between accounts of the same

occurrences by different eye-witnesses, arising sometimes from

imperfect memory, sometimes from undue partiality for one side or the

other. The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract

somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those

inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the

interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must

resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content. In fine, I have

written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the

moment, but as a possession for all time.

The Median War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found a

speedy decision in two actions by sea and two by land. The

Peloponnesian War was prolonged to an immense length, and, long as it

was, it was short without parallel for the misfortunes that it brought

upon Hellas. Never had so many cities been taken and laid desolate,

here by the barbarians, here by the parties contending (the old

inhabitants being sometimes removed to make room for others); never was

there so much banishing and blood-shedding, now on the field of battle,

now in the strife of faction. Old stories of occurrences handed down by

tradition, but scantily confirmed by experience, suddenly ceased to be

incredible; there were earthquakes of unparalleled extent and violence;

eclipses of the sun occurred with a frequency unrecorded in previous

history; there were great droughts in sundry places and consequent

famines, and that most calamitous and awfully fatal visitation, the

plague. All this came upon them with the late war, which was begun by

the Athenians and Peloponnesians by the dissolution of the thirty

years’ truce made after the conquest of Euboea. To the question why

they broke the treaty, I answer by placing first an account of their

grounds of complaint and points of difference, that no one may ever

have to ask the immediate cause which plunged the Hellenes into a war

of such magnitude. The real cause I consider to be the one which was

formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and

the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable. Still

it is well to give the grounds alleged by either side which led to the

dissolution of the treaty and the breaking out of the war.

CHAPTER II

Causes of the War—The Affair of Epidamnus—The Affair of Potidæa

The city of Epidamnus stands on the right of the entrance of the Ionic

Gulf. Its vicinity is inhabited by the Taulantians, an Illyrian people.

The place is a colony from Corcyra, founded by Phalius, son of

Eratocleides, of the family of the Heraclids, who had according to

ancient usage been summoned for the purpose from Corinth, the mother

country. The colonists were joined by some Corinthians, and others of

the Dorian race. Now, as time went on, the city of Epidamnus became

great and populous; but falling a prey to factions arising, it is said,

from a war with her neighbours the barbarians, she became much

enfeebled, and lost a considerable amount of her power. The last act

before the war was the expulsion of the nobles by the people. The

exiled party joined the barbarians, and proceeded to plunder those in

the city by sea and land; and the Epidamnians, finding themselves hard

pressed, sent ambassadors to Corcyra beseeching their mother country

not to allow them to perish, but to make up matters between them and

the exiles, and to rid them of the war with the barbarians. The

ambassadors seated themselves in the temple of Hera as suppliants, and

made the above requests to the Corcyraeans. But the Corcyraeans refused

to accept their supplication, and they were dismissed without having

effected anything.

When the Epidamnians found that no help could be expected from Corcyra,

they were in a strait what to do next. So they sent to Delphi and

inquired of the God whether they should deliver their city to the

Corinthians and endeavour to obtain some assistance from their

founders. The answer he gave them was to deliver the city and place

themselves under Corinthian protection. So the Epidamnians went to

Corinth and delivered over the colony in obedience to the commands of

the oracle. They showed that their founder came from Corinth, and

revealed the answer of the god; and they begged them not to allow them

to perish, but to assist them. This the Corinthians consented to do.

Believing the colony to belong as much to themselves as to the

Corcyraeans, they felt it to be a kind of duty to undertake their

protection. Besides, they hated the Corcyraeans for their contempt of

the mother country. Instead of meeting with the usual honours accorded

to the parent city by every other colony at public assemblies, such as

precedence at sacrifices, Corinth found herself treated with contempt

by a power which in point of wealth could stand comparison with any

even of the richest communities in Hellas, which possessed great

military strength, and which sometimes could not repress a pride in the

high naval position of an island whose nautical renown dated from the

days of its old inhabitants, the Phaeacians. This was one reason of the

care that they lavished on their fleet, which became very efficient;

indeed they began the war with a force of a hundred and twenty galleys.

All these grievances made Corinth eager to send the promised aid to

Epidamnus. Advertisement was made for volunteer settlers, and a force

of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Corinthians was dispatched. They marched

by land to Apollonia, a Corinthian colony, the route by sea being

avoided from fear of Corcyraean interruption. When the Corcyraeans

heard of the arrival of the settlers and troops in Epidamnus, and the

surrender of the colony to Corinth, they took fire. Instantly putting

to sea with five-and-twenty ships, which were quickly followed by

others, they insolently commanded the Epidamnians to receive back the

banished nobles—(it must be premised that the Epidamnian exiles had

come to Corcyra and, pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors, had

appealed to their kindred to restore them)—and to dismiss the

Corinthian garrison and settlers. But to all this the Epidamnians

turned a deaf ear. Upon this the Corcyraeans commenced operations

against them with a fleet of forty sail. They took with them the

exiles, with a view to their restoration, and also secured the services

of the Illyrians. Sitting down before the city, they issued a

proclamation to the effect that any of the natives that chose, and the

foreigners, might depart unharmed, with the alternative of being

treated as enemies. On their refusal the Corcyraeans proceeded to

besiege the city, which stands on an isthmus; and the Corinthians,

receiving intelligence of the investment of Epidamnus, got together an

armament and proclaimed a colony to Epidamnus, perfect political

equality being guaranteed to all who chose to go. Any who were not

prepared to sail at once might, by paying down the sum of fifty

Corinthian drachmae, have a share in the colony without leaving

Corinth. Great numbers took advantage of this proclamation, some being

ready to start directly, others paying the requisite forfeit. In case

of their passage being disputed by the Corcyraeans, several cities were

asked to lend them a convoy. Megara prepared to accompany them with

eight ships, Pale in Cephallonia with four; Epidaurus furnished five,

Hermione one, Troezen two, Leucas ten, and Ambracia eight. The Thebans

and Phliasians were asked for money, the Eleans for hulls as well;

while Corinth herself furnished thirty ships and three thousand heavy

infantry.

When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations they came to Corinth

with envoys from Lacedaemon and Sicyon, whom they persuaded to

accompany them, and bade her recall the garrison and settlers, as she

had nothing to do with Epidamnus. If, however, she had any claims to

make, they were willing to submit the matter to the arbitration of such

of the cities in Peloponnese as should be chosen by mutual agreement,

and that the colony should remain with the city to whom the arbitrators

might assign it. They were also willing to refer the matter to the

oracle at Delphi. If, in defiance of their protestations, war was

appealed to, they should be themselves compelled by this violence to

seek friends in quarters where they had no desire to seek them, and to

make even old ties give way to the necessity of assistance. The answer

they got from Corinth was that, if they would withdraw their fleet and

the barbarians from Epidamnus, negotiation might be possible; but,

while the town was still being besieged, going before arbitrators was

out of the question. The Corcyraeans retorted that if Corinth would

withdraw her troops from Epidamnus they would withdraw theirs, or they

were ready to let both parties remain in statu quo, an armistice being

concluded till judgment could be given.

Turning a deaf ear to all these proposals, when their ships were manned

and their allies had come in, the Corinthians sent a herald before them

to declare war and, getting under way with seventy-five ships and two

thousand heavy infantry, sailed for Epidamnus to give battle to the

Corcyraeans. The fleet was under the command of Aristeus, son of

Pellichas, Callicrates, son of Callias, and Timanor, son of Timanthes;

the troops under that of Archetimus, son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas,

son of Isarchus. When they had reached Actium in the territory of

Anactorium, at the mouth of the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia, where

the temple of Apollo stands, the Corcyraeans sent on a herald in a

light boat to warn them not to sail against them. Meanwhile they

proceeded to man their ships, all of which had been equipped for

action, the old vessels being undergirded to make them seaworthy. On

the return of the herald without any peaceful answer from the

Corinthians, their ships being now manned, they put out to sea to meet

the enemy with a fleet of eighty sail (forty were engaged in the siege

of Epidamnus), formed line, and went into action, and gained a decisive

victory, and destroyed fifteen of the Corinthian vessels. The same day

had seen Epidamnus compelled by its besiegers to capitulate; the

conditions being that the foreigners should be sold, and the

Corinthians kept as prisoners of war, till their fate should be

otherwise decided.

After the engagement the Corcyraeans set up a trophy on Leukimme, a

headland of Corcyra, and slew all their captives except the

Corinthians, whom they kept as prisoners of war. Defeated at sea, the

Corinthians and their allies repaired home, and left the Corcyraeans

masters of all the sea about those parts. Sailing to Leucas, a

Corinthian colony, they ravaged their territory, and burnt Cyllene, the

harbour of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money to

Corinth. For almost the whole of the period that followed the battle

they remained masters of the sea, and the allies of Corinth were

harassed by Corcyraean cruisers. At last Corinth, roused by the

sufferings of her allies, sent out ships and troops in the fall of the

summer, who formed an encampment at Actium and about Chimerium, in

Thesprotis, for the protection of Leucas and the rest of the friendly

cities. The Corcyraeans on their part formed a similar station on

Leukimme. Neither party made any movement, but they remained

confronting each other till the end of the summer, and winter was at

hand before either of them returned home.

Corinth, exasperated by the war with the Corcyraeans, spent the whole

of the year after the engagement and that succeeding it in building

ships, and in straining every nerve to form an efficient fleet; rowers

being drawn from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas by the inducement

of large bounties. The Corcyraeans, alarmed at the news of their

preparations, being without a single ally in Hellas (for they had not

enrolled themselves either in the Athenian or in the Lacedaemonian

confederacy), decided to repair to Athens in order to enter into

alliance and to endeavour to procure support from her. Corinth also,

hearing of their intentions, sent an embassy to Athens to prevent the

Corcyraean navy being joined by the Athenian, and her prospect of

ordering the war according to her wishes being thus impeded. An

assembly was convoked, and the rival advocates appeared: the

Corcyraeans spoke as follows:

“Athenians! when a people that have not rendered any important service

or support to their neighbours in times past, for which they might

claim to be repaid, appear before them as we now appear before you to

solicit their assistance, they may fairly be required to satisfy

certain preliminary conditions. They should show, first, that it is

expedient or at least safe to grant their request; next, that they will

retain a lasting sense of the kindness. But if they cannot clearly

establish any of these points, they must not be annoyed if they meet

with a rebuff. Now the Corcyraeans believe that with their petition for

assistance they can also give you a satisfactory answer on these

points, and they have therefore dispatched us hither. It has so

happened that our policy as regards you with respect to this request,

turns out to be inconsistent, and as regards our interests, to be at

the present crisis inexpedient. We say inconsistent, because a power

which has never in the whole of her past history been willing to ally

herself with any of her neighbours, is now found asking them to ally

themselves with her. And we say inexpedient, because in our present war

with Corinth it has left us in a position of entire isolation, and what

once seemed the wise precaution of refusing to involve ourselves in

alliances with other powers, lest we should also involve ourselves in

risks of their choosing, has now proved to be folly and weakness. It is

true that in the late naval engagement we drove back the Corinthians

from our shores single-handed. But they have now got together a still

larger armament from Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas; and we, seeing

our utter inability to cope with them without foreign aid, and the

magnitude of the danger which subjection to them implies, find it

necessary to ask help from you and from every other power. And we hope

to be excused if we forswear our old principle of complete political

isolation, a principle which was not adopted with any sinister

intention, but was rather the consequence of an error in judgment.

“Now there are many reasons why in the event of your compliance you

will congratulate yourselves on this request having been made to you.

First, because your assistance will be rendered to a power which,

herself inoffensive, is a victim to the injustice of others. Secondly,

because all that we most value is at stake in the present contest, and

your welcome of us under these circumstances will be a proof of

goodwill which will ever keep alive the gratitude you will lay up in

our hearts. Thirdly, yourselves excepted, we are the greatest naval

power in Hellas. Moreover, can you conceive a stroke of good fortune

more rare in itself, or more disheartening to your enemies, than that

the power whose adhesion you would have valued above much material and

moral strength should present herself self-invited, should deliver

herself into your hands without danger and without expense, and should

lastly put you in the way of gaining a high character in the eyes of

the world, the gratitude of those whom you shall assist, and a great

accession of strength for yourselves? You may search all history

without finding many instances of a people gaining all these advantages

at once, or many instances of a power that comes in quest of assistance

being in a position to give to the people whose alliance she solicits

as much safety and honour as she will receive. But it will be urged

that it is only in the case of a war that we shall be found useful. To

this we answer that if any of you imagine that that war is far off, he

is grievously mistaken, and is blind to the fact that Lacedaemon

regards you with jealousy and desires war, and that Corinth is powerful

there—the same, remember, that is your enemy, and is even now trying to

subdue us as a preliminary to attacking you. And this she does to

prevent our becoming united by a common enmity, and her having us both

on her hands, and also to ensure getting the start of you in one of two

ways, either by crippling our power or by making its strength her own.

Now it is our policy to be beforehand with her—that is, for Corcyra to

make an offer of alliance and for you to accept it; in fact, we ought

to form plans against her instead of waiting to defeat the plans she

forms against us.

“If she asserts that for you to receive a colony of hers into alliance

is not right, let her know that every colony that is well treated

honours its parent state, but becomes estranged from it by injustice.

For colonists are not sent forth on the understanding that they are to

be the slaves of those that remain behind, but that they are to be

their equals. And that Corinth was injuring us is clear. Invited to

refer the dispute about Epidamnus to arbitration, they chose to

prosecute their complaints war rather than by a fair trial. And let

their conduct towards us who are their kindred be a warning to you not

to be misled by their deceit, nor to yield to their direct requests;

concessions to adversaries only end in self-reproach, and the more

strictly they are avoided the greater will be the chance of security.

“If it be urged that your reception of us will be a breach of the

treaty existing between you and Lacedaemon, the answer is that we are a

neutral state, and that one of the express provisions of that treaty is

that it shall be competent for any Hellenic state that is neutral to

join whichever side it pleases. And it is intolerable for Corinth to be

allowed to obtain men for her navy not only from her allies, but also

from the rest of Hellas, no small number being furnished by your own

subjects; while we are to be excluded both from the alliance left open

to us by treaty, and from any assistance that we might get from other

quarters, and you are to be accused of political immorality if you

comply with our request. On the other hand, we shall have much greater

cause to complain of you, if you do not comply with it; if we, who are

in peril and are no enemies of yours, meet with a repulse at your

hands, while Corinth, who is the aggressor and your enemy, not only

meets with no hindrance from you, but is even allowed to draw material

for war from your dependencies. This ought not to be, but you should

either forbid her enlisting men in your dominions, or you should lend

us too what help you may think advisable.

“But your real policy is to afford us avowed countenance and support.

The advantages of this course, as we premised in the beginning of our

speech, are many. We mention one that is perhaps the chief. Could there

be a clearer guarantee of our good faith than is offered by the fact

that the power which is at enmity with you is also at enmity with us,

and that that power is fully able to punish defection? And there is a

wide difference between declining the alliance of an inland and of a

maritime power. For your first endeavour should be to prevent, if

possible, the existence of any naval power except your own; failing

this, to secure the friendship of the strongest that does exist. And if

any of you believe that what we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon

this belief, lest it should lead to a breach of the treaty, you must

remember that on the one hand, whatever your fears, your strength will

be formidable to your antagonists; on the other, whatever the

confidence you derive from refusing to receive us, your weakness will

have no terrors for a strong enemy. You must also remember that your

decision is for Athens no less than Corcyra, and that you are not

making the best provision for her interests, if at a time when you are

anxiously scanning the horizon that you may be in readiness for the

breaking out of the war which is all but upon you, you hesitate to

attach to your side a place whose adhesion or estrangement is alike

pregnant with the most vital consequences. For it lies conveniently for

the coast-navigation in the direction of Italy and Sicily, being able

to bar the passage of naval reinforcements from thence to Peloponnese,

and from Peloponnese thither; and it is in other respects a most

desirable station. To sum up as shortly as possible, embracing both

general and particular considerations, let this show you the folly of

sacrificing us. Remember that there are but three considerable naval

powers in Hellas—Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth—and that if you allow two

of these three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for herself, you

will have to hold the sea against the united fleets of Corcyra and

Peloponnese. But if you receive us, you will have our ships to

reinforce you in the struggle.”

Such were the words of the Corcyraeans. After they had finished, the

Corinthians spoke as follows:

“These Corcyraeans in the speech we have just heard do not confine

themselves to the question of their reception into your alliance. They

also talk of our being guilty of injustice, and their being the victims

of an unjustifiable war. It becomes necessary for us to touch upon both

these points before we proceed to the rest of what we have to say, that

you may have a more correct idea of the grounds of our claim, and have

good cause to reject their petition. According to them, their old

policy of refusing all offers of alliance was a policy of moderation.

It was in fact adopted for bad ends, not for good; indeed their conduct

is such as to make them by no means desirous of having allies present

to witness it, or of having the shame of asking their concurrence.

Besides, their geographical situation makes them independent of others,

and consequently the decision in cases where they injure any lies not

with judges appointed by mutual agreement, but with themselves,

because, while they seldom make voyages to their neighbours, they are

constantly being visited by foreign vessels which are compelled to put

in to Corcyra. In short, the object that they propose to themselves, in

their specious policy of complete isolation, is not to avoid sharing in

the crimes of others, but to secure monopoly of crime to themselves—the

licence of outrage wherever they can compel, of fraud wherever they can

elude, and the enjoyment of their gains without shame. And yet if they

were the honest men they pretend to be, the less hold that others had

upon them, the stronger would be the light in which they might have put

their honesty by giving and taking what was just.

“But such has not been their conduct either towards others or towards

us. The attitude of our colony towards us has always been one of

estrangement and is now one of hostility; for, say they: ‘We were not

sent out to be ill-treated.’ We rejoin that we did not found the colony

to be insulted by them, but to be their head and to be regarded with a

proper respect. At any rate our other colonies honour us, and we are

much beloved by our colonists; and clearly, if the majority are

satisfied with us, these can have no good reason for a dissatisfaction

in which they stand alone, and we are not acting improperly in making

war against them, nor are we making war against them without having

received signal provocation. Besides, if we were in the wrong, it would

be honourable in them to give way to our wishes, and disgraceful for us

to trample on their moderation; but in the pride and licence of wealth

they have sinned again and again against us, and never more deeply than

when Epidamnus, our dependency, which they took no steps to claim in

its distress upon our coming to relieve it, was by them seized, and is

now held by force of arms.

“As to their allegation that they wished the question to be first

submitted to arbitration, it is obvious that a challenge coming from

the party who is safe in a commanding position cannot gain the credit

due only to him who, before appealing to arms, in deeds as well as

words, places himself on a level with his adversary. In their case, it

was not before they laid siege to the place, but after they at length

understood that we should not tamely suffer it, that they thought of

the specious word arbitration. And not satisfied with their own

misconduct there, they appear here now requiring you to join with them

not in alliance but in crime, and to receive them in spite of their

being at enmity with us. But it was when they stood firmest that they

should have made overtures to you, and not at a time when we have been

wronged and they are in peril; nor yet at a time when you will be

admitting to a share in your protection those who never admitted you to

a share in their power, and will be incurring an equal amount of blame

from us with those in whose offences you had no hand. No, they should

have shared their power with you before they asked you to share your

fortunes with them.

“So then the reality of the grievances we come to complain of, and the

violence and rapacity of our opponents, have both been proved. But that

you cannot equitably receive them, this you have still to learn. It may

be true that one of the provisions of the treaty is that it shall be

competent for any state, whose name was not down on the list, to join

whichever side it pleases. But this agreement is not meant for those

whose object in joining is the injury of other powers, but for those

whose need of support does not arise from the fact of defection, and

whose adhesion will not bring to the power that is mad enough to

receive them war instead of peace; which will be the case with you, if

you refuse to listen to us. For you cannot become their auxiliary and

remain our friend; if you join in their attack, you must share the

punishment which the defenders inflict on them. And yet you have the

best possible right to be neutral, or, failing this, you should on the

contrary join us against them. Corinth is at least in treaty with you;

with Corcyra you were never even in truce. But do not lay down the

principle that defection is to be patronized. Did we on the defection

of the Samians record our vote against you, when the rest of the

Peloponnesian powers were equally divided on the question whether they

should assist them? No, we told them to their face that every power has

a right to punish its own allies. Why, if you make it your policy to

receive and assist all offenders, you will find that just as many of

your dependencies will come over to us, and the principle that you

establish will press less heavily on us than on yourselves.

“This then is what Hellenic law entitles us to demand as a right. But

we have also advice to offer and claims on your gratitude, which, since

there is no danger of our injuring you, as we are not enemies, and

since our friendship does not amount to very frequent intercourse, we

say ought to be liquidated at the present juncture. When you were in

want of ships of war for the war against the Aeginetans, before the

Persian invasion, Corinth supplied you with twenty vessels. That good

turn, and the line we took on the Samian question, when we were the

cause of the Peloponnesians refusing to assist them, enabled you to

conquer Aegina and to punish Samos. And we acted thus at crises when,

if ever, men are wont in their efforts against their enemies to forget

everything for the sake of victory, regarding him who assists them then

as a friend, even if thus far he has been a foe, and him who opposes

them then as a foe, even if he has thus far been a friend; indeed they

allow their real interests to suffer from their absorbing preoccupation

in the struggle.

“Weigh well these considerations, and let your youth learn what they

are from their elders, and let them determine to do unto us as we have

done unto you. And let them not acknowledge the justice of what we say,

but dispute its wisdom in the contingency of war. Not only is the

straightest path generally speaking the wisest; but the coming of the

war, which the Corcyraeans have used as a bugbear to persuade you to do

wrong, is still uncertain, and it is not worth while to be carried away

by it into gaining the instant and declared enmity of Corinth. It were,

rather, wise to try and counteract the unfavourable impression which

your conduct to Megara has created. For kindness opportunely shown has

a greater power of removing old grievances than the facts of the case

may warrant. And do not be seduced by the prospect of a great naval

alliance. Abstinence from all injustice to other first-rate powers is a

greater tower of strength than anything that can be gained by the

sacrifice of permanent tranquillity for an apparent temporary

advantage. It is now our turn to benefit by the principle that we laid

down at Lacedaemon, that every power has a right to punish her own

allies. We now claim to receive the same from you, and protest against

your rewarding us for benefiting you by our vote by injuring us by

yours. On the contrary, return us like for like, remembering that this

is that very crisis in which he who lends aid is most a friend, and he

who opposes is most a foe. And for these Corcyraeans—neither receive

them into alliance in our despite, nor be their abettors in crime. So

do, and you will act as we have a right to expect of you, and at the

same time best consult your own interests.”

Such were the words of the Corinthians.

When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held. In the

first there was a manifest disposition to listen to the representations

of Corinth; in the second, public feeling had changed and an alliance

with Corcyra was decided on, with certain reservations. It was to be a

defensive, not an offensive alliance. It did not involve a breach of

the treaty with Peloponnese: Athens could not be required to join

Corcyra in any attack upon Corinth. But each of the contracting parties

had a right to the other’s assistance against invasion, whether of his

own territory or that of an ally. For it began now to be felt that the

coming of the Peloponnesian war was only a question of time, and no one

was willing to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyra

sacrificed to Corinth; though if they could let them weaken each other

by mutual conflict, it would be no bad preparation for the struggle

which Athens might one day have to wage with Corinth and the other

naval powers. At the same time the island seemed to lie conveniently on

the coasting passage to Italy and Sicily. With these views, Athens

received Corcyra into alliance and, on the departure of the Corinthians

not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their assistance. They were

commanded by Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus, the son of

Strombichus, and Proteas, the son of Epicles. Their instructions were

to avoid collision with the Corinthian fleet except under certain

circumstances. If it sailed to Corcyra and threatened a landing on her

coast, or in any of her possessions, they were to do their utmost to

prevent it. These instructions were prompted by an anxiety to avoid a

breach of the treaty.

Meanwhile the Corinthians completed their preparations, and sailed for

Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships. Of these Elis furnished ten,

Megara twelve, Leucas ten, Ambracia twenty-seven, Anactorium one, and

Corinth herself ninety. Each of these contingents had its own admiral,

the Corinthian being under the command of Xenoclides, son of Euthycles,

with four colleagues. Sailing from Leucas, they made land at the part

of the continent opposite Corcyra. They anchored in the harbour of

Chimerium, in the territory of Thesprotis, above which, at some

distance from the sea, lies the city of Ephyre, in the Elean district.

By this city the Acherusian lake pours its waters into the sea. It gets

its name from the river Acheron, which flows through Thesprotis and

falls into the lake. There also the river Thyamis flows, forming the

boundary between Thesprotis and Kestrine; and between these rivers

rises the point of Chimerium. In this part of the continent the

Corinthians now came to anchor, and formed an encampment. When the

Corcyraeans saw them coming, they manned a hundred and ten ships,

commanded by Meikiades, Aisimides, and Eurybatus, and stationed

themselves at one of the Sybota isles; the ten Athenian ships being

present. On Point Leukimme they posted their land forces, and a

thousand heavy infantry who had come from Zacynthus to their

assistance. Nor were the Corinthians on the mainland without their

allies. The barbarians flocked in large numbers to their assistance,

the inhabitants of this part of the continent being old allies of

theirs.

When the Corinthian preparations were completed, they took three days’

provisions and put out from Chimerium by night, ready for action.

Sailing with the dawn, they sighted the Corcyraean fleet out at sea and

coming towards them. When they perceived each other, both sides formed

in order of battle. On the Corcyraean right wing lay the Athenian

ships, the rest of the line being occupied by their own vessels formed

in three squadrons, each of which was commanded by one of the three

admirals. Such was the Corcyraean formation. The Corinthian was as

follows: on the right wing lay the Megarian and Ambraciot ships, in the

centre the rest of the allies in order. But the left was composed of

the best sailers in the Corinthian navy, to encounter the Athenians and

the right wing of the Corcyraeans. As soon as the signals were raised

on either side, they joined battle. Both sides had a large number of

heavy infantry on their decks, and a large number of archers and

darters, the old imperfect armament still prevailing. The sea-fight was

an obstinate one, though not remarkable for its science; indeed it was

more like a battle by land. Whenever they charged each other, the

multitude and crush of the vessels made it by no means easy to get

loose; besides, their hopes of victory lay principally in the heavy

infantry on the decks, who stood and fought in order, the ships

remaining stationary. The manoeuvre of breaking the line was not tried;

in short, strength and pluck had more share in the fight than science.

Everywhere tumult reigned, the battle being one scene of confusion;

meanwhile the Athenian ships, by coming up to the Corcyraeans whenever

they were pressed, served to alarm the enemy, though their commanders

could not join in the battle from fear of their instructions. The right

wing of the Corinthians suffered most. The Corcyraeans routed it, and

chased them in disorder to the continent with twenty ships, sailed up

to their camp, and burnt the tents which they found empty, and

plundered the stuff. So in this quarter the Corinthians and their

allies were defeated, and the Corcyraeans were victorious. But where

the Corinthians themselves were, on the left, they gained a decided

success; the scanty forces of the Corcyraeans being further weakened by

the want of the twenty ships absent on the pursuit. Seeing the

Corcyraeans hard pressed, the Athenians began at length to assist them

more unequivocally. At first, it is true, they refrained from charging

any ships; but when the rout was becoming patent, and the Corinthians

were pressing on, the time at last came when every one set to, and all

distinction was laid aside, and it came to this point, that the

Corinthians and Athenians raised their hands against each other.

After the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing themselves in

lashing fast and hauling after them the hulls of the vessels which they

had disabled, turned their attention to the men, whom they butchered as

they sailed through, not caring so much to make prisoners. Some even of

their own friends were slain by them, by mistake, in their ignorance of

the defeat of the right wing For the number of the ships on both sides,

and the distance to which they covered the sea, made it difficult,

after they had once joined, to distinguish between the conquering and

the conquered; this battle proving far greater than any before it, any

at least between Hellenes, for the number of vessels engaged. After the

Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the land, they turned to the

wrecks and their dead, most of whom they succeeded in getting hold of

and conveying to Sybota, the rendezvous of the land forces furnished by

their barbarian allies. Sybota, it must be known, is a desert harbour

of Thesprotis. This task over, they mustered anew, and sailed against

the Corcyraeans, who on their part advanced to meet them with all their

ships that were fit for service and remaining to them, accompanied by

the Athenian vessels, fearing that they might attempt a landing in

their territory. It was by this time getting late, and the paean had

been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back

water. They had observed twenty Athenian ships sailing up, which had

been sent out afterwards to reinforce the ten vessels by the Athenians,

who feared, as it turned out justly, the defeat of the Corcyraeans and

the inability of their handful of ships to protect them. These ships

were thus seen by the Corinthians first. They suspected that they were

from Athens, and that those which they saw were not all, but that there

were more behind; they accordingly began to retire. The Corcyraeans

meanwhile had not sighted them, as they were advancing from a point

which they could not so well see, and were wondering why the

Corinthians were backing water, when some caught sight of them, and

cried out that there were ships in sight ahead. Upon this they also

retired; for it was now getting dark, and the retreat of the

Corinthians had suspended hostilities. Thus they parted from each

other, and the battle ceased with night. The Corcyraeans were in their

camp at Leukimme, when these twenty ships from Athens, under the

command of Glaucon, the son of Leagrus, and Andocides, son of Leogoras,

bore on through the corpses and the wrecks, and sailed up to the camp,

not long after they were sighted. It was now night, and the Corcyraeans

feared that they might be hostile vessels; but they soon knew them, and

the ships came to anchor.

The next day the thirty Athenian vessels put out to sea, accompanied by

all the Corcyraean ships that were seaworthy, and sailed to the harbour

at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay, to see if they would engage. The

Corinthians put out from the land and formed a line in the open sea,

but beyond this made no further movement, having no intention of

assuming the offensive. For they saw reinforcements arrived fresh from

Athens, and themselves confronted by numerous difficulties, such as the

necessity of guarding the prisoners whom they had on board and the want

of all means of refitting their ships in a desert place. What they were

thinking more about was how their voyage home was to be effected; they

feared that the Athenians might consider that the treaty was dissolved

by the collision which had occurred, and forbid their departure.

Accordingly they resolved to put some men on board a boat, and send

them without a herald’s wand to the Athenians, as an experiment. Having

done so, they spoke as follows: “You do wrong, Athenians, to begin war

and break the treaty. Engaged in chastising our enemies, we find you

placing yourselves in our path in arms against us. Now if your

intentions are to prevent us sailing to Corcyra, or anywhere else that

we may wish, and if you are for breaking the treaty, first take us that

are here and treat us as enemies.” Such was what they said, and all the

Corcyraean armament that were within hearing immediately called out to

take them and kill them. But the Athenians answered as follows:

“Neither are we beginning war, Peloponnesians, nor are we breaking the

treaty; but these Corcyraeans are our allies, and we are come to help

them. So if you want to sail anywhere else, we place no obstacle in

your way; but if you are going to sail against Corcyra, or any of her

possessions, we shall do our best to stop you.”

Receiving this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians commenced

preparations for their voyage home, and set up a trophy in Sybota, on

the continent; while the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead that

had been carried out to them by the current, and by a wind which rose

in the night and scattered them in all directions, and set up their

trophy in Sybota, on the island, as victors. The reasons each side had

for claiming the victory were these. The Corinthians had been

victorious in the sea-fight until night; and having thus been enabled

to carry off most wrecks and dead, they were in possession of no fewer

than a thousand prisoners of war, and had sunk close upon seventy

vessels. The Corcyraeans had destroyed about thirty ships, and after

the arrival of the Athenians had taken up the wrecks and dead on their

side; they had besides seen the Corinthians retire before them, backing

water on sight of the Athenian vessels, and upon the arrival of the

Athenians refuse to sail out against them from Sybota. Thus both sides

claimed the victory.

The Corinthians on the voyage home took Anactorium, which stands at the

mouth of the Ambracian gulf. The place was taken by treachery, being

common ground to the Corcyraeans and Corinthians. After establishing

Corinthian settlers there, they retired home. Eight hundred of the

Corcyraeans were slaves; these they sold; two hundred and fifty they

retained in captivity, and treated with great attention, in the hope

that they might bring over their country to Corinth on their return;

most of them being, as it happened, men of very high position in

Corcyra. In this way Corcyra maintained her political existence in the

war with Corinth, and the Athenian vessels left the island. This was

the first cause of the war that Corinth had against the Athenians,

viz., that they had fought against them with the Corcyraeans in time of

treaty.

Almost immediately after this, fresh differences arose between the

Athenians and Peloponnesians, and contributed their share to the war.

Corinth was forming schemes for retaliation, and Athens suspected her

hostility. The Potidæans, who inhabit the isthmus of Pallene, being a

Corinthian colony, but tributary allies of Athens, were ordered to raze

the wall looking towards Pallene, to give hostages, to dismiss the

Corinthian magistrates, and in future not to receive the persons sent

from Corinth annually to succeed them. It was feared that they might be

persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians to revolt, and might draw

the rest of the allies in the direction of Thrace to revolt with them.

These precautions against the Potidæans were taken by the Athenians

immediately after the battle at Corcyra. Not only was Corinth at length

openly hostile, but Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of the

Macedonians, had from an old friend and ally been made an enemy. He had

been made an enemy by the Athenians entering into alliance with his

brother Philip and Derdas, who were in league against him. In his alarm

he had sent to Lacedaemon to try and involve the Athenians in a war

with the Peloponnesians, and was endeavouring to win over Corinth in

order to bring about the revolt of Potidæa. He also made overtures to

the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace, and to the Bottiaeans, to

persuade them to join in the revolt; for he thought that if these

places on the border could be made his allies, it would be easier to

carry on the war with their co-operation. Alive to all this, and

wishing to anticipate the revolt of the cities, the Athenians acted as

follows. They were just then sending off thirty ships and a thousand

heavy infantry for his country under the command of Archestratus, son

of Lycomedes, with four colleagues. They instructed the captains to

take hostages of the Potidæans, to raze the wall, and to be on their

guard against the revolt of the neighbouring cities.

Meanwhile the Potidæans sent envoys to Athens on the chance of

persuading them to take no new steps in their matters; they also went

to Lacedaemon with the Corinthians to secure support in case of need.

Failing after prolonged negotiation to obtain anything satisfactory

from the Athenians; being unable, for all they could say, to prevent

the vessels that were destined for Macedonia from also sailing against

them; and receiving from the Lacedaemonian government a promise to

invade Attica, if the Athenians should attack Potidæa, the Potidæans,

thus favoured by the moment, at last entered into league with the

Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and revolted. And Perdiccas induced the

Chalcidians to abandon and demolish their towns on the seaboard and,

settling inland at Olynthus, to make that one city a strong place:

meanwhile to those who followed his advice he gave a part of his

territory in Mygdonia round Lake Bolbe as a place of abode while the

war against the Athenians should last. They accordingly demolished

their towns, removed inland and prepared for war. The thirty ships of

the Athenians, arriving before the Thracian places, found Potidæa and

the rest in revolt. Their commanders, considering it to be quite

impossible with their present force to carry on war with Perdiccas and

with the confederate towns as well turned to Macedonia, their original

destination, and, having established themselves there, carried on war

in co-operation with Philip, and the brothers of Derdas, who had

invaded the country from the interior.

Meanwhile the Corinthians, with Potidæa in revolt and the Athenian

ships on the coast of Macedonia, alarmed for the safety of the place

and thinking its danger theirs, sent volunteers from Corinth, and

mercenaries from the rest of Peloponnese, to the number of sixteen

hundred heavy infantry in all, and four hundred light troops. Aristeus,

son of Adimantus, who was always a steady friend to the Potidæans, took

command of the expedition, and it was principally for love of him that

most of the men from Corinth volunteered. They arrived in Thrace forty

days after the revolt of Potidæa.

The Athenians also immediately received the news of the revolt of the

cities. On being informed that Aristeus and his reinforcements were on

their way, they sent two thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens

and forty ships against the places in revolt, under the command of

Callias, son of Calliades, and four colleagues. They arrived in

Macedonia first, and found the force of a thousand men that had been

first sent out, just become masters of Therme and besieging Pydna.

Accordingly they also joined in the investment, and besieged Pydna for

a while. Subsequently they came to terms and concluded a forced

alliance with Perdiccas, hastened by the calls of Potidæa and by the

arrival of Aristeus at that place. They withdrew from Macedonia, going

to Beroea and thence to Strepsa, and, after a futile attempt on the

latter place, they pursued by land their march to Potidæa with three

thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens, besides a number of

their allies, and six hundred Macedonian horsemen, the followers of

Philip and Pausanias. With these sailed seventy ships along the coast.

Advancing by short marches, on the third day they arrived at Gigonus,

where they encamped.

Meanwhile the Potidæans and the Peloponnesians with Aristeus were

encamped on the side looking towards Olynthus on the isthmus, in

expectation of the Athenians, and had established their market outside

the city. The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry;

while the command of the cavalry was given to Perdiccas, who had at

once left the alliance of the Athenians and gone back to that of the

Potidæans, having deputed Iolaus as his general: The plan of Aristeus

was to keep his own force on the isthmus, and await the attack of the

Athenians; leaving the Chalcidians and the allies outside the isthmus,

and the two hundred cavalry from Perdiccas in Olynthus to act upon the

Athenian rear, on the occasion of their advancing against him; and thus

to place the enemy between two fires. While Callias the Athenian

general and his colleagues dispatched the Macedonian horse and a few of

the allies to Olynthus, to prevent any movement being made from that

quarter, the Athenians themselves broke up their camp and marched

against Potidæa. After they had arrived at the isthmus, and saw the

enemy preparing for battle, they formed against him, and soon

afterwards engaged. The wing of Aristeus, with the Corinthians and

other picked troops round him, routed the wing opposed to it, and

followed for a considerable distance in pursuit. But the rest of the

army of the Potidæans and of the Peloponnesians was defeated by the

Athenians, and took refuge within the fortifications. Returning from

the pursuit, Aristeus perceived the defeat of the rest of the army.

Being at a loss which of the two risks to choose, whether to go to

Olynthus or to Potidæa, he at last determined to draw his men into as

small a space as possible, and force his way with a run into Potidæa.

Not without difficulty, through a storm of missiles, he passed along by

the breakwater through the sea, and brought off most of his men safe,

though a few were lost. Meanwhile the auxiliaries of the Potidæans from

Olynthus, which is about seven miles off and in sight of Potidæa, when

the battle began and the signals were raised, advanced a little way to

render assistance; and the Macedonian horse formed against them to

prevent it. But on victory speedily declaring for the Athenians and the

signals being taken down, they retired back within the wall; and the

Macedonians returned to the Athenians. Thus there were no cavalry

present on either side. After the battle the Athenians set up a trophy,

and gave back their dead to the Potidæans under truce. The Potidæans

and their allies had close upon three hundred killed; the Athenians a

hundred and fifty of their own citizens, and Callias their general.

The wall on the side of the isthmus had now works at once raised

against it, and manned by the Athenians. That on the side of Pallene

had no works raised against it. They did not think themselves strong

enough at once to keep a garrison in the isthmus and to cross over to

Pallene and raise works there; they were afraid that the Potidæans and

their allies might take advantage of their division to attack them.

Meanwhile the Athenians at home learning that there were no works at

Pallene, some time afterwards sent off sixteen hundred heavy infantry

of their own citizens under the command of Phormio, son of Asopius.

Arrived at Pallene, he fixed his headquarters at Aphytis, and led his

army against Potidæa by short marches, ravaging the country as he

advanced. No one venturing to meet him in the field, he raised works

against the wall on the side of Pallene. So at length Potidæa was

strongly invested on either side, and from the sea by the ships

co-operating in the blockade. Aristeus, seeing its investment complete,

and having no hope of its salvation, except in the event of some

movement from the Peloponnese, or of some other improbable contingency,

advised all except five hundred to watch for a wind and sail out of the

place, in order that their provisions might last the longer. He was

willing to be himself one of those who remained. Unable to persuade

them, and desirous of acting on the next alternative, and of having

things outside in the best posture possible, he eluded the guardships

of the Athenians and sailed out. Remaining among the Chalcidians, he

continued to carry on the war; in particular he laid an ambuscade near

the city of the Sermylians, and cut off many of them; he also

communicated with Peloponnese, and tried to contrive some method by

which help might be brought. Meanwhile, after the completion of the

investment of Potidæa, Phormio next employed his sixteen hundred men in

ravaging Chalcidice and Bottica: some of the towns also were taken by

him.

CHAPTER III

Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Lacedaemon

The Athenians and Peloponnesians had these antecedent grounds of

complaint against each other: the complaint of Corinth was that her

colony of Potidæa, and Corinthian and Peloponnesian citizens within it,

were being besieged; that of Athens against the Peloponnesians that

they had incited a town of hers, a member of her alliance and a

contributor to her revenue, to revolt, and had come and were openly

fighting against her on the side of the Potidæans. For all this, war

had not yet broken out: there was still truce for a while; for this was

a private enterprise on the part of Corinth.

But the siege of Potidæa put an end to her inaction; she had men inside

it: besides, she feared for the place. Immediately summoning the allies

to Lacedaemon, she came and loudly accused Athens of breach of the

treaty and aggression on the rights of Peloponnese. With her, the

Aeginetans, formally unrepresented from fear of Athens, in secret

proved not the least urgent of the advocates for war, asserting that

they had not the independence guaranteed to them by the treaty. After

extending the summons to any of their allies and others who might have

complaints to make of Athenian aggression, the Lacedaemonians held

their ordinary assembly, and invited them to speak. There were many who

came forward and made their several accusations; among them the

Megarians, in a long list of grievances, called special attention to

the fact of their exclusion from the ports of the Athenian empire and

the market of Athens, in defiance of the treaty. Last of all the

Corinthians came forward, and having let those who preceded them

inflame the Lacedaemonians, now followed with a speech to this effect:

“Lacedaemonians! the confidence which you feel in your constitution and

social order, inclines you to receive any reflections of ours on other

powers with a certain scepticism. Hence springs your moderation, but

hence also the rather limited knowledge which you betray in dealing

with foreign politics. Time after time was our voice raised to warn you

of the blows about to be dealt us by Athens, and time after time,

instead of taking the trouble to ascertain the worth of our

communications, you contented yourselves with suspecting the speakers

of being inspired by private interest. And so, instead of calling these

allies together before the blow fell, you have delayed to do so till we

are smarting under it; allies among whom we have not the worst title to

speak, as having the greatest complaints to make, complaints of

Athenian outrage and Lacedaemonian neglect. Now if these assaults on

the rights of Hellas had been made in the dark, you might be

unacquainted with the facts, and it would be our duty to enlighten you.

As it is, long speeches are not needed where you see servitude

accomplished for some of us, meditated for others—in particular for our

allies—and prolonged preparations in the aggressor against the hour of

war. Or what, pray, is the meaning of their reception of Corcyra by

fraud, and their holding it against us by force? what of the siege of

Potidæa?—places one of which lies most conveniently for any action

against the Thracian towns; while the other would have contributed a

very large navy to the Peloponnesians?

“For all this you are responsible. You it was who first allowed them to

fortify their city after the Median war, and afterwards to erect the

long walls—you who, then and now, are always depriving of freedom not

only those whom they have enslaved, but also those who have as yet been

your allies. For the true author of the subjugation of a people is not

so much the immediate agent, as the power which permits it having the

means to prevent it; particularly if that power aspires to the glory of

being the liberator of Hellas. We are at last assembled. It has not

been easy to assemble, nor even now are our objects defined. We ought

not to be still inquiring into the fact of our wrongs, but into the

means of our defence. For the aggressors with matured plans to oppose

to our indecision have cast threats aside and betaken themselves to

action. And we know what are the paths by which Athenian aggression

travels, and how insidious is its progress. A degree of confidence she

may feel from the idea that your bluntness of perception prevents your

noticing her; but it is nothing to the impulse which her advance will

receive from the knowledge that you see, but do not care to interfere.

You, Lacedaemonians, of all the Hellenes are alone inactive, and defend

yourselves not by doing anything but by looking as if you would do

something; you alone wait till the power of an enemy is becoming twice

its original size, instead of crushing it in its infancy. And yet the

world used to say that you were to be depended upon; but in your case,

we fear, it said more than the truth. The Mede, we ourselves know, had

time to come from the ends of the earth to Peloponnese, without any

force of yours worthy of the name advancing to meet him. But this was a

distant enemy. Well, Athens at all events is a near neighbour, and yet

Athens you utterly disregard; against Athens you prefer to act on the

defensive instead of on the offensive, and to make it an affair of

chances by deferring the struggle till she has grown far stronger than

at first. And yet you know that on the whole the rock on which the

barbarian was wrecked was himself, and that if our present enemy Athens

has not again and again annihilated us, we owe it more to her blunders

than to your protection; Indeed, expectations from you have before now

been the ruin of some, whose faith induced them to omit preparation.

“We hope that none of you will consider these words of remonstrance to

be rather words of hostility; men remonstrate with friends who are in

error, accusations they reserve for enemies who have wronged them.

Besides, we consider that we have as good a right as any one to point

out a neighbour’s faults, particularly when we contemplate the great

contrast between the two national characters; a contrast of which, as

far as we can see, you have little perception, having never yet

considered what sort of antagonists you will encounter in the

Athenians, how widely, how absolutely different from yourselves. The

Athenians are addicted to innovation, and their designs are

characterized by swiftness alike in conception and execution; you have

a genius for keeping what you have got, accompanied by a total want of

invention, and when forced to act you never go far enough. Again, they

are adventurous beyond their power, and daring beyond their judgment,

and in danger they are sanguine; your wont is to attempt less than is

justified by your power, to mistrust even what is sanctioned by your

judgment, and to fancy that from danger there is no release. Further,

there is promptitude on their side against procrastination on yours;

they are never at home, you are never from it: for they hope by their

absence to extend their acquisitions, you fear by your advance to

endanger what you have left behind. They are swift to follow up a

success, and slow to recoil from a reverse. Their bodies they spend

ungrudgingly in their country’s cause; their intellect they jealously

husband to be employed in her service. A scheme unexecuted is with them

a positive loss, a successful enterprise a comparative failure. The

deficiency created by the miscarriage of an undertaking is soon filled

up by fresh hopes; for they alone are enabled to call a thing hoped for

a thing got, by the speed with which they act upon their resolutions.

Thus they toil on in trouble and danger all the days of their life,

with little opportunity for enjoying, being ever engaged in getting:

their only idea of a holiday is to do what the occasion demands, and to

them laborious occupation is less of a misfortune than the peace of a

quiet life. To describe their character in a word, one might truly say

that they were born into the world to take no rest themselves and to

give none to others.

“Such is Athens, your antagonist. And yet, Lacedaemonians, you still

delay, and fail to see that peace stays longest with those, who are not

more careful to use their power justly than to show their determination

not to submit to injustice. On the contrary, your ideal of fair dealing

is based on the principle that, if you do not injure others, you need

not risk your own fortunes in preventing others from injuring you. Now

you could scarcely have succeeded in such a policy even with a

neighbour like yourselves; but in the present instance, as we have just

shown, your habits are old-fashioned as compared with theirs. It is the

law as in art, so in politics, that improvements ever prevail; and

though fixed usages may be best for undisturbed communities, constant

necessities of action must be accompanied by the constant improvement

of methods. Thus it happens that the vast experience of Athens has

carried her further than you on the path of innovation.

“Here, at least, let your procrastination end. For the present, assist

your allies and Potidæa in particular, as you promised, by a speedy

invasion of Attica, and do not sacrifice friends and kindred to their

bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to some other

alliance. Such a step would not be condemned either by the Gods who

received our oaths, or by the men who witnessed them. The breach of a

treaty cannot be laid to the people whom desertion compels to seek new

relations, but to the power that fails to assist its confederate. But

if you will only act, we will stand by you; it would be unnatural for

us to change, and never should we meet with such a congenial ally. For

these reasons choose the right course, and endeavour not to let

Peloponnese under your supremacy degenerate from the prestige that it

enjoyed under that of your ancestors.”

Such were the words of the Corinthians. There happened to be Athenian

envoys present at Lacedaemon on other business. On hearing the speeches

they thought themselves called upon to come before the Lacedaemonians.

Their intention was not to offer a defence on any of the charges which

the cities brought against them, but to show on a comprehensive view

that it was not a matter to be hastily decided on, but one that

demanded further consideration. There was also a wish to call attention

to the great power of Athens, and to refresh the memory of the old and

enlighten the ignorance of the young, from a notion that their words

might have the effect of inducing them to prefer tranquillity to war.

So they came to the Lacedaemonians and said that they too, if there was

no objection, wished to speak to their assembly. They replied by

inviting them to come forward. The Athenians advanced, and spoke as

follows:

“The object of our mission here was not to argue with your allies, but

to attend to the matters on which our state dispatched us. However, the

vehemence of the outcry that we hear against us has prevailed on us to

come forward. It is not to combat the accusations of the cities (indeed

you are not the judges before whom either we or they can plead), but to

prevent your taking the wrong course on matters of great importance by

yielding too readily to the persuasions of your allies. We also wish to

show on a review of the whole indictment that we have a fair title to

our possessions, and that our country has claims to consideration. We

need not refer to remote antiquity: there we could appeal to the voice

of tradition, but not to the experience of our audience. But to the

Median War and contemporary history we must refer, although we are

rather tired of continually bringing this subject forward. In our

action during that war we ran great risk to obtain certain advantages:

you had your share in the solid results, do not try to rob us of all

share in the good that the glory may do us. However, the story shall be

told not so much to deprecate hostility as to testify against it, and

to show, if you are so ill advised as to enter into a struggle with

Athens, what sort of an antagonist she is likely to prove. We assert

that at Marathon we were at the front, and faced the barbarian

single-handed. That when he came the second time, unable to cope with

him by land we went on board our ships with all our people, and joined

in the action at Salamis. This prevented his taking the Peloponnesian

states in detail, and ravaging them with his fleet; when the multitude

of his vessels would have made any combination for self-defence

impossible. The best proof of this was furnished by the invader

himself. Defeated at sea, he considered his power to be no longer what

it had been, and retired as speedily as possible with the greater part

of his army.

“Such, then, was the result of the matter, and it was clearly proved

that it was on the fleet of Hellas that her cause depended. Well, to

this result we contributed three very useful elements, viz., the

largest number of ships, the ablest commander, and the most

unhesitating patriotism. Our contingent of ships was little less than

two-thirds of the whole four hundred; the commander was Themistocles,

through whom chiefly it was that the battle took place in the straits,

the acknowledged salvation of our cause. Indeed, this was the reason of

your receiving him with honours such as had never been accorded to any

foreign visitor. While for daring patriotism we had no competitors.

Receiving no reinforcements from behind, seeing everything in front of

us already subjugated, we had the spirit, after abandoning our city,

after sacrificing our property (instead of deserting the remainder of

the league or depriving them of our services by dispersing), to throw

ourselves into our ships and meet the danger, without a thought of

resenting your neglect to assist us. We assert, therefore, that we

conferred on you quite as much as we received. For you had a stake to

fight for; the cities which you had left were still filled with your

homes, and you had the prospect of enjoying them again; and your coming

was prompted quite as much by fear for yourselves as for us; at all

events, you never appeared till we had nothing left to lose. But we

left behind us a city that was a city no longer, and staked our lives

for a city that had an existence only in desperate hope, and so bore

our full share in your deliverance and in ours. But if we had copied

others, and allowed fears for our territory to make us give in our

adhesion to the Mede before you came, or if we had suffered our ruin to

break our spirit and prevent us embarking in our ships, your naval

inferiority would have made a sea-fight unnecessary, and his objects

would have been peaceably attained.

“Surely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism that we displayed at

that crisis, nor by the wisdom of our counsels, do we merit our extreme

unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity for our

empire. That empire we acquired by no violent means, but because you

were unwilling to prosecute to its conclusion the war against the

barbarian, and because the allies attached themselves to us and

spontaneously asked us to assume the command. And the nature of the

case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height;

fear being our principal motive, though honour and interest afterwards

came in. And at last, when almost all hated us, when some had already

revolted and had been subdued, when you had ceased to be the friends

that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, it

appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; especially as all who

left us would fall to you. And no one can quarrel with a people for

making, in matters of tremendous risk, the best provision that it can

for its interest.

“You, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your supremacy to settle

the states in Peloponnese as is agreeable to you. And if at the period

of which we were speaking you had persevered to the end of the matter,

and had incurred hatred in your command, we are sure that you would

have made yourselves just as galling to the allies, and would have been

forced to choose between a strong government and danger to yourselves.

It follows that it was not a very wonderful action, or contrary to the

common practice of mankind, if we did accept an empire that was offered

to us, and refused to give it up under the pressure of three of the

strongest motives, fear, honour, and interest. And it was not we who

set the example, for it has always been law that the weaker should be

subject to the stronger. Besides, we believed ourselves to be worthy of

our position, and so you thought us till now, when calculations of

interest have made you take up the cry of justice—a consideration which

no one ever yet brought forward to hinder his ambition when he had a

chance of gaining anything by might. And praise is due to all who, if

not so superior to human nature as to refuse dominion, yet respect

justice more than their position compels them to do.

“We imagine that our moderation would be best demonstrated by the

conduct of others who should be placed in our position; but even our

equity has very unreasonably subjected us to condemnation instead of

approval. Our abatement of our rights in the contract trials with our

allies, and our causing them to be decided by impartial laws at Athens,

have gained us the character of being litigious. And none care to

inquire why this reproach is not brought against other imperial powers,

who treat their subjects with less moderation than we do; the secret

being that where force can be used, law is not needed. But our subjects

are so habituated to associate with us as equals that any defeat

whatever that clashes with their notions of justice, whether it

proceeds from a legal judgment or from the power which our empire gives

us, makes them forget to be grateful for being allowed to retain most

of their possessions, and more vexed at a part being taken, than if we

had from the first cast law aside and openly gratified our

covetousness. If we had done so, not even would they have disputed that

the weaker must give way to the stronger. Men’s indignation, it seems,

is more excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong; the first looks

like being cheated by an equal, the second like being compelled by a

superior. At all events they contrived to put up with much worse

treatment than this from the Mede, yet they think our rule severe, and

this is to be expected, for the present always weighs heavy on the

conquered. This at least is certain. If you were to succeed in

overthrowing us and in taking our place, you would speedily lose the

popularity with which fear of us has invested you, if your policy of

to-day is at all to tally with the sample that you gave of it during

the brief period of your command against the Mede. Not only is your

life at home regulated by rules and institutions incompatible with

those of others, but your citizens abroad act neither on these rules

nor on those which are recognized by the rest of Hellas.

“Take time then in forming your resolution, as the matter is of great

importance; and do not be persuaded by the opinions and complaints of

others to bring trouble on yourselves, but consider the vast influence

of accident in war, before you are engaged in it. As it continues, it

generally becomes an affair of chances, chances from which neither of

us is exempt, and whose event we must risk in the dark. It is a common

mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act first, and

wait for disaster to discuss the matter. But we are not yet by any

means so misguided, nor, so far as we can see, are you; accordingly,

while it is still open to us both to choose aright, we bid you not to

dissolve the treaty, or to break your oaths, but to have our

differences settled by arbitration according to our agreement. Or else

we take the gods who heard the oaths to witness, and if you begin

hostilities, whatever line of action you choose, we will try not to be

behindhand in repelling you.”

Such were the words of the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had

heard the complaints of the allies against the Athenians, and the

observations of the latter, they made all withdraw, and consulted by

themselves on the question before them. The opinions of the majority

all led to the same conclusion; the Athenians were open aggressors, and

war must be declared at once. But Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king,

came forward, who had the reputation of being at once a wise and a

moderate man, and made the following speech:

“I have not lived so long, Lacedaemonians, without having had the

experience of many wars, and I see those among you of the same age as

myself, who will not fall into the common misfortune of longing for war

from inexperience or from a belief in its advantage and its safety.

This, the war on which you are now debating, would be one of the

greatest magnitude, on a sober consideration of the matter. In a

struggle with Peloponnesians and neighbours our strength is of the same

character, and it is possible to move swiftly on the different points.

But a struggle with a people who live in a distant land, who have also

an extraordinary familiarity with the sea, and who are in the highest

state of preparation in every other department; with wealth private and

public, with ships, and horses, and heavy infantry, and a population

such as no one other Hellenic place can equal, and lastly a number of

tributary allies—what can justify us in rashly beginning such a

struggle? wherein is our trust that we should rush on it unprepared? Is

it in our ships? There we are inferior; while if we are to practise and

become a match for them, time must intervene. Is it in our money? There

we have a far greater deficiency. We neither have it in our treasury,

nor are we ready to contribute it from our private funds. Confidence

might possibly be felt in our superiority in heavy infantry and

population, which will enable us to invade and devastate their lands.

But the Athenians have plenty of other land in their empire, and can

import what they want by sea. Again, if we are to attempt an

insurrection of their allies, these will have to be supported with a

fleet, most of them being islanders. What then is to be our war? For

unless we can either beat them at sea, or deprive them of the revenues

which feed their navy, we shall meet with little but disaster.

Meanwhile our honour will be pledged to keeping on, particularly if it

be the opinion that we began the quarrel. For let us never be elated by

the fatal hope of the war being quickly ended by the devastation of

their lands. I fear rather that we may leave it as a legacy to our

children; so improbable is it that the Athenian spirit will be the

slave of their land, or Athenian experience be cowed by war.

“Not that I would bid you be so unfeeling as to suffer them to injure

your allies, and to refrain from unmasking their intrigues; but I do

bid you not to take up arms at once, but to send and remonstrate with

them in a tone not too suggestive of war, nor again too suggestive of

submission, and to employ the interval in perfecting our own

preparations. The means will be, first, the acquisition of allies,

Hellenic or barbarian it matters not, so long as they are an accession

to our strength naval or pecuniary—I say Hellenic or barbarian, because

the odium of such an accession to all who like us are the objects of

the designs of the Athenians is taken away by the law of

self-preservation—and secondly the development of our home resources.

If they listen to our embassy, so much the better; but if not, after

the lapse of two or three years our position will have become

materially strengthened, and we can then attack them if we think

proper. Perhaps by that time the sight of our preparations, backed by

language equally significant, will have disposed them to submission,

while their land is still untouched, and while their counsels may be

directed to the retention of advantages as yet undestroyed. For the

only light in which you can view their land is that of a hostage in

your hands, a hostage the more valuable the better it is cultivated.

This you ought to spare as long as possible, and not make them

desperate, and so increase the difficulty of dealing with them. For if

while still unprepared, hurried away by the complaints of our allies,

we are induced to lay it waste, have a care that we do not bring deep

disgrace and deep perplexity upon Peloponnese. Complaints, whether of

communities or individuals, it is possible to adjust; but war

undertaken by a coalition for sectional interests, whose progress there

is no means of foreseeing, does not easily admit of creditable

settlement.

“And none need think it cowardice for a number of confederates to pause

before they attack a single city. The Athenians have allies as numerous

as our own, and allies that pay tribute, and war is a matter not so

much of arms as of money, which makes arms of use. And this is more

than ever true in a struggle between a continental and a maritime

power. First, then, let us provide money, and not allow ourselves to be

carried away by the talk of our allies before we have done so: as we

shall have the largest share of responsibility for the consequences be

they good or bad, we have also a right to a tranquil inquiry respecting

them.

“And the slowness and procrastination, the parts of our character that

are most assailed by their criticism, need not make you blush. If we

undertake the war without preparation, we should by hastening its

commencement only delay its conclusion: further, a free and a famous

city has through all time been ours. The quality which they condemn is

really nothing but a wise moderation; thanks to its possession, we

alone do not become insolent in success and give way less than others

in misfortune; we are not carried away by the pleasure of hearing

ourselves cheered on to risks which our judgment condemns; nor, if

annoyed, are we any the more convinced by attempts to exasperate us by

accusation. We are both warlike and wise, and it is our sense of order

that makes us so. We are warlike, because self-control contains honour

as a chief constituent, and honour bravery. And we are wise, because we

are educated with too little learning to despise the laws, and with too

severe a self-control to disobey them, and are brought up not to be too

knowing in useless matters—such as the knowledge which can give a

specious criticism of an enemy’s plans in theory, but fails to assail

them with equal success in practice—but are taught to consider that the

schemes of our enemies are not dissimilar to our own, and that the

freaks of chance are not determinable by calculation. In practice we

always base our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that

his plans are good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes not on a

belief in his blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions. Nor

ought we to believe that there is much difference between man and man,

but to think that the superiority lies with him who is reared in the

severest school. These practices, then, which our ancestors have

delivered to us, and by whose maintenance we have always profited, must

not be given up. And we must not be hurried into deciding in a day’s

brief space a question which concerns many lives and fortunes and many

cities, and in which honour is deeply involved—but we must decide

calmly. This our strength peculiarly enables us to do. As for the

Athenians, send to them on the matter of Potidæa, send on the matter of

the alleged wrongs of the allies, particularly as they are prepared

with legal satisfaction; and to proceed against one who offers

arbitration as against a wrongdoer, law forbids. Meanwhile do not omit

preparation for war. This decision will be the best for yourselves, the

most terrible to your opponents.”

Such were the words of Archidamus. Last came forward Sthenelaidas, one

of the ephors for that year, and spoke to the Lacedaemonians as

follows:

“The long speech of the Athenians I do not pretend to understand. They

said a good deal in praise of themselves, but nowhere denied that they

are injuring our allies and Peloponnese. And yet if they behaved well

against the Mede then, but ill towards us now, they deserve double

punishment for having ceased to be good and for having become bad. We

meanwhile are the same then and now, and shall not, if we are wise,

disregard the wrongs of our allies, or put off till to-morrow the duty

of assisting those who must suffer to-day. Others have much money and

ships and horses, but we have good allies whom we must not give up to

the Athenians, nor by lawsuits and words decide the matter, as it is

anything but in word that we are harmed, but render instant and

powerful help. And let us not be told that it is fitting for us to

deliberate under injustice; long deliberation is rather fitting for

those who have injustice in contemplation. Vote therefore,

Lacedaemonians, for war, as the honour of Sparta demands, and neither

allow the further aggrandizement of Athens, nor betray our allies to

ruin, but with the gods let us advance against the aggressors.”

With these words he, as ephor, himself put the question to the assembly

of the Lacedaemonians. He said that he could not determine which was

the loudest acclamation (their mode of decision is by acclamation not

by voting); the fact being that he wished to make them declare their

opinion openly and thus to increase their ardour for war. Accordingly

he said: “All Lacedaemonians who are of opinion that the treaty has

been broken, and that Athens is guilty, leave your seats and go there,”

pointing out a certain place; “all who are of the opposite opinion,

there.” They accordingly stood up and divided; and those who held that

the treaty had been broken were in a decided majority. Summoning the

allies, they told them that their opinion was that Athens had been

guilty of injustice, but that they wished to convoke all the allies and

put it to the vote; in order that they might make war, if they decided

to do so, on a common resolution. Having thus gained their point, the

delegates returned home at once; the Athenian envoys a little later,

when they had dispatched the objects of their mission. This decision of

the assembly, judging that the treaty had been broken, was made in the

fourteenth year of the thirty years’ truce, which was entered into

after the affair of Euboea.

The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that the

war must be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by the

arguments of the allies, as because they feared the growth of the power

of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to them.

CHAPTER IV

From the end of the Persian to the beginning of the Peloponnesian

War—The Progress from Supremacy to Empire

The way in which Athens came to be placed in the circumstances under

which her power grew was this. After the Medes had returned from

Europe, defeated by sea and land by the Hellenes, and after those of

them who had fled with their ships to Mycale had been destroyed,

Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, the commander of the Hellenes

at Mycale, departed home with the allies from Peloponnese. But the

Athenians and the allies from Ionia and Hellespont, who had now

revolted from the King, remained and laid siege to Sestos, which was

still held by the Medes. After wintering before it, they became masters

of the place on its evacuation by the barbarians; and after this they

sailed away from Hellespont to their respective cities. Meanwhile the

Athenian people, after the departure of the barbarian from their

country, at once proceeded to carry over their children and wives, and

such property as they had left, from the places where they had

deposited them, and prepared to rebuild their city and their walls. For

only isolated portions of the circumference had been left standing, and

most of the houses were in ruins; though a few remained, in which the

Persian grandees had taken up their quarters.

Perceiving what they were going to do, the Lacedaemonians sent an

embassy to Athens. They would have themselves preferred to see neither

her nor any other city in possession of a wall; though here they acted

principally at the instigation of their allies, who were alarmed at the

strength of her newly acquired navy and the valour which she had

displayed in the war with the Medes. They begged her not only to

abstain from building walls for herself, but also to join them in

throwing down the walls that still held together of the

ultra-Peloponnesian cities. The real meaning of their advice, the

suspicion that it contained against the Athenians, was not proclaimed;

it was urged that so the barbarian, in the event of a third invasion,

would not have any strong place, such as he now had in Thebes, for his

base of operations; and that Peloponnese would suffice for all as a

base both for retreat and offence. After the Lacedaemonians had thus

spoken, they were, on the advice of Themistocles, immediately dismissed

by the Athenians, with the answer that ambassadors should be sent to

Sparta to discuss the question. Themistocles told the Athenians to send

him off with all speed to Lacedaemon, but not to dispatch his

colleagues as soon as they had selected them, but to wait until they

had raised their wall to the height from which defence was possible.

Meanwhile the whole population in the city was to labour at the wall,

the Athenians, their wives, and their children, sparing no edifice,

private or public, which might be of any use to the work, but throwing

all down. After giving these instructions, and adding that he would be

responsible for all other matters there, he departed. Arrived at

Lacedaemon he did not seek an audience with the authorities, but tried

to gain time and made excuses. When any of the government asked him why

he did not appear in the assembly, he would say that he was waiting for

his colleagues, who had been detained in Athens by some engagement;

however, that he expected their speedy arrival, and wondered that they

were not yet there. At first the Lacedaemonians trusted the words of

Themistocles, through their friendship for him; but when others

arrived, all distinctly declaring that the work was going on and

already attaining some elevation, they did not know how to disbelieve

it. Aware of this, he told them that rumours are deceptive, and should

not be trusted; they should send some reputable persons from Sparta to

inspect, whose report might be trusted. They dispatched them

accordingly. Concerning these Themistocles secretly sent word to the

Athenians to detain them as far as possible without putting them under

open constraint, and not to let them go until they had themselves

returned. For his colleagues had now joined him, Abronichus, son of

Lysicles, and Aristides, son of Lysimachus, with the news that the wall

was sufficiently advanced; and he feared that when the Lacedaemonians

heard the facts, they might refuse to let them go. So the Athenians

detained the envoys according to his message, and Themistocles had an

audience with the Lacedaemonians, and at last openly told them that

Athens was now fortified sufficiently to protect its inhabitants; that

any embassy which the Lacedaemonians or their allies might wish to send

to them should in future proceed on the assumption that the people to

whom they were going was able to distinguish both its own and the

general interests. That when the Athenians thought fit to abandon their

city and to embark in their ships, they ventured on that perilous step

without consulting them; and that on the other hand, wherever they had

deliberated with the Lacedaemonians, they had proved themselves to be

in judgment second to none. That they now thought it fit that their

city should have a wall, and that this would be more for the advantage

of both the citizens of Athens and the Hellenic confederacy; for

without equal military strength it was impossible to contribute equal

or fair counsel to the common interest. It followed, he observed,

either that all the members of the confederacy should be without walls,

or that the present step should be considered a right one.

The Lacedaemonians did not betray any open signs of anger against the

Athenians at what they heard. The embassy, it seems, was prompted not

by a desire to obstruct, but to guide the counsels of their government:

besides, Spartan feeling was at that time very friendly towards Athens

on account of the patriotism which she had displayed in the struggle

with the Mede. Still the defeat of their wishes could not but cause

them secret annoyance. The envoys of each state departed home without

complaint.

In this way the Athenians walled their city in a little while. To this

day the building shows signs of the haste of its execution; the

foundations are laid of stones of all kinds, and in some places not

wrought or fitted, but placed just in the order in which they were

brought by the different hands; and many columns, too, from tombs, and

sculptured stones were put in with the rest. For the bounds of the city

were extended at every point of the circumference; and so they laid

hands on everything without exception in their haste. Themistocles also

persuaded them to finish the walls of Piraeus, which had been begun

before, in his year of office as archon; being influenced alike by the

fineness of a locality that has three natural harbours, and by the

great start which the Athenians would gain in the acquisition of power

by becoming a naval people. For he first ventured to tell them to stick

to the sea and forthwith began to lay the foundations of the empire. It

was by his advice, too, that they built the walls of that thickness

which can still be discerned round Piraeus, the stones being brought up

by two wagons meeting each other. Between the walls thus formed there

was neither rubble nor mortar, but great stones hewn square and fitted

together, cramped to each other on the outside with iron and lead.

About half the height that he intended was finished. His idea was by

their size and thickness to keep off the attacks of an enemy; he

thought that they might be adequately defended by a small garrison of

invalids, and the rest be freed for service in the fleet. For the fleet

claimed most of his attention. He saw, as I think, that the approach by

sea was easier for the king’s army than that by land: he also thought

Piraeus more valuable than the upper city; indeed, he was always

advising the Athenians, if a day should come when they were hard

pressed by land, to go down into Piraeus, and defy the world with their

fleet. Thus, therefore, the Athenians completed their wall, and

commenced their other buildings immediately after the retreat of the

Mede.

Meanwhile Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, was sent out from Lacedaemon

as commander-in-chief of the Hellenes, with twenty ships from

Peloponnese. With him sailed the Athenians with thirty ships, and a

number of the other allies. They made an expedition against Cyprus and

subdued most of the island, and afterwards against Byzantium, which was

in the hands of the Medes, and compelled it to surrender. This event

took place while the Spartans were still supreme. But the violence of

Pausanias had already begun to be disagreeable to the Hellenes,

particularly to the Ionians and the newly liberated populations. These

resorted to the Athenians and requested them as their kinsmen to become

their leaders, and to stop any attempt at violence on the part of

Pausanias. The Athenians accepted their overtures, and determined to

put down any attempt of the kind and to settle everything else as their

interests might seem to demand. In the meantime the Lacedaemonians

recalled Pausanias for an investigation of the reports which had

reached them. Manifold and grave accusations had been brought against

him by Hellenes arriving in Sparta; and, to all appearance, there had

been in him more of the mimicry of a despot than of the attitude of a

general. As it happened, his recall came just at the time when the

hatred which he had inspired had induced the allies to desert him, the

soldiers from Peloponnese excepted, and to range themselves by the side

of the Athenians. On his arrival at Lacedaemon, he was censured for his

private acts of oppression, but was acquitted on the heaviest counts

and pronounced not guilty; it must be known that the charge of Medism

formed one of the principal, and to all appearance one of the best

founded, articles against him. The Lacedaemonians did not, however,

restore him to his command, but sent out Dorkis and certain others with

a small force; who found the allies no longer inclined to concede to

them the supremacy. Perceiving this they departed, and the

Lacedaemonians did not send out any to succeed them. They feared for

those who went out a deterioration similar to that observable in

Pausanias; besides, they desired to be rid of the Median War, and were

satisfied of the competency of the Athenians for the position, and of

their friendship at the time towards themselves.

The Athenians, having thus succeeded to the supremacy by the voluntary

act of the allies through their hatred of Pausanias, fixed which cities

were to contribute money against the barbarian, which ships; their

professed object being to retaliate for their sufferings by ravaging

the King’s country. Now was the time that the office of “Treasurers for

Hellas” was first instituted by the Athenians. These officers received

the tribute, as the money contributed was called. The tribute was first

fixed at four hundred and sixty talents. The common treasury was at

Delos, and the congresses were held in the temple. Their supremacy

commenced with independent allies who acted on the resolutions of a

common congress. It was marked by the following undertakings in war and

in administration during the interval between the Median and the

present war, against the barbarian, against their own rebel allies, and

against the Peloponnesian powers which would come in contact with them

on various occasions. My excuse for relating these events, and for

venturing on this digression, is that this passage of history has been

omitted by all my predecessors, who have confined themselves either to

Hellenic history before the Median War, or the Median War itself.

Hellanicus, it is true, did touch on these events in his Athenian

history; but he is somewhat concise and not accurate in his dates.

Besides, the history of these events contains an explanation of the

growth of the Athenian empire.

First the Athenians besieged and captured Eion on the Strymon from the

Medes, and made slaves of the inhabitants, being under the command of

Cimon, son of Miltiades. Next they enslaved Scyros, the island in the

Aegean, containing a Dolopian population, and colonized it themselves.

This was followed by a war against Carystus, in which the rest of

Euboea remained neutral, and which was ended by surrender on

conditions. After this Naxos left the confederacy, and a war ensued,

and she had to return after a siege; this was the first instance of the

engagement being broken by the subjugation of an allied city, a

precedent which was followed by that of the rest in the order which

circumstances prescribed. Of all the causes of defection, that

connected with arrears of tribute and vessels, and with failure of

service, was the chief; for the Athenians were very severe and

exacting, and made themselves offensive by applying the screw of

necessity to men who were not used to and in fact not disposed for any

continuous labour. In some other respects the Athenians were not the

old popular rulers they had been at first; and if they had more than

their fair share of service, it was correspondingly easy for them to

reduce any that tried to leave the confederacy. For this the allies had

themselves to blame; the wish to get off service making most of them

arrange to pay their share of the expense in money instead of in ships,

and so to avoid having to leave their homes. Thus while Athens was

increasing her navy with the funds which they contributed, a revolt

always found them without resources or experience for war.

Next we come to the actions by land and by sea at the river Eurymedon,

between the Athenians with their allies, and the Medes, when the

Athenians won both battles on the same day under the conduct of Cimon,

son of Miltiades, and captured and destroyed the whole Phoenician

fleet, consisting of two hundred vessels. Some time afterwards occurred

the defection of the Thasians, caused by disagreements about the marts

on the opposite coast of Thrace, and about the mine in their

possession. Sailing with a fleet to Thasos, the Athenians defeated them

at sea and effected a landing on the island. About the same time they

sent ten thousand settlers of their own citizens and the allies to

settle the place then called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways, now Amphipolis.

They succeeded in gaining possession of Ennea Hodoi from the Edonians,

but on advancing into the interior of Thrace were cut off in Drabescus,

a town of the Edonians, by the assembled Thracians, who regarded the

settlement of the place Ennea Hodoi as an act of hostility. Meanwhile

the Thasians being defeated in the field and suffering siege, appealed

to Lacedaemon, and desired her to assist them by an invasion of Attica.

Without informing Athens, she promised and intended to do so, but was

prevented by the occurrence of the earthquake, accompanied by the

secession of the Helots and the Thuriats and Aethaeans of the Perioeci

to Ithome. Most of the Helots were the descendants of the old

Messenians that were enslaved in the famous war; and so all of them

came to be called Messenians. So the Lacedaemonians being engaged in a

war with the rebels in Ithome, the Thasians in the third year of the

siege obtained terms from the Athenians by razing their walls,

delivering up their ships, and arranging to pay the moneys demanded at

once, and tribute in future; giving up their possessions on the

continent together with the mine.

The Lacedaemonians, meanwhile, finding the war against the rebels in

Ithome likely to last, invoked the aid of their allies, and especially

of the Athenians, who came in some force under the command of Cimon.

The reason for this pressing summons lay in their reputed skill in

siege operations; a long siege had taught the Lacedaemonians their own

deficiency in this art, else they would have taken the place by

assault. The first open quarrel between the Lacedaemonians and

Athenians arose out of this expedition. The Lacedaemonians, when

assault failed to take the place, apprehensive of the enterprising and

revolutionary character of the Athenians, and further looking upon them

as of alien extraction, began to fear that, if they remained, they

might be tempted by the besieged in Ithome to attempt some political

changes. They accordingly dismissed them alone of the allies, without

declaring their suspicions, but merely saying that they had now no need

of them. But the Athenians, aware that their dismissal did not proceed

from the more honourable reason of the two, but from suspicions which

had been conceived, went away deeply offended, and conscious of having

done nothing to merit such treatment from the Lacedaemonians; and the

instant that they returned home they broke off the alliance which had

been made against the Mede, and allied themselves with Sparta’s enemy

Argos; each of the contracting parties taking the same oaths and making

the same alliance with the Thessalians.

Meanwhile the rebels in Ithome, unable to prolong further a ten years’

resistance, surrendered to Lacedaemon; the conditions being that they

should depart from Peloponnese under safe conduct, and should never set

foot in it again: any one who might hereafter be found there was to be

the slave of his captor. It must be known that the Lacedaemonians had

an old oracle from Delphi, to the effect that they should let go the

suppliant of Zeus at Ithome. So they went forth with their children and

their wives, and being received by Athens from the hatred that she now

felt for the Lacedaemonians, were located at Naupactus, which she had

lately taken from the Ozolian Locrians. The Athenians received another

addition to their confederacy in the Megarians; who left the

Lacedaemonian alliance, annoyed by a war about boundaries forced on

them by Corinth. The Athenians occupied Megara and Pegae, and built the

Megarians their long walls from the city to Nisaea, in which they

placed an Athenian garrison. This was the principal cause of the

Corinthians conceiving such a deadly hatred against Athens.

Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a Libyan king of the Libyans on

the Egyptian border, having his headquarters at Marea, the town above

Pharos, caused a revolt of almost the whole of Egypt from King

Artaxerxes and, placing himself at its head, invited the Athenians to

his assistance. Abandoning a Cyprian expedition upon which they

happened to be engaged with two hundred ships of their own and their

allies, they arrived in Egypt and sailed from the sea into the Nile,

and making themselves masters of the river and two-thirds of Memphis,

addressed themselves to the attack of the remaining third, which is

called White Castle. Within it were Persians and Medes who had taken

refuge there, and Egyptians who had not joined the rebellion.

Meanwhile the Athenians, making a descent from their fleet upon Haliae,

were engaged by a force of Corinthians and Epidaurians; and the

Corinthians were victorious. Afterwards the Athenians engaged the

Peloponnesian fleet off Cecruphalia; and the Athenians were victorious.

Subsequently war broke out between Aegina and Athens, and there was a

great battle at sea off Aegina between the Athenians and Aeginetans,

each being aided by their allies; in which victory remained with the

Athenians, who took seventy of the enemy’s ships, and landed in the

country and commenced a siege under the command of Leocrates, son of

Stroebus. Upon this the Peloponnesians, desirous of aiding the

Aeginetans, threw into Aegina a force of three hundred heavy infantry,

who had before been serving with the Corinthians and Epidaurians.

Meanwhile the Corinthians and their allies occupied the heights of

Geraneia, and marched down into the Megarid, in the belief that, with a

large force absent in Aegina and Egypt, Athens would be unable to help

the Megarians without raising the siege of Aegina. But the Athenians,

instead of moving the army of Aegina, raised a force of the old and

young men that had been left in the city, and marched into the Megarid

under the command of Myronides. After a drawn battle with the

Corinthians, the rival hosts parted, each with the impression that they

had gained the victory. The Athenians, however, if anything, had rather

the advantage, and on the departure of the Corinthians set up a trophy.

Urged by the taunts of the elders in their city, the Corinthians made

their preparations, and about twelve days afterwards came and set up

their trophy as victors. Sallying out from Megara, the Athenians cut

off the party that was employed in erecting the trophy, and engaged and

defeated the rest. In the retreat of the vanquished army, a

considerable division, pressed by the pursuers and mistaking the road,

dashed into a field on some private property, with a deep trench all

round it, and no way out. Being acquainted with the place, the

Athenians hemmed their front with heavy infantry and, placing the light

troops round in a circle, stoned all who had gone in. Corinth here

suffered a severe blow. The bulk of her army continued its retreat

home.

About this time the Athenians began to build the long walls to the sea,

that towards Phalerum and that towards Piraeus. Meanwhile the Phocians

made an expedition against Doris, the old home of the Lacedaemonians,

containing the towns of Boeum, Kitinium, and Erineum. They had taken

one of these towns, when the Lacedaemonians under Nicomedes, son of

Cleombrotus, commanding for King Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, who was

still a minor, came to the aid of the Dorians with fifteen hundred

heavy infantry of their own, and ten thousand of their allies. After

compelling the Phocians to restore the town on conditions, they began

their retreat. The route by sea, across the Crissaean Gulf, exposed

them to the risk of being stopped by the Athenian fleet; that across

Geraneia seemed scarcely safe, the Athenians holding Megara and Pegae.

For the pass was a difficult one, and was always guarded by the

Athenians; and, in the present instance, the Lacedaemonians had

information that they meant to dispute their passage. So they resolved

to remain in Boeotia, and to consider which would be the safest line of

march. They had also another reason for this resolve. Secret

encouragement had been given them by a party in Athens, who hoped to

put an end to the reign of democracy and the building of the Long

Walls. Meanwhile the Athenians marched against them with their whole

levy and a thousand Argives and the respective contingents of the rest

of their allies. Altogether they were fourteen thousand strong. The

march was prompted by the notion that the Lacedaemonians were at a loss

how to effect their passage, and also by suspicions of an attempt to

overthrow the democracy. Some cavalry also joined the Athenians from

their Thessalian allies; but these went over to the Lacedaemonians

during the battle.

The battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia. After heavy loss on both

sides, victory declared for the Lacedaemonians and their allies. After

entering the Megarid and cutting down the fruit trees, the

Lacedaemonians returned home across Geraneia and the isthmus. Sixty-two

days after the battle the Athenians marched into Boeotia under the

command of Myronides, defeated the Boeotians in battle at Oenophyta,

and became masters of Boeotia and Phocis. They dismantled the walls of

the Tanagraeans, took a hundred of the richest men of the Opuntian

Locrians as hostages, and finished their own long walls. This was

followed by the surrender of the Aeginetans to Athens on conditions;

they pulled down their walls, gave up their ships, and agreed to pay

tribute in future. The Athenians sailed round Peloponnese under

Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus, burnt the arsenal of Lacedaemon, took

Chalcis, a town of the Corinthians, and in a descent upon Sicyon

defeated the Sicyonians in battle.

Meanwhile the Athenians in Egypt and their allies were still there, and

encountered all the vicissitudes of war. First the Athenians were

masters of Egypt, and the King sent Megabazus a Persian to Lacedaemon

with money to bribe the Peloponnesians to invade Attica and so draw off

the Athenians from Egypt. Finding that the matter made no progress, and

that the money was only being wasted, he recalled Megabazus with the

remainder of the money, and sent Megabuzus, son of Zopyrus, a Persian,

with a large army to Egypt. Arriving by land he defeated the Egyptians

and their allies in a battle, and drove the Hellenes out of Memphis,

and at length shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where he

besieged them for a year and six months. At last, draining the canal of

its waters, which he diverted into another channel, he left their ships

high and dry and joined most of the island to the mainland, and then

marched over on foot and captured it. Thus the enterprise of the

Hellenes came to ruin after six years of war. Of all that large host a

few travelling through Libya reached Cyrene in safety, but most of them

perished. And thus Egypt returned to its subjection to the King, except

Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, whom they were unable to capture

from the extent of the marsh; the marshmen being also the most warlike

of the Egyptians. Inaros, the Libyan king, the sole author of the

Egyptian revolt, was betrayed, taken, and crucified. Meanwhile a

relieving squadron of fifty vessels had sailed from Athens and the rest

of the confederacy for Egypt. They put in to shore at the Mendesian

mouth of the Nile, in total ignorance of what had occurred. Attacked on

the land side by the troops, and from the sea by the Phoenician navy,

most of the ships were destroyed; the few remaining being saved by

retreat. Such was the end of the great expedition of the Athenians and

their allies to Egypt.

Meanwhile Orestes, son of Echecratidas, the Thessalian king, being an

exile from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. Taking

with them the Boeotians and Phocians their allies, the Athenians

marched to Pharsalus in Thessaly. They became masters of the country,

though only in the immediate vicinity of the camp; beyond which they

could not go for fear of the Thessalian cavalry. But they failed to

take the city or to attain any of the other objects of their

expedition, and returned home with Orestes without having effected

anything. Not long after this a thousand of the Athenians embarked in

the vessels that were at Pegae (Pegae, it must be remembered, was now

theirs), and sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the command of

Pericles, son of Xanthippus. Landing in Sicyon and defeating the

Sicyonians who engaged them, they immediately took with them the

Achaeans and, sailing across, marched against and laid siege to

Oeniadae in Acarnania. Failing however to take it, they returned home.

Three years afterwards a truce was made between the Peloponnesians and

Athenians for five years. Released from Hellenic war, the Athenians

made an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred vessels of their own and

their allies, under the command of Cimon. Sixty of these were detached

to Egypt at the instance of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes; the

rest laid siege to Kitium, from which, however, they were compelled to

retire by the death of Cimon and by scarcity of provisions. Sailing off

Salamis in Cyprus, they fought with the Phoenicians, Cyprians, and

Cilicians by land and sea, and, being victorious on both elements

departed home, and with them the returned squadron from Egypt. After

this the Lacedaemonians marched out on a sacred war, and, becoming

masters of the temple at Delphi, it in the hands of the Delphians.

Immediately after their retreat, the Athenians marched out, became

masters of the temple, and placed it in the hands of the Phocians.

Some time after this, Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and some other places in

Boeotia being in the hands of the Boeotian exiles, the Athenians

marched against the above-mentioned hostile places with a thousand

Athenian heavy infantry and the allied contingents, under the command

of Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus. They took Chaeronea, and made slaves of

the inhabitants, and, leaving a garrison, commenced their return. On

their road they were attacked at Coronea by the Boeotian exiles from

Orchomenus, with some Locrians and Euboean exiles, and others who were

of the same way of thinking, were defeated in battle, and some killed,

others taken captive. The Athenians evacuated all Boeotia by a treaty

providing for the recovery of the men; and the exiled Boeotians

returned, and with all the rest regained their independence.

This was soon afterwards followed by the revolt of Euboea from Athens.

Pericles had already crossed over with an army of Athenians to the

island, when news was brought to him that Megara had revolted, that the

Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica, and that the

Athenian garrison had been cut off by the Megarians, with the exception

of a few who had taken refuge in Nisaea. The Megarians had introduced

the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the town before they

revolted. Meanwhile Pericles brought his army back in all haste from

Euboea. After this the Peloponnesians marched into Attica as far as

Eleusis and Thrius, ravaging the country under the conduct of King

Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, and without advancing further

returned home. The Athenians then crossed over again to Euboea under

the command of Pericles, and subdued the whole of the island: all but

Histiaea was settled by convention; the Histiaeans they expelled from

their homes, and occupied their territory themselves.

Not long after their return from Euboea, they made a truce with the

Lacedaemonians and their allies for thirty years, giving up the posts

which they occupied in Peloponnese—Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia.

In the sixth year of the truce, war broke out between the Samians and

Milesians about Priene. Worsted in the war, the Milesians came to

Athens with loud complaints against the Samians. In this they were

joined by certain private persons from Samos itself, who wished to

revolutionize the government. Accordingly the Athenians sailed to Samos

with forty ships and set up a democracy; took hostages from the

Samians, fifty boys and as many men, lodged them in Lemnos, and after

leaving a garrison in the island returned home. But some of the Samians

had not remained in the island, but had fled to the continent. Making

an agreement with the most powerful of those in the city, and an

alliance with Pissuthnes, son of Hystaspes, the then satrap of Sardis,

they got together a force of seven hundred mercenaries, and under cover

of night crossed over to Samos. Their first step was to rise on the

commons, most of whom they secured; their next to steal their hostages

from Lemnos; after which they revolted, gave up the Athenian garrison

left with them and its commanders to Pissuthnes, and instantly prepared

for an expedition against Miletus. The Byzantines also revolted with

them.

As soon as the Athenians heard the news, they sailed with sixty ships

against Samos. Sixteen of these went to Caria to look out for the

Phoenician fleet, and to Chios and Lesbos carrying round orders for

reinforcements, and so never engaged; but forty-four ships under the

command of Pericles with nine colleagues gave battle, off the island of

Tragia, to seventy Samian vessels, of which twenty were transports, as

they were sailing from Miletus. Victory remained with the Athenians.

Reinforced afterwards by forty ships from Athens, and twenty-five Chian

and Lesbian vessels, the Athenians landed, and having the superiority

by land invested the city with three walls; it was also invested from

the sea. Meanwhile Pericles took sixty ships from the blockading

squadron, and departed in haste for Caunus and Caria, intelligence

having been brought in of the approach of the Phoenician fleet to the

aid of the Samians; indeed Stesagoras and others had left the island

with five ships to bring them. But in the meantime the Samians made a

sudden sally, and fell on the camp, which they found unfortified.

Destroying the look-out vessels, and engaging and defeating such as

were being launched to meet them, they remained masters of their own

seas for fourteen days, and carried in and carried out what they

pleased. But on the arrival of Pericles, they were once more shut up.

Fresh reinforcements afterwards arrived—forty ships from Athens with

Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio; twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles,

and thirty vessels from Chios and Lesbos. After a brief attempt at

fighting, the Samians, unable to hold out, were reduced after a nine

months’ siege and surrendered on conditions; they razed their walls,

gave hostages, delivered up their ships, and arranged to pay the

expenses of the war by instalments. The Byzantines also agreed to be

subject as before.

CHAPTER V

Second Congress at Lacedaemon—Preparations for War and Diplomatic

Skirmishes—Cylon—Pausanias—Themistocles

After this, though not many years later, we at length come to what has

been already related, the affairs of Corcyra and Potidæa, and the

events that served as a pretext for the present war. All these actions

of the Hellenes against each other and the barbarian occurred in the

fifty years’ interval between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning

of the present war. During this interval the Athenians succeeded in

placing their empire on a firmer basis, and advanced their own home

power to a very great height. The Lacedaemonians, though fully aware of

it, opposed it only for a little while, but remained inactive during

most of the period, being of old slow to go to war except under the

pressure of necessity, and in the present instance being hampered by

wars at home; until the growth of the Athenian power could be no longer

ignored, and their own confederacy became the object of its

encroachments. They then felt that they could endure it no longer, but

that the time had come for them to throw themselves heart and soul upon

the hostile power, and break it, if they could, by commencing the

present war. And though the Lacedaemonians had made up their own minds

on the fact of the breach of the treaty and the guilt of the Athenians,

yet they sent to Delphi and inquired of the God whether it would be

well with them if they went to war; and, as it is reported, received

from him the answer that if they put their whole strength into the war,

victory would be theirs, and the promise that he himself would be with

them, whether invoked or uninvoked. Still they wished to summon their

allies again, and to take their vote on the propriety of making war.

After the ambassadors from the confederates had arrived and a congress

had been convened, they all spoke their minds, most of them denouncing

the Athenians and demanding that the war should begin. In particular

the Corinthians. They had before on their own account canvassed the

cities in detail to induce them to vote for the war, in the fear that

it might come too late to save Potidæa; they were present also on this

occasion, and came forward the last, and made the following speech:

“Fellow allies, we can no longer accuse the Lacedaemonians of having

failed in their duty: they have not only voted for war themselves, but

have assembled us here for that purpose. We say their duty, for

supremacy has its duties. Besides equitably administering private

interests, leaders are required to show a special care for the common

welfare in return for the special honours accorded to them by all in

other ways. For ourselves, all who have already had dealings with the

Athenians require no warning to be on their guard against them. The

states more inland and out of the highway of communication should

understand that, if they omit to support the coast powers, the result

will be to injure the transit of their produce for exportation and the

reception in exchange of their imports from the sea; and they must not

be careless judges of what is now said, as if it had nothing to do with

them, but must expect that the sacrifice of the powers on the coast

will one day be followed by the extension of the danger to the

interior, and must recognize that their own interests are deeply

involved in this discussion. For these reasons they should not hesitate

to exchange peace for war. If wise men remain quiet, while they are not

injured, brave men abandon peace for war when they are injured,

returning to an understanding on a favourable opportunity: in fact,

they are neither intoxicated by their success in war, nor disposed to

take an injury for the sake of the delightful tranquillity of peace.

Indeed, to falter for the sake of such delights is, if you remain

inactive, the quickest way of losing the sweets of repose to which you

cling; while to conceive extravagant pretensions from success in war is

to forget how hollow is the confidence by which you are elated. For if

many ill-conceived plans have succeeded through the still greater

fatuity of an opponent, many more, apparently well laid, have on the

contrary ended in disgrace. The confidence with which we form our

schemes is never completely justified in their execution; speculation

is carried on in safety, but, when it comes to action, fear causes

failure.

“To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kindling war it is

under the pressure of injury, with adequate grounds of complaint; and

after we have chastised the Athenians we will in season desist. We have

many reasons to expect success—first, superiority in numbers and in

military experience, and secondly our general and unvarying obedience

in the execution of orders. The naval strength which they possess shall

be raised by us from our respective antecedent resources, and from the

moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from these enables us to seduce

their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. For the power of

Athens is more mercenary than national; while ours will not be exposed

to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money. A

single defeat at sea is in all likelihood their ruin: should they hold

out, in that case there will be the more time for us to exercise

ourselves in naval matters; and as soon as we have arrived at an

equality in science, we need scarcely ask whether we shall be their

superiors in courage. For the advantages that we have by nature they

cannot acquire by education; while their superiority in science must be

removed by our practice. The money required for these objects shall be

provided by our contributions: nothing indeed could be more monstrous

than the suggestion that, while their allies never tire of contributing

for their own servitude, we should refuse to spend for vengeance and

self-preservation the treasure which by such refusal we shall forfeit

to Athenian rapacity and see employed for our own ruin.

“We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of

their allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues,

which are the source of their strength, and establishment of fortified

positions in their country, and various operations which cannot be

foreseen at present. For war of all things proceeds least upon definite

rules, but draws principally upon itself for contrivances to meet an

emergency; and in such cases the party who faces the struggle and keeps

his temper best meets with most security, and he who loses his temper

about it with correspondent disaster. Let us also reflect that if it

was merely a number of disputes of territory between rival neighbours,

it might be borne; but here we have an enemy in Athens that is a match

for our whole coalition, and more than a match for any of its members;

so that unless as a body and as individual nationalities and individual

cities we make an unanimous stand against her, she will easily conquer

us divided and in detail. That conquest, terrible as it may sound,

would, it must be known, have no other end than slavery pure and

simple; a word which Peloponnese cannot even hear whispered without

disgrace, or without disgrace see so many states abused by one.

Meanwhile the opinion would be either that we were justly so used, or

that we put up with it from cowardice, and were proving degenerate sons

in not even securing for ourselves the freedom which our fathers gave

to Hellas; and in allowing the establishment in Hellas of a tyrant

state, though in individual states we think it our duty to put down

sole rulers. And we do not know how this conduct can be held free from

three of the gravest failings, want of sense, of courage, or of

vigilance. For we do not suppose that you have taken refuge in that

contempt of an enemy which has proved so fatal in so many instances—a

feeling which from the numbers that it has ruined has come to be called

not contemptuous but contemptible.

“There is, however, no advantage in reflections on the past further

than may be of service to the present. For the future we must provide

by maintaining what the present gives us and redoubling our efforts; it

is hereditary to us to win virtue as the fruit of labour, and you must

not change the habit, even though you should have a slight advantage in

wealth and resources; for it is not right that what was won in want

should be lost in plenty; no, we must boldly advance to the war for

many reasons; the god has commanded it and promised to be with us, and

the rest of Hellas will all join in the struggle, part from fear, part

from interest. You will be the first to break a treaty which the god,

in advising us to go to war, judges to be violated already, but rather

to support a treaty that has been outraged: indeed, treaties are broken

not by resistance but by aggression.

“Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you may view it, will

amply justify you in going to war; and this step we recommend in the

interests of all, bearing in mind that identity of interest is the

surest of bonds, whether between states or individuals. Delay not,

therefore, to assist Potidæa, a Dorian city besieged by Ionians, which

is quite a reversal of the order of things; nor to assert the freedom

of the rest. It is impossible for us to wait any longer when waiting

can only mean immediate disaster for some of us, and, if it comes to be

known that we have conferred but do not venture to protect ourselves,

like disaster in the near future for the rest. Delay not, fellow

allies, but, convinced of the necessity of the crisis and the wisdom of

this counsel, vote for the war, undeterred by its immediate terrors,

but looking beyond to the lasting peace by which it will be succeeded.

Out of war peace gains fresh stability, but to refuse to abandon repose

for war is not so sure a method of avoiding danger. We must believe

that the tyrant city that has been established in Hellas has been

established against all alike, with a programme of universal empire,

part fulfilled, part in contemplation; let us then attack and reduce

it, and win future security for ourselves and freedom for the Hellenes

who are now enslaved.”

Such were the words of the Corinthians. The Lacedaemonians, having now

heard all, give their opinion, took the vote of all the allied states

present in order, great and small alike; and the majority voted for

war. This decided, it was still impossible for them to commence at

once, from their want of preparation; but it was resolved that the

means requisite were to be procured by the different states, and that

there was to be no delay. And indeed, in spite of the time occupied

with the necessary arrangements, less than a year elapsed before Attica

was invaded, and the war openly begun.

This interval was spent in sending embassies to Athens charged with

complaints, in order to obtain as good a pretext for war as possible,

in the event of her paying no attention to them. The first

Lacedaemonian embassy was to order the Athenians to drive out the curse

of the goddess; the history of which is as follows. In former

generations there was an Athenian of the name of Cylon, a victor at the

Olympic games, of good birth and powerful position, who had married a

daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, at that time tyrant of Megara. Now

this Cylon was inquiring at Delphi; when he was told by the god to

seize the Acropolis of Athens on the grand festival of Zeus.

Accordingly, procuring a force from Theagenes and persuading his

friends to join him, when the Olympic festival in Peloponnese came, he

seized the Acropolis, with the intention of making himself tyrant,

thinking that this was the grand festival of Zeus, and also an occasion

appropriate for a victor at the Olympic games. Whether the grand

festival that was meant was in Attica or elsewhere was a question which

he never thought of, and which the oracle did not offer to solve. For

the Athenians also have a festival which is called the grand festival

of Zeus Meilichios or Gracious, viz., the Diasia. It is celebrated

outside the city, and the whole people sacrifice not real victims but a

number of bloodless offerings peculiar to the country. However,

fancying he had chosen the right time, he made the attempt. As soon as

the Athenians perceived it, they flocked in, one and all, from the

country, and sat down, and laid siege to the citadel. But as time went

on, weary of the labour of blockade, most of them departed; the

responsibility of keeping guard being left to the nine archons, with

plenary powers to arrange everything according to their good judgment.

It must be known that at that time most political functions were

discharged by the nine archons. Meanwhile Cylon and his besieged

companions were distressed for want of food and water. Accordingly

Cylon and his brother made their escape; but the rest being hard

pressed, and some even dying of famine, seated themselves as suppliants

at the altar in the Acropolis. The Athenians who were charged with the

duty of keeping guard, when they saw them at the point of death in the

temple, raised them up on the understanding that no harm should be done

to them, led them out, and slew them. Some who as they passed by took

refuge at the altars of the awful goddesses were dispatched on the

spot. From this deed the men who killed them were called accursed and

guilty against the goddess, they and their descendants. Accordingly

these cursed ones were driven out by the Athenians, driven out again by

Cleomenes of Lacedaemon and an Athenian faction; the living were driven

out, and the bones of the dead were taken up; thus they were cast out.

For all that, they came back afterwards, and their descendants are

still in the city.

This, then was the curse that the Lacedaemonians ordered them to drive

out. They were actuated primarily, as they pretended, by a care for the

honour of the gods; but they also know that Pericles, son of

Xanthippus, was connected with the curse on his mother’s side, and they

thought that his banishment would materially advance their designs on

Athens. Not that they really hoped to succeed in procuring this; they

rather thought to create a prejudice against him in the eyes of his

countrymen from the feeling that the war would be partly caused by his

misfortune. For being the most powerful man of his time, and the

leading Athenian statesman, he opposed the Lacedaemonians in

everything, and would have no concessions, but ever urged the Athenians

on to war.

The Athenians retorted by ordering the Lacedaemonians to drive out the

curse of Taenarus. The Lacedaemonians had once raised up some Helot

suppliants from the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, led them away and

slain them; for which they believe the great earthquake at Sparta to

have been a retribution. The Athenians also ordered them to drive out

the curse of the goddess of the Brazen House; the history of which is

as follows. After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had been recalled by the

Spartans from his command in the Hellespont (this is his first recall),

and had been tried by them and acquitted, not being again sent out in a

public capacity, he took a galley of Hermione on his own

responsibility, without the authority of the Lacedaemonians, and

arrived as a private person in the Hellespont. He came ostensibly for

the Hellenic war, really to carry on his intrigues with the King, which

he had begun before his recall, being ambitious of reigning over

Hellas. The circumstance which first enabled him to lay the King under

an obligation, and to make a beginning of the whole design, was this.

Some connections and kinsmen of the King had been taken in Byzantium,

on its capture from the Medes, when he was first there, after the

return from Cyprus. These captives he sent off to the King without the

knowledge of the rest of the allies, the account being that they had

escaped from him. He managed this with the help of Gongylus, an

Eretrian, whom he had placed in charge of Byzantium and the prisoners.

He also gave Gongylus a letter for the King, the contents of which were

as follows, as was afterwards discovered: “Pausanias, the general of

Sparta, anxious to do you a favour, sends you these his prisoners of

war. I propose also, with your approval, to marry your daughter, and to

make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to you. I may say that I

think I am able to do this, with your co-operation. Accordingly if any

of this please you, send a safe man to the sea through whom we may in

future conduct our correspondence.”

This was all that was revealed in the writing, and Xerxes was pleased

with the letter. He sent off Artabazus, son of Pharnaces, to the sea

with orders to supersede Megabates, the previous governor in the

satrapy of Daskylion, and to send over as quickly as possible to

Pausanias at Byzantium a letter which he entrusted to him; to show him

the royal signet, and to execute any commission which he might receive

from Pausanias on the King’s matters with all care and fidelity.

Artabazus on his arrival carried the King’s orders into effect, and

sent over the letter, which contained the following answer: “Thus saith

King Xerxes to Pausanias. For the men whom you have saved for me across

sea from Byzantium, an obligation is laid up for you in our house,

recorded for ever; and with your proposals I am well pleased. Let

neither night nor day stop you from diligently performing any of your

promises to me; neither for cost of gold nor of silver let them be

hindered, nor yet for number of troops, wherever it may be that their

presence is needed; but with Artabazus, an honourable man whom I send

you, boldly advance my objects and yours, as may be most for the honour

and interest of us both.”

Before held in high honour by the Hellenes as the hero of Plataea,

Pausanias, after the receipt of this letter, became prouder than ever,

and could no longer live in the usual style, but went out of Byzantium

in a Median dress, was attended on his march through Thrace by a

bodyguard of Medes and Egyptians, kept a Persian table, and was quite

unable to contain his intentions, but betrayed by his conduct in

trifles what his ambition looked one day to enact on a grander scale.

He also made himself difficult of access, and displayed so violent a

temper to every one without exception that no one could come near him.

Indeed, this was the principal reason why the confederacy went over to

the Athenians.

The above-mentioned conduct, coming to the ears of the Lacedaemonians,

occasioned his first recall. And after his second voyage out in the

ship of Hermione, without their orders, he gave proofs of similar

behaviour. Besieged and expelled from Byzantium by the Athenians, he

did not return to Sparta; but news came that he had settled at Colonae

in the Troad, and was intriguing with the barbarians, and that his stay

there was for no good purpose; and the ephors, now no longer

hesitating, sent him a herald and a scytale with orders to accompany

the herald or be declared a public enemy. Anxious above everything to

avoid suspicion, and confident that he could quash the charge by means

of money, he returned a second time to Sparta. At first thrown into

prison by the ephors (whose powers enable them to do this to the King),

soon compromised the matter and came out again, and offered himself for

trial to any who wished to institute an inquiry concerning him.

Now the Spartans had no tangible proof against him—neither his enemies

nor the nation—of that indubitable kind required for the punishment of

a member of the royal family, and at that moment in high office; he

being regent for his first cousin King Pleistarchus, Leonidas’s son,

who was still a minor. But by his contempt of the laws and imitation of

the barbarians, he gave grounds for much suspicion of his being

discontented with things established; all the occasions on which he had

in any way departed from the regular customs were passed in review, and

it was remembered that he had taken upon himself to have inscribed on

the tripod at Delphi, which was dedicated by the Hellenes as the

first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, the following couplet:

The Mede defeated, great Pausanias raised

This monument, that Phœbus might be praised.

At the time the Lacedaemonians had at once erased the couplet, and

inscribed the names of the cities that had aided in the overthrow of

the barbarian and dedicated the offering. Yet it was considered that

Pausanias had here been guilty of a grave offence, which, interpreted

by the light of the attitude which he had since assumed, gained a new

significance, and seemed to be quite in keeping with his present

schemes. Besides, they were informed that he was even intriguing with

the Helots; and such indeed was the fact, for he promised them freedom

and citizenship if they would join him in insurrection and would help

him to carry out his plans to the end. Even now, mistrusting the

evidence even of the Helots themselves, the ephors would not consent to

take any decided step against him; in accordance with their regular

custom towards themselves, namely, to be slow in taking any irrevocable

resolve in the matter of a Spartan citizen without indisputable proof.

At last, it is said, the person who was going to carry to Artabazus the

last letter for the King, a man of Argilus, once the favourite and most

trusty servant of Pausanias, turned informer. Alarmed by the reflection

that none of the previous messengers had ever returned, having

counterfeited the seal, in order that, if he found himself mistaken in

his surmises, or if Pausanias should ask to make some correction, he

might not be discovered, he undid the letter, and found the postscript

that he had suspected, viz. an order to put him to death.

On being shown the letter, the ephors now felt more certain. Still,

they wished to hear Pausanias commit himself with their own ears.

Accordingly the man went by appointment to Taenarus as a suppliant, and

there built himself a hut divided into two by a partition; within which

he concealed some of the ephors and let them hear the whole matter

plainly. For Pausanias came to him and asked him the reason of his

suppliant position; and the man reproached him with the order that he

had written concerning him, and one by one declared all the rest of the

circumstances, how he who had never yet brought him into any danger,

while employed as agent between him and the King, was yet just like the

mass of his servants to be rewarded with death. Admitting all this, and

telling him not to be angry about the matter, Pausanias gave him the

pledge of raising him up from the temple, and begged him to set off as

quickly as possible, and not to hinder the business in hand.

The ephors listened carefully, and then departed, taking no action for

the moment, but, having at last attained to certainty, were preparing

to arrest him in the city. It is reported that, as he was about to be

arrested in the street, he saw from the face of one of the ephors what

he was coming for; another, too, made him a secret signal, and betrayed

it to him from kindness. Setting off with a run for the temple of the

goddess of the Brazen House, the enclosure of which was near at hand,

he succeeded in taking sanctuary before they took him, and entering

into a small chamber, which formed part of the temple, to avoid being

exposed to the weather, lay still there. The ephors, for the moment

distanced in the pursuit, afterwards took off the roof of the chamber,

and having made sure that he was inside, shut him in, barricaded the

doors, and staying before the place, reduced him by starvation. When

they found that he was on the point of expiring, just as he was, in the

chamber, they brought him out of the temple, while the breath was still

in him, and as soon as he was brought out he died. They were going to

throw him into the Kaiadas, where they cast criminals, but finally

decided to inter him somewhere near. But the god at Delphi afterwards

ordered the Lacedaemonians to remove the tomb to the place of his

death—where he now lies in the consecrated ground, as an inscription on

a monument declares—and, as what had been done was a curse to them, to

give back two bodies instead of one to the goddess of the Brazen House.

So they had two brazen statues made, and dedicated them as a substitute

for Pausanias. The Athenians retorted by telling the Lacedaemonians to

drive out what the god himself had pronounced to be a curse.

To return to the Medism of Pausanias. Matter was found in the course of

the inquiry to implicate Themistocles; and the Lacedaemonians

accordingly sent envoys to the Athenians and required them to punish

him as they had punished Pausanias. The Athenians consented to do so.

But he had, as it happened, been ostracized, and, with a residence at

Argos, was in the habit of visiting other parts of Peloponnese. So they

sent with the Lacedaemonians, who were ready to join in the pursuit,

persons with instructions to take him wherever they found him. But

Themistocles got scent of their intentions, and fled from Peloponnese

to Corcyra, which was under obligations towards him. But the

Corcyraeans alleged that they could not venture to shelter him at the

cost of offending Athens and Lacedaemon, and they conveyed him over to

the continent opposite. Pursued by the officers who hung on the report

of his movements, at a loss where to turn, he was compelled to stop at

the house of Admetus, the Molossian king, though they were not on

friendly terms. Admetus happened not to be indoors, but his wife, to

whom he made himself a suppliant, instructed him to take their child in

his arms and sit down by the hearth. Soon afterwards Admetus came in,

and Themistocles told him who he was, and begged him not to revenge on

Themistocles in exile any opposition which his requests might have

experienced from Themistocles at Athens. Indeed, he was now far too low

for his revenge; retaliation was only honourable between equals.

Besides, his opposition to the king had only affected the success of a

request, not the safety of his person; if the king were to give him up

to the pursuers that he mentioned, and the fate which they intended for

him, he would just be consigning him to certain death.

The King listened to him and raised him up with his son, as he was

sitting with him in his arms after the most effectual method of

supplication, and on the arrival of the Lacedaemonians not long

afterwards, refused to give him up for anything they could say, but

sent him off by land to the other sea to Pydna in Alexander’s

dominions, as he wished to go to the Persian king. There he met with a

merchantman on the point of starting for Ionia. Going on board, he was

carried by a storm to the Athenian squadron which was blockading Naxos.

In his alarm—he was luckily unknown to the people in the vessel—he told

the master who he was and what he was flying for, and said that, if he

refused to save him, he would declare that he was taking him for a

bribe. Meanwhile their safety consisted in letting no one leave the

ship until a favourable time for sailing should arise. If he complied

with his wishes, he promised him a proper recompense. The master acted

as he desired, and, after lying to for a day and a night out of reach

of the squadron, at length arrived at Ephesus.

After having rewarded him with a present of money, as soon as he

received some from his friends at Athens and from his secret hoards at

Argos, Themistocles started inland with one of the coast Persians, and

sent a letter to King Artaxerxes, Xerxes’s son, who had just come to

the throne. Its contents were as follows: “I, Themistocles, am come to

you, who did your house more harm than any of the Hellenes, when I was

compelled to defend myself against your father’s invasion—harm,

however, far surpassed by the good that I did him during his retreat,

which brought no danger for me but much for him. For the past, you are

a good turn in my debt”—here he mentioned the warning sent to Xerxes

from Salamis to retreat, as well as his finding the bridges unbroken,

which, as he falsely pretended, was due to him—“for the present, able

to do you great service, I am here, pursued by the Hellenes for my

friendship for you. However, I desire a year’s grace, when I shall be

able to declare in person the objects of my coming.”

It is said that the King approved his intention, and told him to do as

he said. He employed the interval in making what progress he could in

the study of the Persian tongue, and of the customs of the country.

Arrived at court at the end of the year, he attained to very high

consideration there, such as no Hellene has ever possessed before or

since; partly from his splendid antecedents, partly from the hopes

which he held out of effecting for him the subjugation of Hellas, but

principally by the proof which experience daily gave of his capacity.

For Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most indubitable signs of

genius; indeed, in this particular he has a claim on our admiration

quite extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own native capacity, alike

unformed and unsupplemented by study, he was at once the best judge in

those sudden crises which admit of little or of no deliberation, and

the best prophet of the future, even to its most distant possibilities.

An able theoretical expositor of all that came within the sphere of his

practice, he was not without the power of passing an adequate judgment

in matters in which he had no experience. He could also excellently

divine the good and evil which lay hid in the unseen future. In fine,

whether we consider the extent of his natural powers, or the slightness

of his application, this extraordinary man must be allowed to have

surpassed all others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an

emergency. Disease was the real cause of his death; though there is a

story of his having ended his life by poison, on finding himself unable

to fulfil his promises to the king. However this may be, there is a

monument to him in the marketplace of Asiatic Magnesia. He was governor

of the district, the King having given him Magnesia, which brought in

fifty talents a year, for bread, Lampsacus, which was considered to be

the richest wine country, for wine, and Myos for other provisions. His

bones, it is said, were conveyed home by his relatives in accordance

with his wishes, and interred in Attic ground. This was done without

the knowledge of the Athenians; as it is against the law to bury in

Attica an outlaw for treason. So ends the history of Pausanias and

Themistocles, the Lacedaemonian and the Athenian, the most famous men

of their time in Hellas.

To return to the Lacedaemonians. The history of their first embassy,

the injunctions which it conveyed, and the rejoinder which it provoked,

concerning the expulsion of the accursed persons, have been related

already. It was followed by a second, which ordered Athens to raise the

siege of Potidæa, and to respect the independence of Aegina. Above all,

it gave her most distinctly to understand that war might be prevented

by the revocation of the Megara decree, excluding the Megarians from

the use of Athenian harbours and of the market of Athens. But Athens

was not inclined either to revoke the decree, or to entertain their

other proposals; she accused the Megarians of pushing their cultivation

into the consecrated ground and the unenclosed land on the border, and

of harbouring her runaway slaves. At last an embassy arrived with the

Lacedaemonian ultimatum. The ambassadors were Ramphias, Melesippus, and

Agesander. Not a word was said on any of the old subjects; there was

simply this: “Lacedaemon wishes the peace to continue, and there is no

reason why it should not, if you would leave the Hellenes independent.”

Upon this the Athenians held an assembly, and laid the matter before

their consideration. It was resolved to deliberate once for all on all

their demands, and to give them an answer. There were many speakers who

came forward and gave their support to one side or the other, urging

the necessity of war, or the revocation of the decree and the folly of

allowing it to stand in the way of peace. Among them came forward

Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the first man of his time at Athens,

ablest alike in counsel and in action, and gave the following advice:

“There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to through everything,

and that is the principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians. I

know that the spirit which inspires men while they are being persuaded

to make war is not always retained in action; that as circumstances

change, resolutions change. Yet I see that now as before the same,

almost literally the same, counsel is demanded of me; and I put it to

those of you who are allowing yourselves to be persuaded, to support

the national resolves even in the case of reverses, or to forfeit all

credit for their wisdom in the event of success. For sometimes the

course of things is as arbitrary as the plans of man; indeed this is

why we usually blame chance for whatever does not happen as we

expected. Now it was clear before that Lacedaemon entertained designs

against us; it is still more clear now. The treaty provides that we

shall mutually submit our differences to legal settlement, and that we

shall meanwhile each keep what we have. Yet the Lacedaemonians never

yet made us any such offer, never yet would accept from us any such

offer; on the contrary, they wish complaints to be settled by war

instead of by negotiation; and in the end we find them here dropping

the tone of expostulation and adopting that of command. They order us

to raise the siege of Potidæa, to let Aegina be independent, to revoke

the Megara decree; and they conclude with an ultimatum warning us to

leave the Hellenes independent. I hope that you will none of you think

that we shall be going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the

Megara decree, which appears in front of their complaints, and the

revocation of which is to save us from war, or let any feeling of

self-reproach linger in your minds, as if you went to war for slight

cause. Why, this trifle contains the whole seal and trial of your

resolution. If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some

greater demand, as having been frightened into obedience in the first

instance; while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that

they must treat you more as equals. Make your decision therefore at

once, either to submit before you are harmed, or if we are to go to

war, as I for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether the

ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against making concessions

or consenting to a precarious tenure of our possessions. For all claims

from an equal, urged upon a neighbour as commands before any attempt at

legal settlement, be they great or be they small, have only one

meaning, and that is slavery.

“As to the war and the resources of either party, a detailed comparison

will not show you the inferiority of Athens. Personally engaged in the

cultivation of their land, without funds either private or public, the

Peloponnesians are also without experience in long wars across sea,

from the strict limit which poverty imposes on their attacks upon each

other. Powers of this description are quite incapable of often manning

a fleet or often sending out an army: they cannot afford the absence

from their homes, the expenditure from their own funds; and besides,

they have not command of the sea. Capital, it must be remembered,

maintains a war more than forced contributions. Farmers are a class of

men that are always more ready to serve in person than in purse.

Confident that the former will survive the dangers, they are by no

means so sure that the latter will not be prematurely exhausted,

especially if the war last longer than they expect, which it very

likely will. In a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies may

be able to defy all Hellas, but they are incapacitated from carrying on

a war against a power different in character from their own, by the

want of the single council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous

action, and the substitution of a diet composed of various races, in

which every state possesses an equal vote, and each presses its own

ends, a condition of things which generally results in no action at

all. The great wish of some is to avenge themselves on some particular

enemy, the great wish of others to save their own pocket. Slow in

assembling, they devote a very small fraction of the time to the

consideration of any public object, most of it to the prosecution of

their own objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his

neglect, that it is the business of somebody else to look after this or

that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all

separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays.

“But the principal point is the hindrance that they will experience

from want of money. The slowness with which it comes in will cause

delay; but the opportunities of war wait for no man. Again, we need not

be alarmed either at the possibility of their raising fortifications in

Attica, or at their navy. It would be difficult for any system of

fortifications to establish a rival city, even in time of peace, much

more, surely, in an enemy’s country, with Athens just as much fortified

against it as it against Athens; while a mere post might be able to do

some harm to the country by incursions and by the facilities which it

would afford for desertion, but can never prevent our sailing into

their country and raising fortifications there, and making reprisals

with our powerful fleet. For our naval skill is of more use to us for

service on land, than their military skill for service at sea.

Familiarity with the sea they will not find an easy acquisition. If you

who have been practising at it ever since the Median invasion have not

yet brought it to perfection, is there any chance of anything

considerable being effected by an agricultural, unseafaring population,

who will besides be prevented from practising by the constant presence

of strong squadrons of observation from Athens? With a small squadron

they might hazard an engagement, encouraging their ignorance by

numbers; but the restraint of a strong force will prevent their moving,

and through want of practice they will grow more clumsy, and

consequently more timid. It must be kept in mind that seamanship, just

like anything else, is a matter of art, and will not admit of being

taken up occasionally as an occupation for times of leisure; on the

contrary, it is so exacting as to leave leisure for nothing else.

“Even if they were to touch the moneys at Olympia or Delphi, and try to

seduce our foreign sailors by the temptation of higher pay, that would

only be a serious danger if we could not still be a match for them by

embarking our own citizens and the aliens resident among us. But in

fact by this means we are always a match for them; and, best of all, we

have a larger and higher class of native coxswains and sailors among

our own citizens than all the rest of Hellas. And to say nothing of the

danger of such a step, none of our foreign sailors would consent to

become an outlaw from his country, and to take service with them and

their hopes, for the sake of a few days’ high pay.

“This, I think, is a tolerably fair account of the position of the

Peloponnesians; that of Athens is free from the defects that I have

criticized in them, and has other advantages of its own, which they can

show nothing to equal. If they march against our country we will sail

against theirs, and it will then be found that the desolation of the

whole of Attica is not the same as that of even a fraction of

Peloponnese; for they will not be able to supply the deficiency except

by a battle, while we have plenty of land both on the islands and the

continent. The rule of the sea is indeed a great matter. Consider for a

moment. Suppose that we were islanders; can you conceive a more

impregnable position? Well, this in future should, as far as possible,

be our conception of our position. Dismissing all thought of our land

and houses, we must vigilantly guard the sea and the city. No

irritation that we may feel for the former must provoke us to a battle

with the numerical superiority of the Peloponnesians. A victory would

only be succeeded by another battle against the same superiority: a

reverse involves the loss of our allies, the source of our strength,

who will not remain quiet a day after we become unable to march against

them. We must cry not over the loss of houses and land but of men’s

lives; since houses and land do not gain men, but men them. And if I

had thought that I could persuade you, I would have bid you go out and

lay them waste with your own hands, and show the Peloponnesians that

this at any rate will not make you submit.

“I have many other reasons to hope for a favourable issue, if you can

consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the conduct of

the war, and will abstain from wilfully involving yourselves in other

dangers; indeed, I am more afraid of our own blunders than of the

enemy’s devices. But these matters shall be explained in another

speech, as events require; for the present dismiss these men with the

answer that we will allow Megara the use of our market and harbours,

when the Lacedaemonians suspend their alien acts in favour of us and

our allies, there being nothing in the treaty to prevent either one or

the other: that we will leave the cities independent, if independent we

found them when we made the treaty, and when the Lacedaemonians grant

to their cities an independence not involving subservience to

Lacedaemonian interests, but such as each severally may desire: that we

are willing to give the legal satisfaction which our agreements

specify, and that we shall not commence hostilities, but shall resist

those who do commence them. This is an answer agreeable at once to the

rights and the dignity of Athens. It must be thoroughly understood that

war is a necessity; but that the more readily we accept it, the less

will be the ardour of our opponents, and that out of the greatest

dangers communities and individuals acquire the greatest glory. Did not

our fathers resist the Medes not only with resources far different from

ours, but even when those resources had been abandoned; and more by

wisdom than by fortune, more by daring than by strength, did not they

beat off the barbarian and advance their affairs to their present

height? We must not fall behind them, but must resist our enemies in

any way and in every way, and attempt to hand down our power to our

posterity unimpaired.”

Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians, persuaded of the wisdom

of his advice, voted as he desired, and answered the Lacedaemonians as

he recommended, both on the separate points and in the general; they

would do nothing on dictation, but were ready to have the complaints

settled in a fair and impartial manner by the legal method, which the

terms of the truce prescribed. So the envoys departed home and did not

return again.

These were the charges and differences existing between the rival

powers before the war, arising immediately from the affair at Epidamnus

and Corcyra. Still intercourse continued in spite of them, and mutual

communication. It was carried on without heralds, but not without

suspicion, as events were occurring which were equivalent to a breach

of the treaty and matter for war.

CHAPTER VI

Beginning of the Peloponnesian War—First Invasion of Attica—Funeral

Oration of Pericles

The war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies on

either side now really begins. For now all intercourse except through

the medium of heralds ceased, and hostilities were commenced and

prosecuted without intermission. The history follows the chronological

order of events by summers and winters.

The thirty years’ truce which was entered into after the conquest of

Euboea lasted fourteen years. In the fifteenth, in the forty-eighth

year of the priestess-ship of Chrysis at Argos, in the ephorate of

Aenesias at Sparta, in the last month but two of the archonship of

Pythodorus at Athens, and six months after the battle of Potidæa, just

at the beginning of spring, a Theban force a little over three hundred

strong, under the command of their Boeotarchs, Pythangelus, son of

Phyleides, and Diemporus, son of Onetorides, about the first watch of

the night, made an armed entry into Plataea, a town of Boeotia in

alliance with Athens. The gates were opened to them by a Plataean

called Naucleides, who, with his party, had invited them in, meaning to

put to death the citizens of the opposite party, bring over the city to

Thebes, and thus obtain power for themselves. This was arranged through

Eurymachus, son of Leontiades, a person of great influence at Thebes.

For Plataea had always been at variance with Thebes; and the latter,

foreseeing that war was at hand, wished to surprise her old enemy in

time of peace, before hostilities had actually broken out. Indeed this

was how they got in so easily without being observed, as no guard had

been posted. After the soldiers had grounded arms in the market-place,

those who had invited them in wished them to set to work at once and go

to their enemies’ houses. This, however, the Thebans refused to do, but

determined to make a conciliatory proclamation, and if possible to come

to a friendly understanding with the citizens. Their herald accordingly

invited any who wished to resume their old place in the confederacy of

their countrymen to ground arms with them, for they thought that in

this way the city would readily join them.

On becoming aware of the presence of the Thebans within their gates,

and of the sudden occupation of the town, the Plataeans concluded in

their alarm that more had entered than was really the case, the night

preventing their seeing them. They accordingly came to terms and,

accepting the proposal, made no movement; especially as the Thebans

offered none of them any violence. But somehow or other, during the

negotiations, they discovered the scanty numbers of the Thebans, and

decided that they could easily attack and overpower them; the mass of

the Plataeans being averse to revolting from Athens. At all events they

resolved to attempt it. Digging through the party walls of the houses,

they thus managed to join each other without being seen going through

the streets, in which they placed wagons without the beasts in them, to

serve as a barricade, and arranged everything else as seemed convenient

for the occasion. When everything had been done that circumstances

permitted, they watched their opportunity and went out of their houses

against the enemy. It was still night, though daybreak was at hand: in

daylight it was thought that their attack would be met by men full of

courage and on equal terms with their assailants, while in darkness it

would fall upon panic-stricken troops, who would also be at a

disadvantage from their enemy’s knowledge of the locality. So they made

their assault at once, and came to close quarters as quickly as they

could.

The Thebans, finding themselves outwitted, immediately closed up to

repel all attacks made upon them. Twice or thrice they beat back their

assailants. But the men shouted and charged them, the women and slaves

screamed and yelled from the houses and pelted them with stones and

tiles; besides, it had been raining hard all night; and so at last

their courage gave way, and they turned and fled through the town. Most

of the fugitives were quite ignorant of the right ways out, and this,

with the mud, and the darkness caused by the moon being in her last

quarter, and the fact that their pursuers knew their way about and

could easily stop their escape, proved fatal to many. The only gate

open was the one by which they had entered, and this was shut by one of

the Plataeans driving the spike of a javelin into the bar instead of

the bolt; so that even here there was no longer any means of exit. They

were now chased all over the town. Some got on the wall and threw

themselves over, in most cases with a fatal result. One party managed

to find a deserted gate, and obtaining an axe from a woman, cut through

the bar; but as they were soon observed only a few succeeded in getting

out. Others were cut off in detail in different parts of the city. The

most numerous and compact body rushed into a large building next to the

city wall: the doors on the side of the street happened to be open, and

the Thebans fancied that they were the gates of the town, and that

there was a passage right through to the outside. The Plataeans, seeing

their enemies in a trap, now consulted whether they should set fire to

the building and burn them just as they were, or whether there was

anything else that they could do with them; until at length these and

the rest of the Theban survivors found wandering about the town agreed

to an unconditional surrender of themselves and their arms to the

Plataeans.

While such was the fate of the party in Plataea, the rest of the

Thebans who were to have joined them with all their forces before

daybreak, in case of anything miscarrying with the body that had

entered, received the news of the affair on the road, and pressed

forward to their succour. Now Plataea is nearly eight miles from

Thebes, and their march delayed by the rain that had fallen in the

night, for the river Asopus had risen and was not easy of passage; and

so, having to march in the rain, and being hindered in crossing the

river, they arrived too late, and found the whole party either slain or

captive. When they learned what had happened, they at once formed a

design against the Plataeans outside the city. As the attack had been

made in time of peace, and was perfectly unexpected, there were of

course men and stock in the fields; and the Thebans wished if possible

to have some prisoners to exchange against their countrymen in the

town, should any chance to have been taken alive. Such was their plan.

But the Plataeans suspected their intention almost before it was

formed, and becoming alarmed for their fellow citizens outside the

town, sent a herald to the Thebans, reproaching them for their

unscrupulous attempt to seize their city in time of peace, and warning

them against any outrage on those outside. Should the warning be

disregarded, they threatened to put to death the men they had in their

hands, but added that, on the Thebans retiring from their territory,

they would surrender the prisoners to their friends. This is the Theban

account of the matter, and they say that they had an oath given them.

The Plataeans, on the other hand, do not admit any promise of an

immediate surrender, but make it contingent upon subsequent

negotiation: the oath they deny altogether. Be this as it may, upon the

Thebans retiring from their territory without committing any injury,

the Plataeans hastily got in whatever they had in the country and

immediately put the men to death. The prisoners were a hundred and

eighty in number; Eurymachus, the person with whom the traitors had

negotiated, being one.

This done, the Plataeans sent a messenger to Athens, gave back the dead

to the Thebans under a truce, and arranged things in the city as seemed

best to meet the present emergency. The Athenians meanwhile, having had

word of the affair sent them immediately after its occurrence, had

instantly seized all the Boeotians in Attica, and sent a herald to the

Plataeans to forbid their proceeding to extremities with their Theban

prisoners without instructions from Athens. The news of the men’s death

had of course not arrived; the first messenger having left Plataea just

when the Thebans entered it, the second just after their defeat and

capture; so there was no later news. Thus the Athenians sent orders in

ignorance of the facts; and the herald on his arrival found the men

slain. After this the Athenians marched to Plataea and brought in

provisions, and left a garrison in the place, also taking away the

women and children and such of the men as were least efficient.

After the affair at Plataea, the treaty had been broken by an overt

act, and Athens at once prepared for war, as did also Lacedaemon and

her allies. They resolved to send embassies to the King and to such

other of the barbarian powers as either party could look to for

assistance, and tried to ally themselves with the independent states at

home. Lacedaemon, in addition to the existing marine, gave orders to

the states that had declared for her in Italy and Sicily to build

vessels up to a grand total of five hundred, the quota of each city

being determined by its size, and also to provide a specified sum of

money. Till these were ready they were to remain neutral and to admit

single Athenian ships into their harbours. Athens on her part reviewed

her existing confederacy, and sent embassies to the places more

immediately round Peloponnese—Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and

Zacynthus—perceiving that if these could be relied on she could carry

the war all round Peloponnese.

And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and put forth their

utmost strength for the war, this was only natural. Zeal is always at

its height at the commencement of an undertaking; and on this

particular occasion Peloponnese and Athens were both full of young men

whose inexperience made them eager to take up arms, while the rest of

Hellas stood straining with excitement at the conflict of its leading

cities. Everywhere predictions were being recited and oracles being

chanted by such persons as collect them, and this not only in the

contending cities. Further, some while before this, there was an

earthquake at Delos, for the first time in the memory of the Hellenes.

This was said and thought to be ominous of the events impending;

indeed, nothing of the kind that happened was allowed to pass without

remark. The good wishes of men made greatly for the Lacedaemonians,

especially as they proclaimed themselves the liberators of Hellas. No

private or public effort that could help them in speech or action was

omitted; each thinking that the cause suffered wherever he could not

himself see to it. So general was the indignation felt against Athens,

whether by those who wished to escape from her empire, or were

apprehensive of being absorbed by it. Such were the preparations and

such the feelings with which the contest opened.

The allies of the two belligerents were the following. These were the

allies of Lacedaemon: all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus except

the Argives and Achaeans, who were neutral; Pellene being the only

Achaean city that first joined in the war, though her example was

afterwards followed by the rest. Outside Peloponnese the Megarians,

Locrians, Boeotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians.

Of these, ships were furnished by the Corinthians, Megarians,

Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians; and cavalry

by the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The other states sent

infantry. This was the Lacedaemonian confederacy. That of Athens

comprised the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in Naupactus,

most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans, Zacynthians, and some

tributary cities in the following countries, viz., Caria upon the sea

with her Dorian neighbours, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian towns,

the islands lying between Peloponnese and Crete towards the east, and

all the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. Of these, ships were furnished

by Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, infantry and money by the rest. Such

were the allies of either party and their resources for the war.

Immediately after the affair at Plataea, Lacedaemon sent round orders

to the cities in Peloponnese and the rest of her confederacy to prepare

troops and the provisions requisite for a foreign campaign, in order to

invade Attica. The several states were ready at the time appointed and

assembled at the Isthmus: the contingent of each city being two-thirds

of its whole force. After the whole army had mustered, the

Lacedaemonian king, Archidamus, the leader of the expedition, called

together the generals of all the states and the principal persons and

officers, and exhorted them as follows:

“Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both within

and without Peloponnese, and the elder men among us here are not

without experience in war. Yet we have never set out with a larger

force than the present; and if our numbers and efficiency are

remarkable, so also is the power of the state against which we march.

We ought not then to show ourselves inferior to our ancestors, or

unequal to our own reputation. For the hopes and attention of all

Hellas are bent upon the present effort, and its sympathy is with the

enemy of the hated Athens. Therefore, numerous as the invading army may

appear to be, and certain as some may think it that our adversary will

not meet us in the field, this is no sort of justification for the

least negligence upon the march; but the officers and men of each

particular city should always be prepared for the advent of danger in

their own quarters. The course of war cannot be foreseen, and its

attacks are generally dictated by the impulse of the moment; and where

overweening self-confidence has despised preparation, a wise

apprehension often been able to make head against superior numbers. Not

that confidence is out of place in an army of invasion, but in an

enemy’s country it should also be accompanied by the precautions of

apprehension: troops will by this combination be best inspired for

dealing a blow, and best secured against receiving one. In the present

instance, the city against which we are going, far from being so

impotent for defence, is on the contrary most excellently equipped at

all points; so that we have every reason to expect that they will take

the field against us, and that if they have not set out already before

we are there, they will certainly do so when they see us in their

territory wasting and destroying their property. For men are always

exasperated at suffering injuries to which they are not accustomed, and

on seeing them inflicted before their very eyes; and where least

inclined for reflection, rush with the greatest heat to action. The

Athenians are the very people of all others to do this, as they aspire

to rule the rest of the world, and are more in the habit of invading

and ravaging their neighbours’ territory, than of seeing their own

treated in the like fashion. Considering, therefore, the power of the

state against which we are marching, and the greatness of the

reputation which, according to the event, we shall win or lose for our

ancestors and ourselves, remember as you follow where you may be led to

regard discipline and vigilance as of the first importance, and to obey

with alacrity the orders transmitted to you; as nothing contributes so

much to the credit and safety of an army as the union of large bodies

by a single discipline.”

With this brief speech dismissing the assembly, Archidamus first sent

off Melesippus, son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in case she

should be more inclined to submit on seeing the Peloponnesians actually

on the march. But the Athenians did not admit into the city or to their

assembly, Pericles having already carried a motion against admitting

either herald or embassy from the Lacedaemonians after they had once

marched out.

The herald was accordingly sent away without an audience, and ordered

to be beyond the frontier that same day; in future, if those who sent

him had a proposition to make, they must retire to their own territory

before they dispatched embassies to Athens. An escort was sent with

Melesippus to prevent his holding communication with any one. When he

reached the frontier and was just going to be dismissed, he departed

with these words: “This day will be the beginning of great misfortunes

to the Hellenes.” As soon as he arrived at the camp, and Archidamus

learnt that the Athenians had still no thoughts of submitting, he at

length began his march, and advanced with his army into their

territory. Meanwhile the Boeotians, sending their contingent and

cavalry to join the Peloponnesian expedition, went to Plataea with the

remainder and laid waste the country.

While the Peloponnesians were still mustering at the Isthmus, or on the

march before they invaded Attica, Pericles, son of Xanthippus, one of

the ten generals of the Athenians, finding that the invasion was to

take place, conceived the idea that Archidamus, who happened to be his

friend, might possibly pass by his estate without ravaging it. This he

might do, either from a personal wish to oblige him, or acting under

instructions from Lacedaemon for the purpose of creating a prejudice

against him, as had been before attempted in the demand for the

expulsion of the accursed family. He accordingly took the precaution of

announcing to the Athenians in the assembly that, although Archidamus

was his friend, yet this friendship should not extend to the detriment

of the state, and that in case the enemy should make his houses and

lands an exception to the rest and not pillage them, he at once gave

them up to be public property, so that they should not bring him into

suspicion. He also gave the citizens some advice on their present

affairs in the same strain as before. They were to prepare for the war,

and to carry in their property from the country. They were not to go

out to battle, but to come into the city and guard it, and get ready

their fleet, in which their real strength lay. They were also to keep a

tight rein on their allies—the strength of Athens being derived from

the money brought in by their payments, and success in war depending

principally upon conduct and capital, had no reason to despond. Apart

from other sources of income, an average revenue of six hundred talents

of silver was drawn from the tribute of the allies; and there were

still six thousand talents of coined silver in the Acropolis, out of

nine thousand seven hundred that had once been there, from which the

money had been taken for the porch of the Acropolis, the other public

buildings, and for Potidæa. This did not include the uncoined gold and

silver in public and private offerings, the sacred vessels for the

processions and games, the Median spoils, and similar resources to the

amount of five hundred talents. To this he added the treasures of the

other temples. These were by no means inconsiderable, and might fairly

be used. Nay, if they were ever absolutely driven to it, they might

take even the gold ornaments of Athene herself; for the statue

contained forty talents of pure gold and it was all removable. This

might be used for self-preservation, and must every penny of it be

restored. Such was their financial position—surely a satisfactory one.

Then they had an army of thirteen thousand heavy infantry, besides

sixteen thousand more in the garrisons and on home duty at Athens. This

was at first the number of men on guard in the event of an invasion: it

was composed of the oldest and youngest levies and the resident aliens

who had heavy armour. The Phaleric wall ran for four miles, before it

joined that round the city; and of this last nearly five had a guard,

although part of it was left without one, viz., that between the Long

Wall and the Phaleric. Then there were the Long Walls to Piraeus, a

distance of some four miles and a half, the outer of which was manned.

Lastly, the circumference of Piraeus with Munychia was nearly seven

miles and a half; only half of this, however, was guarded. Pericles

also showed them that they had twelve hundred horse including mounted

archers, with sixteen hundred archers unmounted, and three hundred

galleys fit for service. Such were the resources of Athens in the

different departments when the Peloponnesian invasion was impending and

hostilities were being commenced. Pericles also urged his usual

arguments for expecting a favourable issue to the war.

The Athenians listened to his advice, and began to carry in their wives

and children from the country, and all their household furniture, even

to the woodwork of their houses which they took down. Their sheep and

cattle they sent over to Euboea and the adjacent islands. But they

found it hard to move, as most of them had been always used to live in

the country.

From very early times this had been more the case with the Athenians

than with others. Under Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign

of Theseus, Attica had always consisted of a number of independent

townships, each with its own town hall and magistrates. Except in times

of danger the king at Athens was not consulted; in ordinary seasons

they carried on their government and settled their affairs without his

interference; sometimes even they waged war against him, as in the case

of the Eleusinians with Eumolpus against Erechtheus. In Theseus,

however, they had a king of equal intelligence and power; and one of

the chief features in his organization of the country was to abolish

the council-chambers and magistrates of the petty cities, and to merge

them in the single council-chamber and town hall of the present

capital. Individuals might still enjoy their private property just as

before, but they were henceforth compelled to have only one political

centre, viz., Athens; which thus counted all the inhabitants of Attica

among her citizens, so that when Theseus died he left a great state

behind him. Indeed, from him dates the Synoecia, or Feast of Union;

which is paid for by the state, and which the Athenians still keep in

honour of the goddess. Before this the city consisted of the present

citadel and the district beneath it looking rather towards the south.

This is shown by the fact that the temples of the other deities,

besides that of Athene, are in the citadel; and even those that are

outside it are mostly situated in this quarter of the city, as that of

the Olympian Zeus, of the Pythian Apollo, of Earth, and of Dionysus in

the Marshes, the same in whose honour the older Dionysia are to this

day celebrated in the month of Anthesterion not only by the Athenians

but also by their Ionian descendants. There are also other ancient

temples in this quarter. The fountain too, which, since the alteration

made by the tyrants, has been called Enneacrounos, or Nine Pipes, but

which, when the spring was open, went by the name of Callirhoe, or

Fairwater, was in those days, from being so near, used for the most

important offices. Indeed, the old fashion of using the water before

marriage and for other sacred purposes is still kept up. Again, from

their old residence in that quarter, the citadel is still known among

Athenians as the city.

The Athenians thus long lived scattered over Attica in independent

townships. Even after the centralization of Theseus, old habit still

prevailed; and from the early times down to the present war most

Athenians still lived in the country with their families and

households, and were consequently not at all inclined to move now,

especially as they had only just restored their establishments after

the Median invasion. Deep was their trouble and discontent at

abandoning their houses and the hereditary temples of the ancient

constitution, and at having to change their habits of life and to bid

farewell to what each regarded as his native city.

When they arrived at Athens, though a few had houses of their own to go

to, or could find an asylum with friends or relatives, by far the

greater number had to take up their dwelling in the parts of the city

that were not built over and in the temples and chapels of the heroes,

except the Acropolis and the temple of the Eleusinian Demeter and such

other Places as were always kept closed. The occupation of the plot of

ground lying below the citadel called the Pelasgian had been forbidden

by a curse; and there was also an ominous fragment of a Pythian oracle

which said:

Leave the Pelasgian parcel desolate, Woe worth the day that men inhabit

it!

Yet this too was now built over in the necessity of the moment. And in

my opinion, if the oracle proved true, it was in the opposite sense to

what was expected. For the misfortunes of the state did not arise from

the unlawful occupation, but the necessity of the occupation from the

war; and though the god did not mention this, he foresaw that it would

be an evil day for Athens in which the plot came to be inhabited. Many

also took up their quarters in the towers of the walls or wherever else

they could. For when they were all come in, the city proved too small

to hold them; though afterwards they divided the Long Walls and a great

part of Piraeus into lots and settled there. All this while great

attention was being given to the war; the allies were being mustered,

and an armament of a hundred ships equipped for Peloponnese. Such was

the state of preparation at Athens.

Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing. The first town

they came to in Attica was Oenoe, where they to enter the country.

Sitting down before it, they prepared to assault the wall with engines

and otherwise. Oenoe, standing upon the Athenian and Boeotian border,

was of course a walled town, and was used as a fortress by the

Athenians in time of war. So the Peloponnesians prepared for their

assault, and wasted some valuable time before the place. This delay

brought the gravest censure upon Archidamus. Even during the levying of

the war he had credit for weakness and Athenian sympathies by the half

measures he had advocated; and after the army had assembled he had

further injured himself in public estimation by his loitering at the

Isthmus and the slowness with which the rest of the march had been

conducted. But all this was as nothing to the delay at Oenoe. During

this interval the Athenians were carrying in their property; and it was

the belief of the Peloponnesians that a quick advance would have found

everything still out, had it not been for his procrastination. Such was

the feeling of the army towards Archidamus during the siege. But he, it

is said, expected that the Athenians would shrink from letting their

land be wasted, and would make their submission while it was still

uninjured; and this was why he waited.

But after he had assaulted Oenoe, and every possible attempt to take it

had failed, as no herald came from Athens, he at last broke up his camp

and invaded Attica. This was about eighty days after the Theban attempt

upon Plataea, just in the middle of summer, when the corn was ripe, and

Archidamus, son of Zeuxis, king of Lacedaemon, was in command.

Encamping in Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, they began their ravages,

and putting to flight some Athenian horse at a place called Rheiti, or

the Brooks, they then advanced, keeping Mount Aegaleus on their right,

through Cropia, until they reached Acharnae, the largest of the

Athenian demes or townships. Sitting down before it, they formed a camp

there, and continued their ravages for a long while.

The reason why Archidamus remained in order of battle at Acharnae

during this incursion, instead of descending into the plain, is said to

have been this. He hoped that the Athenians might possibly be tempted

by the multitude of their youth and the unprecedented efficiency of

their service to come out to battle and attempt to stop the devastation

of their lands. Accordingly, as they had met him at Eleusis or the

Thriasian plain, he tried if they could be provoked to a sally by the

spectacle of a camp at Acharnae. He thought the place itself a good

position for encamping; and it seemed likely that such an important

part of the state as the three thousand heavy infantry of the

Acharnians would refuse to submit to the ruin of their property, and

would force a battle on the rest of the citizens. On the other hand,

should the Athenians not take the field during this incursion, he could

then fearlessly ravage the plain in future invasions, and extend his

advance up to the very walls of Athens. After the Acharnians had lost

their own property they would be less willing to risk themselves for

that of their neighbours; and so there would be division in the

Athenian counsels. These were the motives of Archidamus for remaining

at Acharnae.

In the meanwhile, as long as the army was at Eleusis and the Thriasian

plain, hopes were still entertained of its not advancing any nearer. It

was remembered that Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon,

had invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army fourteen years before, but

had retreated without advancing farther than Eleusis and Thria, which

indeed proved the cause of his exile from Sparta, as it was thought he

had been bribed to retreat. But when they saw the army at Acharnae,

barely seven miles from Athens, they lost all patience. The territory

of Athens was being ravaged before the very eyes of the Athenians, a

sight which the young men had never seen before and the old only in the

Median wars; and it was naturally thought a grievous insult, and the

determination was universal, especially among the young men, to sally

forth and stop it. Knots were formed in the streets and engaged in hot

discussion; for if the proposed sally was warmly recommended, it was

also in some cases opposed. Oracles of the most various import were

recited by the collectors, and found eager listeners in one or other of

the disputants. Foremost in pressing for the sally were the Acharnians,

as constituting no small part of the army of the state, and as it was

their land that was being ravaged. In short, the whole city was in a

most excited state; Pericles was the object of general indignation; his

previous counsels were totally forgotten; he was abused for not leading

out the army which he commanded, and was made responsible for the whole

of the public suffering.

He, meanwhile, seeing anger and infatuation just now in the ascendant,

and of his wisdom in refusing a sally, would not call either assembly

or meeting of the people, fearing the fatal results of a debate

inspired by passion and not by prudence. Accordingly he addressed

himself to the defence of the city, and kept it as quiet as possible,

though he constantly sent out cavalry to prevent raids on the lands

near the city from flying parties of the enemy. There was a trifling

affair at Phrygia between a squadron of the Athenian horse with the

Thessalians and the Boeotian cavalry; in which the former had rather

the best of it, until the heavy infantry advanced to the support of the

Boeotians, when the Thessalians and Athenians were routed and lost a

few men, whose bodies, however, were recovered the same day without a

truce. The next day the Peloponnesians set up a trophy. Ancient

alliance brought the Thessalians to the aid of Athens; those who came

being the Larisaeans, Pharsalians, Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians,

and Pheraeans. The Larisaean commanders were Polymedes and Aristonus,

two party leaders in Larisa; the Pharsalian general was Menon; each of

the other cities had also its own commander.

In the meantime the Peloponnesians, as the Athenians did not come out

to engage them, broke up from Acharnae and ravaged some of the demes

between Mount Parnes and Brilessus. While they were in Attica the

Athenians sent off the hundred ships which they had been preparing

round Peloponnese, with a thousand heavy infantry and four hundred

archers on board, under the command of Carcinus, son of Xenotimus,

Proteas, son of Epicles, and Socrates, son of Antigenes. This armament

weighed anchor and started on its cruise, and the Peloponnesians, after

remaining in Attica as long as their provisions lasted, retired through

Boeotia by a different road to that by which they had entered. As they

passed Oropus they ravaged the territory of Graea, which is held by the

Oropians from Athens, and reaching Peloponnese broke up to their

respective cities.

After they had retired the Athenians set guards by land and sea at the

points at which they intended to have regular stations during the war.

They also resolved to set apart a special fund of a thousand talents

from the moneys in the Acropolis. This was not to be spent, but the

current expenses of the war were to be otherwise provided for. If any

one should move or put to the vote a proposition for using the money

for any purpose whatever except that of defending the city in the event

of the enemy bringing a fleet to make an attack by sea, it should be a

capital offence. With this sum of money they also set aside a special

fleet of one hundred galleys, the best ships of each year, with their

captains. None of these were to be used except with the money and

against the same peril, should such peril arise.

Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships round Peloponnese,

reinforced by a Corcyraean squadron of fifty vessels and some others of

the allies in those parts, cruised about the coasts and ravaged the

country. Among other places they landed in Laconia and made an assault

upon Methone; there being no garrison in the place, and the wall being

weak. But it so happened that Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan, was

in command of a guard for the defence of the district. Hearing of the

attack, he hurried with a hundred heavy infantry to the assistance of

the besieged, and dashing through the army of the Athenians, which was

scattered over the country and had its attention turned to the wall,

threw himself into Methone. He lost a few men in making good his

entrance, but saved the place and won the thanks of Sparta by his

exploit, being thus the first officer who obtained this notice during

the war. The Athenians at once weighed anchor and continued their

cruise. Touching at Pheia in Elis, they ravaged the country for two

days and defeated a picked force of three hundred men that had come

from the vale of Elis and the immediate neighbourhood to the rescue.

But a stiff squall came down upon them, and, not liking to face it in a

place where there was no harbour, most of them got on board their

ships, and doubling Point Ichthys sailed into the port of Pheia. In the

meantime the Messenians, and some others who could not get on board,

marched over by land and took Pheia. The fleet afterwards sailed round

and picked them up and then put to sea; Pheia being evacuated, as the

main army of the Eleans had now come up. The Athenians continued their

cruise, and ravaged other places on the coast.

About the same time the Athenians sent thirty ships to cruise round

Locris and also to guard Euboea; Cleopompus, son of Clinias, being in

command. Making descents from the fleet he ravaged certain places on

the sea-coast, and captured Thronium and took hostages from it. He also

defeated at Alope the Locrians that had assembled to resist him.

During the summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans with their

wives and children from Aegina, on the ground of their having been the

chief agents in bringing the war upon them. Besides, Aegina lies so

near Peloponnese that it seemed safer to send colonists of their own to

hold it, and shortly afterwards the settlers were sent out. The

banished Aeginetans found an asylum in Thyrea, which was given to them

by Lacedaemon, not only on account of her quarrel with Athens, but also

because the Aeginetans had laid her under obligations at the time of

the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. The territory of Thyrea is

on the frontier of Argolis and Laconia, reaching down to the sea. Those

of the Aeginetans who did not settle here were scattered over the rest

of Hellas.

The same summer, at the beginning of a new lunar month, the only time

by the way at which it appears possible, the sun was eclipsed after

noon. After it had assumed the form of a crescent and some of the stars

had come out, it returned to its natural shape.

During the same summer Nymphodorus, son of Pythes, an Abderite, whose

sister Sitalces had married, was made their proxenus by the Athenians

and sent for to Athens. They had hitherto considered him their enemy;

but he had great influence with Sitalces, and they wished this prince

to become their ally. Sitalces was the son of Teres and King of the

Thracians. Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first to establish

the great kingdom of the Odrysians on a scale quite unknown to the rest

of Thrace, a large portion of the Thracians being independent. This

Teres is in no way related to Tereus who married Pandion’s daughter

Procne from Athens; nor indeed did they belong to the same part of

Thrace. Tereus lived in Daulis, part of what is now called Phocis, but

which at that time was inhabited by Thracians. It was in this land that

the women perpetrated the outrage upon Itys; and many of the poets when

they mention the nightingale call it the Daulian bird. Besides, Pandion

in contracting an alliance for his daughter would consider the

advantages of mutual assistance, and would naturally prefer a match at

the above moderate distance to the journey of many days which separates

Athens from the Odrysians. Again the names are different; and this

Teres was king of the Odrysians, the first by the way who attained to

any power. Sitalces, his son, was now sought as an ally by the

Athenians, who desired his aid in the reduction of the Thracian towns

and of Perdiccas. Coming to Athens, Nymphodorus concluded the alliance

with Sitalces and made his son Sadocus an Athenian citizen, and

promised to finish the war in Thrace by persuading Sitalces to send the

Athenians a force of Thracian horse and targeteers. He also reconciled

them with Perdiccas, and induced them to restore Therme to him; upon

which Perdiccas at once joined the Athenians and Phormio in an

expedition against the Chalcidians. Thus Sitalces, son of Teres, King

of the Thracians, and Perdiccas, son of Alexander, King of the

Macedonians, became allies of Athens.

Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred vessels were still cruising

round Peloponnese. After taking Sollium, a town belonging to Corinth,

and presenting the city and territory to the Acarnanians of Palaira,

they stormed Astacus, expelled its tyrant Evarchus, and gained the

place for their confederacy. Next they sailed to the island of

Cephallenia and brought it over without using force. Cephallenia lies

off Acarnania and Leucas, and consists of four states, the Paleans,

Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronaeans. Not long afterwards the fleet

returned to Athens. Towards the autumn of this year the Athenians

invaded the Megarid with their whole levy, resident aliens included,

under the command of Pericles, son of Xanthippus. The Athenians in the

hundred ships round Peloponnese on their journey home had just reached

Aegina, and hearing that the citizens at home were in full force at

Megara, now sailed over and joined them. This was without doubt the

largest army of Athenians ever assembled, the state being still in the

flower of her strength and yet unvisited by the plague. Full ten

thousand heavy infantry were in the field, all Athenian citizens,

besides the three thousand before Potidæa. Then the resident aliens who

joined in the incursion were at least three thousand strong; besides

which there was a multitude of light troops. They ravaged the greater

part of the territory, and then retired. Other incursions into the

Megarid were afterwards made by the Athenians annually during the war,

sometimes only with cavalry, sometimes with all their forces. This went

on until the capture of Nisaea. Atalanta also, the desert island off

the Opuntian coast, was towards the end of this summer converted into a

fortified post by the Athenians, in order to prevent privateers issuing

from Opus and the rest of Locris and plundering Euboea. Such were the

events of this summer after the return of the Peloponnesians from

Attica.

In the ensuing winter the Acarnanian Evarchus, wishing to return to

Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail over with forty ships and

fifteen hundred heavy infantry and restore him; himself also hiring

some mercenaries. In command of the force were Euphamidas, son of

Aristonymus, Timoxenus, son of Timocrates, and Eumachus, son of

Chrysis, who sailed over and restored him and, after failing in an

attempt on some places on the Acarnanian coast which they were desirous

of gaining, began their voyage home. Coasting along shore they touched

at Cephallenia and made a descent on the Cranian territory, and losing

some men by the treachery of the Cranians, who fell suddenly upon them

after having agreed to treat, put to sea somewhat hurriedly and

returned home.

In the same winter the Athenians gave a funeral at the public cost to

those who had first fallen in this war. It was a custom of their

ancestors, and the manner of it is as follows. Three days before the

ceremony, the bones of the dead are laid out in a tent which has been

erected; and their friends bring to their relatives such offerings as

they please. In the funeral procession cypress coffins are borne in

cars, one for each tribe; the bones of the deceased being placed in the

coffin of their tribe. Among these is carried one empty bier decked for

the missing, that is, for those whose bodies could not be recovered.

Any citizen or stranger who pleases, joins in the procession: and the

female relatives are there to wail at the burial. The dead are laid in

the public sepulchre in the Beautiful suburb of the city, in which

those who fall in war are always buried; with the exception of those

slain at Marathon, who for their singular and extraordinary valour were

interred on the spot where they fell. After the bodies have been laid

in the earth, a man chosen by the state, of approved wisdom and eminent

reputation, pronounces over them an appropriate panegyric; after which

all retire. Such is the manner of the burying; and throughout the whole

of the war, whenever the occasion arose, the established custom was

observed. Meanwhile these were the first that had fallen, and Pericles,

son of Xanthippus, was chosen to pronounce their eulogium. When the

proper time arrived, he advanced from the sepulchre to an elevated

platform in order to be heard by as many of the crowd as possible, and

spoke as follows:

“Most of my predecessors in this place have commended him who made this

speech part of the law, telling us that it is well that it should be

delivered at the burial of those who fall in battle. For myself, I

should have thought that the worth which had displayed itself in deeds

would be sufficiently rewarded by honours also shown by deeds; such as

you now see in this funeral prepared at the people’s cost. And I could

have wished that the reputations of many brave men were not to be

imperilled in the mouth of a single individual, to stand or fall

according as he spoke well or ill. For it is hard to speak properly

upon a subject where it is even difficult to convince your hearers that

you are speaking the truth. On the one hand, the friend who is familiar

with every fact of the story may think that some point has not been set

forth with that fullness which he wishes and knows it to deserve; on

the other, he who is a stranger to the matter may be led by envy to

suspect exaggeration if he hears anything above his own nature. For men

can endure to hear others praised only so long as they can severally

persuade themselves of their own ability to equal the actions

recounted: when this point is passed, envy comes in and with it

incredulity. However, since our ancestors have stamped this custom with

their approval, it becomes my duty to obey the law and to try to

satisfy your several wishes and opinions as best I may.

“I shall begin with our ancestors: it is both just and proper that they

should have the honour of the first mention on an occasion like the

present. They dwelt in the country without break in the succession from

generation to generation, and handed it down free to the present time

by their valour. And if our more remote ancestors deserve praise, much

more do our own fathers, who added to their inheritance the empire

which we now possess, and spared no pains to be able to leave their

acquisitions to us of the present generation. Lastly, there are few

parts of our dominions that have not been augmented by those of us

here, who are still more or less in the vigour of life; while the

mother country has been furnished by us with everything that can enable

her to depend on her own resources whether for war or for peace. That

part of our history which tells of the military achievements which gave

us our several possessions, or of the ready valour with which either we

or our fathers stemmed the tide of Hellenic or foreign aggression, is a

theme too familiar to my hearers for me to dilate on, and I shall

therefore pass it by. But what was the road by which we reached our

position, what the form of government under which our greatness grew,

what the national habits out of which it sprang; these are questions

which I may try to solve before I proceed to my panegyric upon these

men; since I think this to be a subject upon which on the present

occasion a speaker may properly dwell, and to which the whole

assemblage, whether citizens or foreigners, may listen with advantage.

“Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbouring states; we are

rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration

favours the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a

democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in

their private differences; if no social standing, advancement in public

life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being

allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if

a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity

of his condition. The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends

also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous

surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry

with our neighbour for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those

injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they

inflict no positive penalty. But all this ease in our private relations

does not make us lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief

safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws,

particularly such as regard the protection of the injured, whether they

are actually on the statute book, or belong to that code which,

although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace.

“Further, we provide plenty of means for the mind to refresh itself

from business. We celebrate games and sacrifices all the year round,

and the elegance of our private establishments forms a daily source of

pleasure and helps to banish the spleen; while the magnitude of our

city draws the produce of the world into our harbour, so that to the

Athenian the fruits of other countries are as familiar a luxury as

those of his own.

“If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ from our

antagonists. We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien

acts exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing,

although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our

liberality; trusting less in system and policy than to the native

spirit of our citizens; while in education, where our rivals from their

very cradles by a painful discipline seek after manliness, at Athens we

live exactly as we please, and yet are just as ready to encounter every

legitimate danger. In proof of this it may be noticed that the

Lacedaemonians do not invade our country alone, but bring with them all

their confederates; while we Athenians advance unsupported into the

territory of a neighbour, and fighting upon a foreign soil usually

vanquish with ease men who are defending their homes. Our united force

was never yet encountered by any enemy, because we have at once to

attend to our marine and to dispatch our citizens by land upon a

hundred different services; so that, wherever they engage with some

such fraction of our strength, a success against a detachment is

magnified into a victory over the nation, and a defeat into a reverse

suffered at the hands of our entire people. And yet if with habits not

of labour but of ease, and courage not of art but of nature, we are

still willing to encounter danger, we have the double advantage of

escaping the experience of hardships in anticipation and of facing them

in the hour of need as fearlessly as those who are never free from

them.

“Nor are these the only points in which our city is worthy of

admiration. We cultivate refinement without extravagance and knowledge

without effeminacy; wealth we employ more for use than for show, and

place the real disgrace of poverty not in owning to the fact but in

declining the struggle against it. Our public men have, besides

politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary

citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still fair

judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, regarding him

who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, we

Athenians are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate, and,

instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of

action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at

all. Again, in our enterprises we present the singular spectacle of

daring and deliberation, each carried to its highest point, and both

united in the same persons; although usually decision is the fruit of

ignorance, hesitation of reflection. But the palm of courage will

surely be adjudged most justly to those, who best know the difference

between hardship and pleasure and yet are never tempted to shrink from

danger. In generosity we are equally singular, acquiring our friends by

conferring, not by receiving, favours. Yet, of course, the doer of the

favour is the firmer friend of the two, in order by continued kindness

to keep the recipient in his debt; while the debtor feels less keenly

from the very consciousness that the return he makes will be a payment,

not a free gift. And it is only the Athenians, who, fearless of

consequences, confer their benefits not from calculations of

expediency, but in the confidence of liberality.

“In short, I say that as a city we are the school of Hellas, while I

doubt if the world can produce a man who, where he has only himself to

depend upon, is equal to so many emergencies, and graced by so happy a

versatility, as the Athenian. And that this is no mere boast thrown out

for the occasion, but plain matter of fact, the power of the state

acquired by these habits proves. For Athens alone of her contemporaries

is found when tested to be greater than her reputation, and alone gives

no occasion to her assailants to blush at the antagonist by whom they

have been worsted, or to her subjects to question her title by merit to

rule. Rather, the admiration of the present and succeeding ages will be

ours, since we have not left our power without witness, but have shown

it by mighty proofs; and far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist,

or other of his craft whose verses might charm for the moment only for

the impression which they gave to melt at the touch of fact, we have

forced every sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and

everywhere, whether for evil or for good, have left imperishable

monuments behind us. Such is the Athens for which these men, in the

assertion of their resolve not to lose her, nobly fought and died; and

well may every one of their survivors be ready to suffer in her cause.

“Indeed if I have dwelt at some length upon the character of our

country, it has been to show that our stake in the struggle is not the

same as theirs who have no such blessings to lose, and also that the

panegyric of the men over whom I am now speaking might be by definite

proofs established. That panegyric is now in a great measure complete;

for the Athens that I have celebrated is only what the heroism of these

and their like have made her, men whose fame, unlike that of most

Hellenes, will be found to be only commensurate with their deserts. And

if a test of worth be wanted, it is to be found in their closing scene,

and this not only in cases in which it set the final seal upon their

merit, but also in those in which it gave the first intimation of their

having any. For there is justice in the claim that steadfastness in his

country’s battles should be as a cloak to cover a man’s other

imperfections; since the good action has blotted out the bad, and his

merit as a citizen more than outweighed his demerits as an individual.

But none of these allowed either wealth with its prospect of future

enjoyment to unnerve his spirit, or poverty with its hope of a day of

freedom and riches to tempt him to shrink from danger. No, holding that

vengeance upon their enemies was more to be desired than any personal

blessings, and reckoning this to be the most glorious of hazards, they

joyfully determined to accept the risk, to make sure of their

vengeance, and to let their wishes wait; and while committing to hope

the uncertainty of final success, in the business before them they

thought fit to act boldly and trust in themselves. Thus choosing to die

resisting, rather than to live submitting, they fled only from

dishonour, but met danger face to face, and after one brief moment,

while at the summit of their fortune, escaped, not from their fear, but

from their glory.

“So died these men as became Athenians. You, their survivors, must

determine to have as unfaltering a resolution in the field, though you

may pray that it may have a happier issue. And not contented with ideas

derived only from words of the advantages which are bound up with the

defence of your country, though these would furnish a valuable text to

a speaker even before an audience so alive to them as the present, you

must yourselves realize the power of Athens, and feed your eyes upon

her from day to day, till love of her fills your hearts; and then, when

all her greatness shall break upon you, you must reflect that it was by

courage, sense of duty, and a keen feeling of honour in action that men

were enabled to win all this, and that no personal failure in an

enterprise could make them consent to deprive their country of their

valour, but they laid it at her feet as the most glorious contribution

that they could offer. For this offering of their lives made in common

by them all they each of them individually received that renown which

never grows old, and for a sepulchre, not so much that in which their

bones have been deposited, but that noblest of shrines wherein their

glory is laid up to be eternally remembered upon every occasion on

which deed or story shall call for its commemoration. For heroes have

the whole earth for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, where

the column with its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every

breast a record unwritten with no tablet to preserve it, except that of

the heart. These take as your model and, judging happiness to be the

fruit of freedom and freedom of valour, never decline the dangers of

war. For it is not the miserable that would most justly be unsparing of

their lives; these have nothing to hope for: it is rather they to whom

continued life may bring reverses as yet unknown, and to whom a fall,

if it came, would be most tremendous in its consequences. And surely,

to a man of spirit, the degradation of cowardice must be immeasurably

more grievous than the unfelt death which strikes him in the midst of

his strength and patriotism!

“Comfort, therefore, not condolence, is what I have to offer to the

parents of the dead who may be here. Numberless are the chances to

which, as they know, the life of man is subject; but fortunate indeed

are they who draw for their lot a death so glorious as that which has

caused your mourning, and to whom life has been so exactly measured as

to terminate in the happiness in which it has been passed. Still I know

that this is a hard saying, especially when those are in question of

whom you will constantly be reminded by seeing in the homes of others

blessings of which once you also boasted: for grief is felt not so much

for the want of what we have never known, as for the loss of that to

which we have been long accustomed. Yet you who are still of an age to

beget children must bear up in the hope of having others in their

stead; not only will they help you to forget those whom you have lost,

but will be to the state at once a reinforcement and a security; for

never can a fair or just policy be expected of the citizen who does

not, like his fellows, bring to the decision the interests and

apprehensions of a father. While those of you who have passed your

prime must congratulate yourselves with the thought that the best part

of your life was fortunate, and that the brief span that remains will

be cheered by the fame of the departed. For it is only the love of

honour that never grows old; and honour it is, not gain, as some would

have it, that rejoices the heart of age and helplessness.

“Turning to the sons or brothers of the dead, I see an arduous struggle

before you. When a man is gone, all are wont to praise him, and should

your merit be ever so transcendent, you will still find it difficult

not merely to overtake, but even to approach their renown. The living

have envy to contend with, while those who are no longer in our path

are honoured with a goodwill into which rivalry does not enter. On the

other hand, if I must say anything on the subject of female excellence

to those of you who will now be in widowhood, it will be all comprised

in this brief exhortation. Great will be your glory in not falling

short of your natural character; and greatest will be hers who is least

talked of among the men, whether for good or for bad.

“My task is now finished. I have performed it to the best of my

ability, and in word, at least, the requirements of the law are now

satisfied. If deeds be in question, those who are here interred have

received part of their honours already, and for the rest, their

children will be brought up till manhood at the public expense: the

state thus offers a valuable prize, as the garland of victory in this

race of valour, for the reward both of those who have fallen and their

survivors. And where the rewards for merit are greatest, there are

found the best citizens.

“And now that you have brought to a close your lamentations for your

relatives, you may depart.”

CHAPTER VII

Second Year of the War—The Plague of Athens—Position and Policy of

Pericles—Fall of Potidæa

Such was the funeral that took place during this winter, with which the

first year of the war came to an end. In the first days of summer the

Lacedaemonians and their allies, with two-thirds of their forces as

before, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son of

Zeuxidamus, King of Lacedaemon, and sat down and laid waste the

country. Not many days after their arrival in Attica the plague first

began to show itself among the Athenians. It was said that it had

broken out in many places previously in the neighbourhood of Lemnos and

elsewhere; but a pestilence of such extent and mortality was nowhere

remembered. Neither were the physicians at first of any service,

ignorant as they were of the proper way to treat it, but they died

themselves the most thickly, as they visited the sick most often; nor

did any human art succeed any better. Supplications in the temples,

divinations, and so forth were found equally futile, till the

overwhelming nature of the disaster at last put a stop to them

altogether.

It first began, it is said, in the parts of Ethiopia above Egypt, and

thence descended into Egypt and Libya and into most of the King’s

country. Suddenly falling upon Athens, it first attacked the population

in Piraeus—which was the occasion of their saying that the

Peloponnesians had poisoned the reservoirs, there being as yet no wells

there—and afterwards appeared in the upper city, when the deaths became

much more frequent. All speculation as to its origin and its causes, if

causes can be found adequate to produce so great a disturbance, I leave

to other writers, whether lay or professional; for myself, I shall

simply set down its nature, and explain the symptoms by which perhaps

it may be recognized by the student, if it should ever break out again.

This I can the better do, as I had the disease myself, and watched its

operation in the case of others.

That year then is admitted to have been otherwise unprecedentedly free

from sickness; and such few cases as occurred all determined in this.

As a rule, however, there was no ostensible cause; but people in good

health were all of a sudden attacked by violent heats in the head, and

redness and inflammation in the eyes, the inward parts, such as the

throat or tongue, becoming bloody and emitting an unnatural and fetid

breath. These symptoms were followed by sneezing and hoarseness, after

which the pain soon reached the chest, and produced a hard cough. When

it fixed in the stomach, it upset it; and discharges of bile of every

kind named by physicians ensued, accompanied by very great distress. In

most cases also an ineffectual retching followed, producing violent

spasms, which in some cases ceased soon after, in others much later.

Externally the body was not very hot to the touch, nor pale in its

appearance, but reddish, livid, and breaking out into small pustules

and ulcers. But internally it burned so that the patient could not bear

to have on him clothing or linen even of the very lightest description;

or indeed to be otherwise than stark naked. What they would have liked

best would have been to throw themselves into cold water; as indeed was

done by some of the neglected sick, who plunged into the rain-tanks in

their agonies of unquenchable thirst; though it made no difference

whether they drank little or much. Besides this, the miserable feeling

of not being able to rest or sleep never ceased to torment them. The

body meanwhile did not waste away so long as the distemper was at its

height, but held out to a marvel against its ravages; so that when they

succumbed, as in most cases, on the seventh or eighth day to the

internal inflammation, they had still some strength in them. But if

they passed this stage, and the disease descended further into the

bowels, inducing a violent ulceration there accompanied by severe

diarrhoea, this brought on a weakness which was generally fatal. For

the disorder first settled in the head, ran its course from thence

through the whole of the body, and, even where it did not prove mortal,

it still left its mark on the extremities; for it settled in the privy

parts, the fingers and the toes, and many escaped with the loss of

these, some too with that of their eyes. Others again were seized with

an entire loss of memory on their first recovery, and did not know

either themselves or their friends.

But while the nature of the distemper was such as to baffle all

description, and its attacks almost too grievous for human nature to

endure, it was still in the following circumstance that its difference

from all ordinary disorders was most clearly shown. All the birds and

beasts that prey upon human bodies, either abstained from touching them

(though there were many lying unburied), or died after tasting them. In

proof of this, it was noticed that birds of this kind actually

disappeared; they were not about the bodies, or indeed to be seen at

all. But of course the effects which I have mentioned could best be

studied in a domestic animal like the dog.

Such then, if we pass over the varieties of particular cases which were

many and peculiar, were the general features of the distemper.

Meanwhile the town enjoyed an immunity from all the ordinary disorders;

or if any case occurred, it ended in this. Some died in neglect, others

in the midst of every attention. No remedy was found that could be used

as a specific; for what did good in one case, did harm in another.

Strong and weak constitutions proved equally incapable of resistance,

all alike being swept away, although dieted with the utmost precaution.

By far the most terrible feature in the malady was the dejection which

ensued when any one felt himself sickening, for the despair into which

they instantly fell took away their power of resistance, and left them

a much easier prey to the disorder; besides which, there was the awful

spectacle of men dying like sheep, through having caught the infection

in nursing each other. This caused the greatest mortality. On the one

hand, if they were afraid to visit each other, they perished from

neglect; indeed many houses were emptied of their inmates for want of a

nurse: on the other, if they ventured to do so, death was the

consequence. This was especially the case with such as made any

pretensions to goodness: honour made them unsparing of themselves in

their attendance in their friends’ houses, where even the members of

the family were at last worn out by the moans of the dying, and

succumbed to the force of the disaster. Yet it was with those who had

recovered from the disease that the sick and the dying found most

compassion. These knew what it was from experience, and had now no fear

for themselves; for the same man was never attacked twice—never at

least fatally. And such persons not only received the congratulations

of others, but themselves also, in the elation of the moment, half

entertained the vain hope that they were for the future safe from any

disease whatsoever.

An aggravation of the existing calamity was the influx from the country

into the city, and this was especially felt by the new arrivals. As

there were no houses to receive them, they had to be lodged at the hot

season of the year in stifling cabins, where the mortality raged

without restraint. The bodies of dying men lay one upon another, and

half-dead creatures reeled about the streets and gathered round all the

fountains in their longing for water. The sacred places also in which

they had quartered themselves were full of corpses of persons that had

died there, just as they were; for as the disaster passed all bounds,

men, not knowing what was to become of them, became utterly careless of

everything, whether sacred or profane. All the burial rites before in

use were entirely upset, and they buried the bodies as best they could.

Many from want of the proper appliances, through so many of their

friends having died already, had recourse to the most shameless

sepultures: sometimes getting the start of those who had raised a pile,

they threw their own dead body upon the stranger’s pyre and ignited it;

sometimes they tossed the corpse which they were carrying on the top of

another that was burning, and so went off.

Nor was this the only form of lawless extravagance which owed its

origin to the plague. Men now coolly ventured on what they had formerly

done in a corner, and not just as they pleased, seeing the rapid

transitions produced by persons in prosperity suddenly dying and those

who before had nothing succeeding to their property. So they resolved

to spend quickly and enjoy themselves, regarding their lives and riches

as alike things of a day. Perseverance in what men called honour was

popular with none, it was so uncertain whether they would be spared to

attain the object; but it was settled that present enjoyment, and all

that contributed to it, was both honourable and useful. Fear of gods or

law of man there was none to restrain them. As for the first, they

judged it to be just the same whether they worshipped them or not, as

they saw all alike perishing; and for the last, no one expected to live

to be brought to trial for his offences, but each felt that a far

severer sentence had been already passed upon them all and hung ever

over their heads, and before this fell it was only reasonable to enjoy

life a little.

Such was the nature of the calamity, and heavily did it weigh on the

Athenians; death raging within the city and devastation without. Among

other things which they remembered in their distress was, very

naturally, the following verse which the old men said had long ago been

uttered:

A Dorian war shall come and with it death.

So a dispute arose as to whether dearth and not death had not been the

word in the verse; but at the present juncture, it was of course

decided in favour of the latter; for the people made their recollection

fit in with their sufferings. I fancy, however, that if another Dorian

war should ever afterwards come upon us, and a dearth should happen to

accompany it, the verse will probably be read accordingly. The oracle

also which had been given to the Lacedaemonians was now remembered by

those who knew of it. When the god was asked whether they should go to

war, he answered that if they put their might into it, victory would be

theirs, and that he would himself be with them. With this oracle events

were supposed to tally. For the plague broke out as soon as the

Peloponnesians invaded Attica, and never entering Peloponnese (not at

least to an extent worth noticing), committed its worst ravages at

Athens, and next to Athens, at the most populous of the other towns.

Such was the history of the plague.

After ravaging the plain, the Peloponnesians advanced into the Paralian

region as far as Laurium, where the Athenian silver mines are, and

first laid waste the side looking towards Peloponnese, next that which

faces Euboea and Andros. But Pericles, who was still general, held the

same opinion as in the former invasion, and would not let the Athenians

march out against them.

However, while they were still in the plain, and had not yet entered

the Paralian land, he had prepared an armament of a hundred ships for

Peloponnese, and when all was ready put out to sea. On board the ships

he took four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and three hundred

cavalry in horse transports, and then for the first time made out of

old galleys; fifty Chian and Lesbian vessels also joining in the

expedition. When this Athenian armament put out to sea, they left the

Peloponnesians in Attica in the Paralian region. Arriving at Epidaurus

in Peloponnese they ravaged most of the territory, and even had hopes

of taking the town by an assault: in this however they were not

successful. Putting out from Epidaurus, they laid waste the territory

of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, all towns on the coast of

Peloponnese, and thence sailing to Prasiai, a maritime town in Laconia,

ravaged part of its territory, and took and sacked the place itself;

after which they returned home, but found the Peloponnesians gone and

no longer in Attica.

During the whole time that the Peloponnesians were in Attica and the

Athenians on the expedition in their ships, men kept dying of the

plague both in the armament and in Athens. Indeed it was actually

asserted that the departure of the Peloponnesians was hastened by fear

of the disorder; as they heard from deserters that it was in the city,

and also could see the burials going on. Yet in this invasion they

remained longer than in any other, and ravaged the whole country, for

they were about forty days in Attica.

The same summer Hagnon, son of Nicias, and Cleopompus, son of Clinias,

the colleagues of Pericles, took the armament of which he had lately

made use, and went off upon an expedition against the Chalcidians in

the direction of Thrace and Potidæa, which was still under siege. As

soon as they arrived, they brought up their engines against Potidæa and

tried every means of taking it, but did not succeed either in capturing

the city or in doing anything else worthy of their preparations. For

the plague attacked them here also, and committed such havoc as to

cripple them completely, even the previously healthy soldiers of the

former expedition catching the infection from Hagnon’s troops; while

Phormio and the sixteen hundred men whom he commanded only escaped by

being no longer in the neighbourhood of the Chalcidians. The end of it

was that Hagnon returned with his ships to Athens, having lost one

thousand and fifty out of four thousand heavy infantry in about forty

days; though the soldiers stationed there before remained in the

country and carried on the siege of Potidæa.

After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians a change came over the

spirit of the Athenians. Their land had now been twice laid waste; and

war and pestilence at once pressed heavy upon them. They began to find

fault with Pericles, as the author of the war and the cause of all

their misfortunes, and became eager to come to terms with Lacedaemon,

and actually sent ambassadors thither, who did not however succeed in

their mission. Their despair was now complete and all vented itself

upon Pericles. When he saw them exasperated at the present turn of

affairs and acting exactly as he had anticipated, he called an

assembly, being (it must be remembered) still general, with the double

object of restoring confidence and of leading them from these angry

feelings to a calmer and more hopeful state of mind. He accordingly

came forward and spoke as follows:

“I was not unprepared for the indignation of which I have been the

object, as I know its causes; and I have called an assembly for the

purpose of reminding you upon certain points, and of protesting against

your being unreasonably irritated with me, or cowed by your sufferings.

I am of opinion that national greatness is more for the advantage of

private citizens, than any individual well-being coupled with public

humiliation. A man may be personally ever so well off, and yet if his

country be ruined he must be ruined with it; whereas a flourishing

commonwealth always affords chances of salvation to unfortunate

individuals. Since then a state can support the misfortunes of private

citizens, while they cannot support hers, it is surely the duty of

every one to be forward in her defence, and not like you to be so

confounded with your domestic afflictions as to give up all thoughts of

the common safety, and to blame me for having counselled war and

yourselves for having voted it. And yet if you are angry with me, it is

with one who, as I believe, is second to no man either in knowledge of

the proper policy, or in the ability to expound it, and who is moreover

not only a patriot but an honest one. A man possessing that knowledge

without that faculty of exposition might as well have no idea at all on

the matter: if he had both these gifts, but no love for his country, he

would be but a cold advocate for her interests; while were his

patriotism not proof against bribery, everything would go for a price.

So that if you thought that I was even moderately distinguished for

these qualities when you took my advice and went to war, there is

certainly no reason now why I should be charged with having done wrong.

“For those of course who have a free choice in the matter and whose

fortunes are not at stake, war is the greatest of follies. But if the

only choice was between submission with loss of independence, and

danger with the hope of preserving that independence, in such a case it

is he who will not accept the risk that deserves blame, not he who

will. I am the same man and do not alter, it is you who change, since

in fact you took my advice while unhurt, and waited for misfortune to

repent of it; and the apparent error of my policy lies in the infirmity

of your resolution, since the suffering that it entails is being felt

by every one among you, while its advantage is still remote and obscure

to all, and a great and sudden reverse having befallen you, your mind

is too much depressed to persevere in your resolves. For before what is

sudden, unexpected, and least within calculation, the spirit quails;

and putting all else aside, the plague has certainly been an emergency

of this kind. Born, however, as you are, citizens of a great state, and

brought up, as you have been, with habits equal to your birth, you

should be ready to face the greatest disasters and still to keep

unimpaired the lustre of your name. For the judgment of mankind is as

relentless to the weakness that falls short of a recognized renown, as

it is jealous of the arrogance that aspires higher than its due. Cease

then to grieve for your private afflictions, and address yourselves

instead to the safety of the commonwealth.

“If you shrink before the exertions which the war makes necessary, and

fear that after all they may not have a happy result, you know the

reasons by which I have often demonstrated to you the groundlessness of

your apprehensions. If those are not enough, I will now reveal an

advantage arising from the greatness of your dominion, which I think

has never yet suggested itself to you, which I never mentioned in my

previous speeches, and which has so bold a sound that I should scarce

adventure it now, were it not for the unnatural depression which I see

around me. You perhaps think that your empire extends only over your

allies; I will declare to you the truth. The visible field of action

has two parts, land and sea. In the whole of one of these you are

completely supreme, not merely as far as you use it at present, but

also to what further extent you may think fit: in fine, your naval

resources are such that your vessels may go where they please, without

the King or any other nation on earth being able to stop them. So that

although you may think it a great privation to lose the use of your

land and houses, still you must see that this power is something widely

different; and instead of fretting on their account, you should really

regard them in the light of the gardens and other accessories that

embellish a great fortune, and as, in comparison, of little moment. You

should know too that liberty preserved by your efforts will easily

recover for us what we have lost, while, the knee once bowed, even what

you have will pass from you. Your fathers receiving these possessions

not from others, but from themselves, did not let slip what their

labour had acquired, but delivered them safe to you; and in this

respect at least you must prove yourselves their equals, remembering

that to lose what one has got is more disgraceful than to be balked in

getting, and you must confront your enemies not merely with spirit but

with disdain. Confidence indeed a blissful ignorance can impart, ay,

even to a coward’s breast, but disdain is the privilege of those who,

like us, have been assured by reflection of their superiority to their

adversary. And where the chances are the same, knowledge fortifies

courage by the contempt which is its consequence, its trust being

placed, not in hope, which is the prop of the desperate, but in a

judgment grounded upon existing resources, whose anticipations are more

to be depended upon.

“Again, your country has a right to your services in sustaining the

glories of her position. These are a common source of pride to you all,

and you cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect to share

its honours. You should remember also that what you are fighting

against is not merely slavery as an exchange for independence, but also

loss of empire and danger from the animosities incurred in its

exercise. Besides, to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of

you in the alarm of the moment has become enamoured of the honesty of

such an unambitious part. For what you hold is, to speak somewhat

plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is

unsafe. And men of these retiring views, making converts of others,

would quickly ruin a state; indeed the result would be the same if they

could live independent by themselves; for the retiring and unambitious

are never secure without vigorous protectors at their side; in fine,

such qualities are useless to an imperial city, though they may help a

dependency to an unmolested servitude.

“But you must not be seduced by citizens like these or angry with

me—who, if I voted for war, only did as you did yourselves—in spite of

the enemy having invaded your country and done what you could be

certain that he would do, if you refused to comply with his demands;

and although besides what we counted for, the plague has come upon

us—the only point indeed at which our calculation has been at fault. It

is this, I know, that has had a large share in making me more unpopular

than I should otherwise have been—quite undeservedly, unless you are

also prepared to give me the credit of any success with which chance

may present you. Besides, the hand of heaven must be borne with

resignation, that of the enemy with fortitude; this was the old way at

Athens, and do not you prevent it being so still. Remember, too, that

if your country has the greatest name in all the world, it is because

she never bent before disaster; because she has expended more life and

effort in war than any other city, and has won for herself a power

greater than any hitherto known, the memory of which will descend to

the latest posterity; even if now, in obedience to the general law of

decay, we should ever be forced to yield, still it will be remembered

that we held rule over more Hellenes than any other Hellenic state,

that we sustained the greatest wars against their united or separate

powers, and inhabited a city unrivalled by any other in resources or

magnitude. These glories may incur the censure of the slow and

unambitious; but in the breast of energy they will awake emulation, and

in those who must remain without them an envious regret. Hatred and

unpopularity at the moment have fallen to the lot of all who have

aspired to rule others; but where odium must be incurred, true wisdom

incurs it for the highest objects. Hatred also is short-lived; but that

which makes the splendour of the present and the glory of the future

remains for ever unforgotten. Make your decision, therefore, for glory

then and honour now, and attain both objects by instant and zealous

effort: do not send heralds to Lacedaemon, and do not betray any sign

of being oppressed by your present sufferings, since they whose minds

are least sensitive to calamity, and whose hands are most quick to meet

it, are the greatest men and the greatest communities.”

Such were the arguments by which Pericles tried to cure the Athenians

of their anger against him and to divert their thoughts from their

immediate afflictions. As a community he succeeded in convincing them;

they not only gave up all idea of sending to Lacedaemon, but applied

themselves with increased energy to the war; still as private

individuals they could not help smarting under their sufferings, the

common people having been deprived of the little that they were

possessed, while the higher orders had lost fine properties with costly

establishments and buildings in the country, and, worst of all, had war

instead of peace. In fact, the public feeling against him did not

subside until he had been fined. Not long afterwards, however,

according to the way of the multitude, they again elected him general

and committed all their affairs to his hands, having now become less

sensitive to their private and domestic afflictions, and understanding

that he was the best man of all for the public necessities. For as long

as he was at the head of the state during the peace, he pursued a

moderate and conservative policy; and in his time its greatness was at

its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly

gauged the power of his country. He outlived its commencement two years

and six months, and the correctness of his previsions respecting it

became better known by his death. He told them to wait quietly, to pay

attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose

the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a

favourable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing

private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite

foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to

themselves and to their allies—projects whose success would only

conduce to the honour and advantage of private persons, and whose

failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war. The causes

of this are not far to seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and

known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent control over

the multitude—in short, to lead them instead of being led by them; for

as he never sought power by improper means, he was never compelled to

flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so high an estimation that

he could afford to anger them by contradiction. Whenever he saw them

unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with a word reduce them to

alarm; on the other hand, if they fell victims to a panic, he could at

once restore them to confidence. In short, what was nominally a

democracy became in his hands government by the first citizen. With his

successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each

grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of

state affairs to the whims of the multitude. This, as might have been

expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders,

and amongst them the Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so

much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was

sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures

afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to

occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the

commons, by which they not only paralysed operations in the field, but

also first introduced civil discord at home. Yet after losing most of

their fleet besides other forces in Sicily, and with faction already

dominant in the city, they could still for three years make head

against their original adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians,

but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by the

King’s son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy.

Nor did they finally succumb till they fell the victims of their own

intestine disorders. So superfluously abundant were the resources from

which the genius of Pericles foresaw an easy triumph in the war over

the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians.

During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies made an

expedition with a hundred ships against Zacynthus, an island lying off

the coast of Elis, peopled by a colony of Achaeans from Peloponnese,

and in alliance with Athens. There were a thousand Lacedaemonian heavy

infantry on board, and Cnemus, a Spartan, as admiral. They made a

descent from their ships, and ravaged most of the country; but as the

inhabitants would not submit, they sailed back home.

At the end of the same summer the Corinthian Aristeus, Aneristus,

Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, envoys from Lacedaemon, Timagoras, a Tegean,

and a private individual named Pollis from Argos, on their way to Asia

to persuade the King to supply funds and join in the war, came to

Sitalces, son of Teres in Thrace, with the idea of inducing him, if

possible, to forsake the alliance of Athens and to march on Potidæa

then besieged by an Athenian force, and also of getting conveyed by his

means to their destination across the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, who

was to send them up the country to the King. But there chanced to be

with Sitalces some Athenian ambassadors—Learchus, son of Callimachus,

and Ameiniades, son of Philemon—who persuaded Sitalces’ son, Sadocus,

the new Athenian citizen, to put the men into their hands and thus

prevent their crossing over to the King and doing their part to injure

the country of his choice. He accordingly had them seized, as they were

travelling through Thrace to the vessel in which they were to cross the

Hellespont, by a party whom he had sent on with Learchus and

Ameiniades, and gave orders for their delivery to the Athenian

ambassadors, by whom they were brought to Athens. On their arrival, the

Athenians, afraid that Aristeus, who had been notably the prime mover

in the previous affairs of Potidæa and their Thracian possessions,

might live to do them still more mischief if he escaped, slew them all

the same day, without giving them a trial or hearing the defence which

they wished to offer, and cast their bodies into a pit; thinking

themselves justified in using in retaliation the same mode of warfare

which the Lacedaemonians had begun, when they slew and cast into pits

all the Athenian and allied traders whom they caught on board the

merchantmen round Peloponnese. Indeed, at the outset of the war, the

Lacedaemonians butchered as enemies all whom they took on the sea,

whether allies of Athens or neutrals.

About the same time towards the close of the summer, the Ambraciot

forces, with a number of barbarians that they had raised, marched

against the Amphilochian Argos and the rest of that country. The origin

of their enmity against the Argives was this. This Argos and the rest

of Amphilochia were colonized by Amphilochus, son of Amphiaraus.

Dissatisfied with the state of affairs at home on his return thither

after the Trojan War, he built this city in the Ambracian Gulf, and

named it Argos after his own country. This was the largest town in

Amphilochia, and its inhabitants the most powerful. Under the pressure

of misfortune many generations afterwards, they called in the

Ambraciots, their neighbours on the Amphilochian border, to join their

colony; and it was by this union with the Ambraciots that they learnt

their present Hellenic speech, the rest of the Amphilochians being

barbarians. After a time the Ambraciots expelled the Argives and held

the city themselves. Upon this the Amphilochians gave themselves over

to the Acarnanians; and the two together called the Athenians, who sent

them Phormio as general and thirty ships; upon whose arrival they took

Argos by storm, and made slaves of the Ambraciots; and the

Amphilochians and Acarnanians inhabited the town in common. After this

began the alliance between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The enmity of

the Ambraciots against the Argives thus commenced with the enslavement

of their citizens; and afterwards during the war they collected this

armament among themselves and the Chaonians, and other of the

neighbouring barbarians. Arrived before Argos, they became masters of

the country; but not being successful in their attacks upon the town,

returned home and dispersed among their different peoples.

Such were the events of the summer. The ensuing winter the Athenians

sent twenty ships round Peloponnese, under the command of Phormio, who

stationed himself at Naupactus and kept watch against any one sailing

in or out of Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf. Six others went to Caria

and Lycia under Melesander, to collect tribute in those parts, and also

to prevent the Peloponnesian privateers from taking up their station in

those waters and molesting the passage of the merchantmen from Phaselis

and Phoenicia and the adjoining continent. However, Melesander, going

up the country into Lycia with a force of Athenians from the ships and

the allies, was defeated and killed in battle, with the loss of a

number of his troops.

The same winter the Potidæans at length found themselves no longer able

to hold out against their besiegers. The inroads of the Peloponnesians

into Attica had not had the desired effect of making the Athenians

raise the siege. Provisions there were none left; and so far had

distress for food gone in Potidæa that, besides a number of other

horrors, instances had even occurred of the people having eaten one

another. In this extremity they at last made proposals for capitulating

to the Athenian generals in command against them—Xenophon, son of

Euripides, Hestiodorus, son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus, son of

Callimachus. The generals accepted their proposals, seeing the

sufferings of the army in so exposed a position; besides which the

state had already spent two thousand talents upon the siege. The terms

of the capitulation were as follows: a free passage out for themselves,

their children, wives and auxiliaries, with one garment apiece, the

women with two, and a fixed sum of money for their journey. Under this

treaty they went out to Chalcidice and other places, according as was

their power. The Athenians, however, blamed the generals for granting

terms without instructions from home, being of opinion that the place

would have had to surrender at discretion. They afterwards sent

settlers of their own to Potidæa, and colonized it. Such were the

events of the winter, and so ended the second year of this war of which

Thucydides was the historian.

CHAPTER VIII

Third Year of the War—Investment of Plataea—Naval Victories of

Phormio—Thracian Irruption into Macedonia under Sitalces

The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, instead of

invading Attica, marched against Plataea, under the command of

Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. He had

encamped his army and was about to lay waste the country, when the

Plataeans hastened to send envoys to him, and spoke as follows:

“Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, in invading the Plataean territory, you

do what is wrong in itself, and worthy neither of yourselves nor of the

fathers who begot you. Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, your countryman,

after freeing Hellas from the Medes with the help of those Hellenes who

were willing to undertake the risk of the battle fought near our city,

offered sacrifice to Zeus the Liberator in the marketplace of Plataea,

and calling all the allies together restored to the Plataeans their

city and territory, and declared it independent and inviolate against

aggression or conquest. Should any such be attempted, the allies

present were to help according to their power. Your fathers rewarded us

thus for the courage and patriotism that we displayed at that perilous

epoch; but you do just the contrary, coming with our bitterest enemies,

the Thebans, to enslave us. We appeal, therefore, to the gods to whom

the oaths were then made, to the gods of your ancestors, and lastly to

those of our country, and call upon you to refrain from violating our

territory or transgressing the oaths, and to let us live independent,

as Pausanias decreed.”

The Plataeans had got thus far when they were cut short by Archidamus

saying: “There is justice, Plataeans, in what you say, if you act up to

your words. According, to the grant of Pausanias, continue to be

independent yourselves, and join in freeing those of your fellow

countrymen who, after sharing in the perils of that period, joined in

the oaths to you, and are now subject to the Athenians; for it is to

free them and the rest that all this provision and war has been made. I

could wish that you would share our labours and abide by the oaths

yourselves; if this is impossible, do what we have already required of

you—remain neutral, enjoying your own; join neither side, but receive

both as friends, neither as allies for the war. With this we shall be

satisfied.” Such were the words of Archidamus. The Plataeans, after

hearing what he had to say, went into the city and acquainted the

people with what had passed, and presently returned for answer that it

was impossible for them to do what he proposed without consulting the

Athenians, with whom their children and wives now were; besides which

they had their fears for the town. After his departure, what was to

prevent the Athenians from coming and taking it out of their hands, or

the Thebans, who would be included in the oaths, from taking advantage

of the proposed neutrality to make a second attempt to seize the city?

Upon these points he tried to reassure them by saying: “You have only

to deliver over the city and houses to us Lacedaemonians, to point out

the boundaries of your land, the number of your fruit-trees, and

whatever else can be numerically stated, and yourselves to withdraw

wherever you like as long as the war shall last. When it is over we

will restore to you whatever we received, and in the interim hold it in

trust and keep it in cultivation, paying you a sufficient allowance.”

When they had heard what he had to say, they re-entered the city, and

after consulting with the people said that they wished first to

acquaint the Athenians with this proposal, and in the event of their

approving to accede to it; in the meantime they asked him to grant them

a truce and not to lay waste their territory. He accordingly granted a

truce for the number of days requisite for the journey, and meanwhile

abstained from ravaging their territory. The Plataean envoys went to

Athens, and consulted with the Athenians, and returned with the

following message to those in the city: “The Athenians say, Plataeans,

that they never hitherto, since we became their allies, on any occasion

abandoned us to an enemy, nor will they now neglect us, but will help

us according to their ability; and they adjure you by the oaths which

your fathers swore, to keep the alliance unaltered.”

On the delivery of this message by the envoys, the Plataeans resolved

not to be unfaithful to the Athenians but to endure, if it must be,

seeing their lands laid waste and any other trials that might come to

them, and not to send out again, but to answer from the wall that it

was impossible for them to do as the Lacedaemonians proposed. As soon

as he had received this answer, King Archidamus proceeded first to make

a solemn appeal to the gods and heroes of the country in words

following: “Ye gods and heroes of the Plataean territory, be my

witnesses that not as aggressors originally, nor until these had first

departed from the common oath, did we invade this land, in which our

fathers offered you their prayers before defeating the Medes, and which

you made auspicious to the Hellenic arms; nor shall we be aggressors in

the measures to which we may now resort, since we have made many fair

proposals but have not been successful. Graciously accord that those

who were the first to offend may be punished for it, and that vengeance

may be attained by those who would righteously inflict it.”

After this appeal to the gods Archidamus put his army in motion. First

he enclosed the town with a palisade formed of the fruit-trees which

they cut down, to prevent further egress from Plataea; next they threw

up a mound against the city, hoping that the largeness of the force

employed would ensure the speedy reduction of the place. They

accordingly cut down timber from Cithaeron, and built it up on either

side, laying it like lattice-work to serve as a wall to keep the mound

from spreading abroad, and carried to it wood and stones and earth and

whatever other material might help to complete it. They continued to

work at the mound for seventy days and nights without intermission,

being divided into relief parties to allow of some being employed in

carrying while others took sleep and refreshment; the Lacedaemonian

officer attached to each contingent keeping the men to the work. But

the Plataeans, observing the progress of the mound, constructed a wall

of wood and fixed it upon that part of the city wall against which the

mound was being erected, and built up bricks inside it which they took

from the neighbouring houses. The timbers served to bind the building

together, and to prevent its becoming weak as it advanced in height; it

had also a covering of skins and hides, which protected the woodwork

against the attacks of burning missiles and allowed the men to work in

safety. Thus the wall was raised to a great height, and the mound

opposite made no less rapid progress. The Plataeans also thought of

another expedient; they pulled out part of the wall upon which the

mound abutted, and carried the earth into the city.

Discovering this the Peloponnesians twisted up clay in wattles of reed

and threw it into the breach formed in the mound, in order to give it

consistency and prevent its being carried away like the soil. Stopped

in this way the Plataeans changed their mode of operation, and digging

a mine from the town calculated their way under the mound, and began to

carry off its material as before. This went on for a long while without

the enemy outside finding it out, so that for all they threw on the top

their mound made no progress in proportion, being carried away from

beneath and constantly settling down in the vacuum. But the Plataeans,

fearing that even thus they might not be able to hold out against the

superior numbers of the enemy, had yet another invention. They stopped

working at the large building in front of the mound, and starting at

either end of it inside from the old low wall, built a new one in the

form of a crescent running in towards the town; in order that in the

event of the great wall being taken this might remain, and the enemy

have to throw up a fresh mound against it, and as they advanced within

might not only have their trouble over again, but also be exposed to

missiles on their flanks. While raising the mound the Peloponnesians

also brought up engines against the city, one of which was brought up

upon the mound against the great building and shook down a good piece

of it, to the no small alarm of the Plataeans. Others were advanced

against different parts of the wall but were lassoed and broken by the

Plataeans; who also hung up great beams by long iron chains from either

extremity of two poles laid on the wall and projecting over it, and

drew them up at an angle whenever any point was threatened by the

engine, and loosing their hold let the beam go with its chains slack,

so that it fell with a run and snapped off the nose of the battering

ram.

After this the Peloponnesians, finding that their engines effected

nothing, and that their mound was met by the counterwork, concluded

that their present means of offence were unequal to the taking of the

city, and prepared for its circumvallation. First, however, they

determined to try the effects of fire and see whether they could not,

with the help of a wind, burn the town, as it was not a large one;

indeed they thought of every possible expedient by which the place

might be reduced without the expense of a blockade. They accordingly

brought faggots of brushwood and threw them from the mound, first into

the space between it and the wall; and this soon becoming full from the

number of hands at work, they next heaped the faggots up as far into

the town as they could reach from the top, and then lighted the wood by

setting fire to it with sulphur and pitch. The consequence was a fire

greater than any one had ever yet seen produced by human agency, though

it could not of course be compared to the spontaneous conflagrations

sometimes known to occur through the wind rubbing the branches of a

mountain forest together. And this fire was not only remarkable for its

magnitude, but was also, at the end of so many perils, within an ace of

proving fatal to the Plataeans; a great part of the town became

entirely inaccessible, and had a wind blown upon it, in accordance with

the hopes of the enemy, nothing could have saved them. As it was, there

is also a story of heavy rain and thunder having come on by which the

fire was put out and the danger averted.

Failing in this last attempt the Peloponnesians left a portion of their

forces on the spot, dismissing the rest, and built a wall of

circumvallation round the town, dividing the ground among the various

cities present; a ditch being made within and without the lines, from

which they got their bricks. All being finished by about the rising of

Arcturus, they left men enough to man half the wall, the rest being

manned by the Boeotians, and drawing off their army dispersed to their

several cities. The Plataeans had before sent off their wives and

children and oldest men and the mass of the non-combatants to Athens;

so that the number of the besieged left in the place comprised four

hundred of their own citizens, eighty Athenians, and a hundred and ten

women to bake their bread. This was the sum total at the commencement

of the siege, and there was no one else within the walls, bond or free.

Such were the arrangements made for the blockade of Plataea.

The same summer and simultaneously with the expedition against Plataea,

the Athenians marched with two thousand heavy infantry and two hundred

horse against the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace and the

Bottiaeans, just as the corn was getting ripe, under the command of

Xenophon, son of Euripides, with two colleagues. Arriving before

Spartolus in Bottiaea, they destroyed the corn and had some hopes of

the city coming over through the intrigues of a faction within. But

those of a different way of thinking had sent to Olynthus; and a

garrison of heavy infantry and other troops arrived accordingly. These

issuing from Spartolus were engaged by the Athenians in front of the

town: the Chalcidian heavy infantry, and some auxiliaries with them,

were beaten and retreated into Spartolus; but the Chalcidian horse and

light troops defeated the horse and light troops of the Athenians. The

Chalcidians had already a few targeteers from Crusis, and presently

after the battle were joined by some others from Olynthus; upon seeing

whom the light troops from Spartolus, emboldened by this accession and

by their previous success, with the help of the Chalcidian horse and

the reinforcement just arrived again attacked the Athenians, who

retired upon the two divisions which they had left with their baggage.

Whenever the Athenians advanced, their adversary gave way, pressing

them with missiles the instant they began to retire. The Chalcidian

horse also, riding up and charging them just as they pleased, at last

caused a panic amongst them and routed and pursued them to a great

distance. The Athenians took refuge in Potidæa, and afterwards

recovered their dead under truce, and returned to Athens with the

remnant of their army; four hundred and thirty men and all the generals

having fallen. The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans set up a trophy, took up

their dead, and dispersed to their several cities.

The same summer, not long after this, the Ambraciots and Chaonians,

being desirous of reducing the whole of Acarnania and detaching it from

Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to equip a fleet from their

confederacy and send a thousand heavy infantry to Acarnania,

representing that, if a combined movement were made by land and sea,

the coast Acarnanians would be unable to march, and the conquest of

Zacynthus and Cephallenia easily following on the possession of

Acarnania, the cruise round Peloponnese would be no longer so

convenient for the Athenians. Besides which there was a hope of taking

Naupactus. The Lacedaemonians accordingly at once sent off a few

vessels with Cnemus, who was still high admiral, and the heavy infantry

on board; and sent round orders for the fleet to equip as quickly as

possible and sail to Leucas. The Corinthians were the most forward in

the business; the Ambraciots being a colony of theirs. While the ships

from Corinth, Sicyon, and the neighbourhood were getting ready, and

those from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia, which had arrived before,

were waiting for them at Leucas, Cnemus and his thousand heavy infantry

had run into the gulf, giving the slip to Phormio, the commander of the

Athenian squadron stationed off Naupactus, and began at once to prepare

for the land expedition. The Hellenic troops with him consisted of the

Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians, and the thousand

Peloponnesians with whom he came; the barbarian of a thousand

Chaonians, who, belonging to a nation that has no king, were led by

Photys and Nicanor, the two members of the royal family to whom the

chieftainship for that year had been confided. With the Chaonians came

also some Thesprotians, like them without a king, some Molossians and

Atintanians led by Sabylinthus, the guardian of King Tharyps who was

still a minor, and some Paravaeans, under their king Oroedus,

accompanied by a thousand Orestians, subjects of King Antichus and

placed by him under the command of Oroedus. There were also a thousand

Macedonians sent by Perdiccas without the knowledge of the Athenians,

but they arrived too late. With this force Cnemus set out, without

waiting for the fleet from Corinth. Passing through the territory of

Amphilochian Argos, and sacking the open village of Limnaea, they

advanced to Stratus the Acarnanian capital; this once taken, the rest

of the country, they felt convinced, would speedily follow.

The Acarnanians, finding themselves invaded by a large army by land,

and from the sea threatened by a hostile fleet, made no combined

attempt at resistance, but remained to defend their homes, and sent for

help to Phormio, who replied that, when a fleet was on the point of

sailing from Corinth, it was impossible for him to leave Naupactus

unprotected. The Peloponnesians meanwhile and their allies advanced

upon Stratus in three divisions, with the intention of encamping near

it and attempting the wall by force if they failed to succeed by

negotiation. The order of march was as follows: the centre was occupied

by the Chaonians and the rest of the barbarians, with the Leucadians

and Anactorians and their followers on the right, and Cnemus with the

Peloponnesians and Ambraciots on the left; each division being a long

way off from, and sometimes even out of sight of, the others. The

Hellenes advanced in good order, keeping a look-out till they encamped

in a good position; but the Chaonians, filled with self-confidence, and

having the highest character for courage among the tribes of that part

of the continent, without waiting to occupy their camp, rushed on with

the rest of the barbarians, in the idea that they should take the town

by assault and obtain the sole glory of the enterprise. While they were

coming on, the Stratians, becoming aware how things stood, and thinking

that the defeat of this division would considerably dishearten the

Hellenes behind it, occupied the environs of the town with ambuscades,

and as soon as they approached engaged them at close quarters from the

city and the ambuscades. A panic seizing the Chaonians, great numbers

of them were slain; and as soon as they were seen to give way the rest

of the barbarians turned and fled. Owing to the distance by which their

allies had preceded them, neither of the Hellenic divisions knew

anything of the battle, but fancied they were hastening on to encamp.

However, when the flying barbarians broke in upon them, they opened

their ranks to receive them, brought their divisions together, and

stopped quiet where they were for the day; the Stratians not offering

to engage them, as the rest of the Acarnanians had not yet arrived, but

contenting themselves with slinging at them from a distance, which

distressed them greatly, as there was no stirring without their armour.

The Acarnanians would seem to excel in this mode of warfare.

As soon as night fell, Cnemus hastily drew off his army to the river

Anapus, about nine miles from Stratus, recovering his dead next day

under truce, and being there joined by the friendly Oeniadae, fell back

upon their city before the enemy’s reinforcements came up. From hence

each returned home; and the Stratians set up a trophy for the battle

with the barbarians.

Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates in

the Crissaean Gulf, which was to have co-operated with Cnemus and

prevented the coast Acarnanians from joining their countrymen in the

interior, was disabled from doing so by being compelled about the same

time as the battle at Stratus to fight with Phormio and the twenty

Athenian vessels stationed at Naupactus. For they were watched, as they

coasted along out of the gulf, by Phormio, who wished to attack in the

open sea. But the Corinthians and allies had started for Acarnania

without any idea of fighting at sea, and with vessels more like

transports for carrying soldiers; besides which, they never dreamed of

the twenty Athenian ships venturing to engage their forty-seven.

However, while they were coasting along their own shore, there were the

Athenians sailing along in line with them; and when they tried to cross

over from Patrae in Achaea to the mainland on the other side, on their

way to Acarnania, they saw them again coming out from Chalcis and the

river Evenus to meet them. They slipped from their moorings in the

night, but were observed, and were at length compelled to fight in mid

passage. Each state that contributed to the armament had its own

general; the Corinthian commanders were Machaon, Isocrates, and

Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians ranged their vessels in as large a

circle as possible without leaving an opening, with the prows outside

and the sterns in; and placed within all the small craft in company,

and their five best sailers to issue out at a moment’s notice and

strengthen any point threatened by the enemy.

The Athenians, formed in line, sailed round and round them, and forced

them to contract their circle, by continually brushing past and making

as though they would attack at once, having been previously cautioned

by Phormio not to do so till he gave the signal. His hope was that the

Peloponnesians would not retain their order like a force on shore, but

that the ships would fall foul of one another and the small craft cause

confusion; and if the wind should blow from the gulf (in expectation of

which he kept sailing round them, and which usually rose towards

morning), they would not, he felt sure, remain steady an instant. He

also thought that it rested with him to attack when he pleased, as his

ships were better sailers, and that an attack timed by the coming of

the wind would tell best. When the wind came down, the enemy’s ships

were now in a narrow space, and what with the wind and the small craft

dashing against them, at once fell into confusion: ship fell foul of

ship, while the crews were pushing them off with poles, and by their

shouting, swearing, and struggling with one another, made captains’

orders and boatswains’ cries alike inaudible, and through being unable

for want of practice to clear their oars in the rough water, prevented

the vessels from obeying their helmsmen properly. At this moment

Phormio gave the signal, and the Athenians attacked. Sinking first one

of the admirals, they then disabled all they came across, so that no

one thought of resistance for the confusion, but fled for Patrae and

Dyme in Achaea. The Athenians gave chase and captured twelve ships, and

taking most of the men out of them sailed to Molycrium, and after

setting up a trophy on the promontory of Rhium and dedicating a ship to

Poseidon, returned to Naupactus. As for the Peloponnesians, they at

once sailed with their remaining ships along the coast from Dyme and

Patrae to Cyllene, the Eleian arsenal; where Cnemus, and the ships from

Leucas that were to have joined them, also arrived after the battle at

Stratus.

The Lacedaemonians now sent to the fleet to Cnemus three

commissioners—Timocrates, Bradidas, and Lycophron—with orders to

prepare to engage again with better fortune, and not to be driven from

the sea by a few vessels; for they could not at all account for their

discomfiture, the less so as it was their first attempt at sea; and

they fancied that it was not that their marine was so inferior, but

that there had been misconduct somewhere, not considering the long

experience of the Athenians as compared with the little practice which

they had had themselves. The commissioners were accordingly sent in

anger. As soon as they arrived they set to work with Cnemus to order

ships from the different states, and to put those which they already

had in fighting order. Meanwhile Phormio sent word to Athens of their

preparations and his own victory, and desired as many ships as possible

to be speedily sent to him, as he stood in daily expectation of a

battle. Twenty were accordingly sent, but instructions were given to

their commander to go first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys,

who was proxenus of the Athenians, had persuaded them to sail against

Cydonia, promising to procure the reduction of that hostile town; his

real wish being to oblige the Polichnitans, neighbours of the

Cydonians. He accordingly went with the ships to Crete, and,

accompanied by the Polichnitans, laid waste the lands of the Cydonians;

and, what with adverse winds and stress of weather wasted no little

time there.

While the Athenians were thus detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians in

Cyllene got ready for battle, and coasted along to Panormus in Achaea,

where their land army had come to support them. Phormio also coasted

along to Molycrian Rhium, and anchored outside it with twenty ships,

the same as he had fought with before. This Rhium was friendly to the

Athenians. The other, in Peloponnese, lies opposite to it; the sea

between them is about three-quarters of a mile broad, and forms the

mouth of the Crissaean gulf. At this, the Achaean Rhium, not far off

Panormus, where their army lay, the Peloponnesians now cast anchor with

seventy-seven ships, when they saw the Athenians do so. For six or

seven days they remained opposite each other, practising and preparing

for the battle; the one resolved not to sail out of the Rhia into the

open sea, for fear of the disaster which had already happened to them,

the other not to sail into the straits, thinking it advantageous to the

enemy, to fight in the narrows. At last Cnemus and Brasidas and the

rest of the Peloponnesian commanders, being desirous of bringing on a

battle as soon as possible, before reinforcements should arrive from

Athens, and noticing that the men were most of them cowed by the

previous defeat and out of heart for the business, first called them

together and encouraged them as follows:

“Peloponnesians, the late engagement, which may have made some of you

afraid of the one now in prospect, really gives no just ground for

apprehension. Preparation for it, as you know, there was little enough;

and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea as an

expedition by land. Besides this, the chances of war were largely

against us; and perhaps also inexperience had something to do with our

failure in our first naval action. It was not, therefore, cowardice

that produced our defeat, nor ought the determination which force has

not quelled, but which still has a word to say with its adversary, to

lose its edge from the result of an accident; but admitting the

possibility of a chance miscarriage, we should know that brave hearts

must be always brave, and while they remain so can never put forward

inexperience as an excuse for misconduct. Nor are you so behind the

enemy in experience as you are ahead of him in courage; and although

the science of your opponents would, if valour accompanied it, have

also the presence of mind to carry out at in emergency the lesson it

has learnt, yet a faint heart will make all art powerless in the face

of danger. For fear takes away presence of mind, and without valour art

is useless. Against their superior experience set your superior daring,

and against the fear induced by defeat the fact of your having been

then unprepared; remember, too, that you have always the advantage of

superior numbers, and of engaging off your own coast, supported by your

heavy infantry; and as a rule, numbers and equipment give victory. At

no point, therefore, is defeat likely; and as for our previous

mistakes, the very fact of their occurrence will teach us better for

the future. Steersmen and sailors may, therefore, confidently attend to

their several duties, none quitting the station assigned to them: as

for ourselves, we promise to prepare for the engagement at least as

well as your previous commanders, and to give no excuse for any one

misconducting himself. Should any insist on doing so, he shall meet

with the punishment he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured with

the appropriate rewards of valour.”

The Peloponnesian commanders encouraged their men after this fashion.

Phormio, meanwhile, being himself not without fears for the courage of

his men, and noticing that they were forming in groups among themselves

and were alarmed at the odds against them, desired to call them

together and give them confidence and counsel in the present emergency.

He had before continually told them, and had accustomed their minds to

the idea, that there was no numerical superiority that they could not

face; and the men themselves had long been persuaded that Athenians

need never retire before any quantity of Peloponnesian vessels. At the

moment, however, he saw that they were dispirited by the sight before

them, and wishing to refresh their confidence, called them together and

spoke as follows:

“I see, my men, that you are frightened by the number of the enemy, and

I have accordingly called you together, not liking you to be afraid of

what is not really terrible. In the first place, the Peloponnesians,

already defeated, and not even themselves thinking that they are a

match for us, have not ventured to meet us on equal terms, but have

equipped this multitude of ships against us. Next, as to that upon

which they most rely, the courage which they suppose constitutional to

them, their confidence here only arises from the success which their

experience in land service usually gives them, and which they fancy

will do the same for them at sea. But this advantage will in all

justice belong to us on this element, if to them on that; as they are

not superior to us in courage, but we are each of us more confident,

according to our experience in our particular department. Besides, as

the Lacedaemonians use their supremacy over their allies to promote

their own glory, they are most of them being brought into danger

against their will, or they would never, after such a decided defeat,

have ventured upon a fresh engagement. You need not, therefore, be

afraid of their dash. You, on the contrary, inspire a much greater and

better founded alarm, both because of your late victory and also of

their belief that we should not face them unless about to do something

worthy of a success so signal. An adversary numerically superior, like

the one before us, comes into action trusting more to strength than to

resolution; while he who voluntarily confronts tremendous odds must

have very great internal resources to draw upon. For these reasons the

Peloponnesians fear our irrational audacity more than they would ever

have done a more commensurate preparation. Besides, many armaments have

before now succumbed to an inferior through want of skill or sometimes

of courage; neither of which defects certainly are ours. As to the

battle, it shall not be, if I can help it, in the strait, nor will I

sail in there at all; seeing that in a contest between a number of

clumsily managed vessels and a small, fast, well-handled squadron, want

of sea room is an undoubted disadvantage. One cannot run down an enemy

properly without having a sight of him a good way off, nor can one

retire at need when pressed; one can neither break the line nor return

upon his rear, the proper tactics for a fast sailer; but the naval

action necessarily becomes a land one, in which numbers must decide the

matter. For all this I will provide as far as can be. Do you stay at

your posts by your ships, and be sharp at catching the word of command,

the more so as we are observing one another from so short a distance;

and in action think order and silence all-important—qualities useful in

war generally, and in naval engagements in particular; and behave

before the enemy in a manner worthy of your past exploits. The issues

you will fight for are great—to destroy the naval hopes of the

Peloponnesians or to bring nearer to the Athenians their fears for the

sea. And I may once more remind you that you have defeated most of them

already; and beaten men do not face a danger twice with the same

determination.”

Such was the exhortation of Phormio. The Peloponnesians finding that

the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows, in order to

lead them in whether they wished it or not, put out at dawn, and

forming four abreast, sailed inside the gulf in the direction of their

own country, the right wing leading as they had lain at anchor. In this

wing were placed twenty of their best sailers; so that in the event of

Phormio thinking that their object was Naupactus, and coasting along

thither to save the place, the Athenians might not be able to escape

their onset by getting outside their wing, but might be cut off by the

vessels in question. As they expected, Phormio, in alarm for the place

at that moment emptied of its garrison, as soon as he saw them put out,

reluctantly and hurriedly embarked and sailed along shore; the

Messenian land forces moving along also to support him. The

Peloponnesians seeing him coasting along with his ships in single file,

and by this inside the gulf and close inshore as they so much wished,

at one signal tacked suddenly and bore down in line at their best speed

on the Athenians, hoping to cut off the whole squadron. The eleven

leading vessels, however, escaped the Peloponnesian wing and its sudden

movement, and reached the more open water; but the rest were overtaken

as they tried to run through, driven ashore and disabled; such of the

crews being slain as had not swum out of them. Some of the ships the

Peloponnesians lashed to their own, and towed off empty; one they took

with the men in it; others were just being towed off, when they were

saved by the Messenians dashing into the sea with their armour and

fighting from the decks that they had boarded.

Thus far victory was with the Peloponnesians, and the Athenian fleet

destroyed; the twenty ships in the right wing being meanwhile in chase

of the eleven Athenian vessels that had escaped their sudden movement

and reached the more open water. These, with the exception of one ship,

all outsailed them and got safe into Naupactus, and forming close

inshore opposite the temple of Apollo, with their prows facing the

enemy, prepared to defend themselves in case the Peloponnesians should

sail inshore against them. After a while the Peloponnesians came up,

chanting the paean for their victory as they sailed on; the single

Athenian ship remaining being chased by a Leucadian far ahead of the

rest. But there happened to be a merchantman lying at anchor in the

roadstead, which the Athenian ship found time to sail round, and struck

the Leucadian in chase amidships and sank her. An exploit so sudden and

unexpected produced a panic among the Peloponnesians; and having fallen

out of order in the excitement of victory, some of them dropped their

oars and stopped their way in order to let the main body come up—an

unsafe thing to do considering how near they were to the enemy’s prows;

while others ran aground in the shallows, in their ignorance of the

localities.

Elated at this incident, the Athenians at one word gave a cheer, and

dashed at the enemy, who, embarrassed by his mistakes and the disorder

in which he found himself, only stood for an instant, and then fled for

Panormus, whence he had put out. The Athenians following on his heels

took the six vessels nearest them, and recovered those of their own

which had been disabled close inshore and taken in tow at the beginning

of the action; they killed some of the crews and took some prisoners.

On board the Leucadian which went down off the merchantman, was the

Lacedaemonian Timocrates, who killed himself when the ship was sunk,

and was cast up in the harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians on their

return set up a trophy on the spot from which they had put out and

turned the day, and picking up the wrecks and dead that were on their

shore, gave back to the enemy their dead under truce. The

Peloponnesians also set up a trophy as victors for the defeat inflicted

upon the ships they had disabled in shore, and dedicated the vessel

which they had taken at Achaean Rhium, side by side with the trophy.

After this, apprehensive of the reinforcement expected from Athens, all

except the Leucadians sailed into the Crissaean Gulf for Corinth. Not

long after their retreat, the twenty Athenian ships, which were to have

joined Phormio before the battle, arrived at Naupactus.

Thus the summer ended. Winter was now at hand; but dispersing the

fleet, which had retired to Corinth and the Crissaean Gulf, Cnemus,

Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian captains allowed themselves to be

persuaded by the Megarians to make an attempt upon Piraeus, the port of

Athens, which from her decided superiority at sea had been naturally

left unguarded and open. Their plan was as follows: The men were each

to take their oar, cushion, and rowlock thong, and, going overland from

Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side, to get to Megara as quickly as

they could, and launching forty vessels, which happened to be in the

docks at Nisaea, to sail at once to Piraeus. There was no fleet on the

look-out in the harbour, and no one had the least idea of the enemy

attempting a surprise; while an open attack would, it was thought,

never be deliberately ventured on, or, if in contemplation, would be

speedily known at Athens. Their plan formed, the next step was to put

it in execution. Arriving by night and launching the vessels from

Nisaea, they sailed, not to Piraeus as they had originally intended,

being afraid of the risk, besides which there was some talk of a wind

having stopped them, but to the point of Salamis that looks towards

Megara; where there was a fort and a squadron of three ships to prevent

anything sailing in or out of Megara. This fort they assaulted, and

towed off the galleys empty, and surprising the inhabitants began to

lay waste the rest of the island.

Meanwhile fire signals were raised to alarm Athens, and a panic ensued

there as serious as any that occurred during the war. The idea in the

city was that the enemy had already sailed into Piraeus: in Piraeus it

was thought that they had taken Salamis and might at any moment arrive

in the port; as indeed might easily have been done if their hearts had

been a little firmer: certainly no wind would have prevented them. As

soon as day broke, the Athenians assembled in full force, launched

their ships, and embarking in haste and uproar went with the fleet to

Salamis, while their soldiery mounted guard in Piraeus. The

Peloponnesians, on becoming aware of the coming relief, after they had

overrun most of Salamis, hastily sailed off with their plunder and

captives and the three ships from Fort Budorum to Nisaea; the state of

their ships also causing them some anxiety, as it was a long while

since they had been launched, and they were not water-tight. Arrived at

Megara, they returned back on foot to Corinth. The Athenians finding

them no longer at Salamis, sailed back themselves; and after this made

arrangements for guarding Piraeus more diligently in future, by closing

the harbours, and by other suitable precautions.

About the same time, at the beginning of this winter, Sitalces, son of

Teres, the Odrysian king of Thrace, made an expedition against

Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the Chalcidians in

the neighbourhood of Thrace; his object being to enforce one promise

and fulfil another. On the one hand Perdiccas had made him a promise,

when hard pressed at the commencement of the war, upon condition that

Sitalces should reconcile the Athenians to him and not attempt to

restore his brother and enemy, the pretender Philip, but had not

offered to fulfil his engagement; on the other he, Sitalces, on

entering into alliance with the Athenians, had agreed to put an end to

the Chalcidian war in Thrace. These were the two objects of his

invasion. With him he brought Amyntas, the son of Philip, whom he

destined for the throne of Macedonia, and some Athenian envoys then at

his court on this business, and Hagnon as general; for the Athenians

were to join him against the Chalcidians with a fleet and as many

soldiers as they could get together.

Beginning with the Odrysians, he first called out the Thracian tribes

subject to him between Mounts Haemus and Rhodope and the Euxine and

Hellespont; next the Getae beyond Haemus, and the other hordes settled

south of the Danube in the neighbourhood of the Euxine, who, like the

Getae, border on the Scythians and are armed in the same manner, being

all mounted archers. Besides these he summoned many of the hill

Thracian independent swordsmen, called Dii and mostly inhabiting Mount

Rhodope, some of whom came as mercenaries, others as volunteers; also

the Agrianes and Laeaeans, and the rest of the Paeonian tribes in his

empire, at the confines of which these lay, extending up to the Laeaean

Paeonians and the river Strymon, which flows from Mount Scombrus

through the country of the Agrianes and Laeaeans; there the empire of

Sitalces ends and the territory of the independent Paeonians begins.

Bordering on the Triballi, also independent, were the Treres and

Tilataeans, who dwell to the north of Mount Scombrus and extend towards

the setting sun as far as the river Oskius. This river rises in the

same mountains as the Nestus and Hebrus, a wild and extensive range

connected with Rhodope.

The empire of the Odrysians extended along the seaboard from Abdera to

the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine. The navigation of this coast by

the shortest route takes a merchantman four days and four nights with a

wind astern the whole way: by land an active man, travelling by the

shortest road, can get from Abdera to the Danube in eleven days. Such

was the length of its coast line. Inland from Byzantium to the Laeaeans

and the Strymon, the farthest limit of its extension into the interior,

it is a journey of thirteen days for an active man. The tribute from

all the barbarian districts and the Hellenic cities, taking what they

brought in under Seuthes, the successor of Sitalces, who raised it to

its greatest height, amounted to about four hundred talents in gold and

silver. There were also presents in gold and silver to a no less

amount, besides stuff, plain and embroidered, and other articles, made

not only for the king, but also for the Odrysian lords and nobles. For

there was here established a custom opposite to that prevailing in the

Persian kingdom, namely, of taking rather than giving; more disgrace

being attached to not giving when asked than to asking and being

refused; and although this prevailed elsewhere in Thrace, it was

practised most extensively among the powerful Odrysians, it being

impossible to get anything done without a present. It was thus a very

powerful kingdom; in revenue and general prosperity surpassing all in

Europe between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine, and in numbers and

military resources coming decidedly next to the Scythians, with whom

indeed no people in Europe can bear comparison, there not being even in

Asia any nation singly a match for them if unanimous, though of course

they are not on a level with other races in general intelligence and

the arts of civilized life.

It was the master of this empire that now prepared to take the field.

When everything was ready, he set out on his march for Macedonia, first

through his own dominions, next over the desolate range of Cercine that

divides the Sintians and Paeonians, crossing by a road which he had

made by felling the timber on a former campaign against the latter

people. Passing over these mountains, with the Paeonians on his right

and the Sintians and Maedians on the left, he finally arrived at

Doberus, in Paeonia, losing none of his army on the march, except

perhaps by sickness, but receiving some augmentations, many of the

independent Thracians volunteering to join him in the hope of plunder;

so that the whole is said to have formed a grand total of a hundred and

fifty thousand. Most of this was infantry, though there was about a

third cavalry, furnished principally by the Odrysians themselves and

next to them by the Getae. The most warlike of the infantry were the

independent swordsmen who came down from Rhodope; the rest of the mixed

multitude that followed him being chiefly formidable by their numbers.

Assembling in Doberus, they prepared for descending from the heights

upon Lower Macedonia, where the dominions of Perdiccas lay; for the

Lyncestae, Elimiots, and other tribes more inland, though Macedonians

by blood, and allies and dependants of their kindred, still have their

own separate governments. The country on the sea coast, now called

Macedonia, was first acquired by Alexander, the father of Perdiccas,

and his ancestors, originally Temenids from Argos. This was effected by

the expulsion from Pieria of the Pierians, who afterwards inhabited

Phagres and other places under Mount Pangaeus, beyond the Strymon

(indeed the country between Pangaeus and the sea is still called the

Pierian Gulf); of the Bottiaeans, at present neighbours of the

Chalcidians, from Bottia, and by the acquisition in Paeonia of a narrow

strip along the river Axius extending to Pella and the sea; the

district of Mygdonia, between the Axius and the Strymon, being also

added by the expulsion of the Edonians. From Eordia also were driven

the Eordians, most of whom perished, though a few of them still live

round Physca, and the Almopians from Almopia. These Macedonians also

conquered places belonging to the other tribes, which are still

theirs—Anthemus, Crestonia, Bisaltia, and much of Macedonia proper. The

whole is now called Macedonia, and at the time of the invasion of

Sitalces, Perdiccas, Alexander’s son, was the reigning king.

These Macedonians, unable to take the field against so numerous an

invader, shut themselves up in such strong places and fortresses as the

country possessed. Of these there was no great number, most of those

now found in the country having been erected subsequently by Archelaus,

the son of Perdiccas, on his accession, who also cut straight roads,

and otherwise put the kingdom on a better footing as regards horses,

heavy infantry, and other war material than had been done by all the

eight kings that preceded him. Advancing from Doberus, the Thracian

host first invaded what had been once Philip’s government, and took

Idomene by assault, Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places by

negotiation, these last coming over for love of Philip’s son, Amyntas,

then with Sitalces. Laying siege to Europus, and failing to take it, he

next advanced into the rest of Macedonia to the left of Pella and

Cyrrhus, not proceeding beyond this into Bottiaea and Pieria, but

staying to lay waste Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus.

The Macedonians never even thought of meeting him with infantry; but

the Thracian host was, as opportunity offered, attacked by handfuls of

their horse, which had been reinforced from their allies in the

interior. Armed with cuirasses, and excellent horsemen, wherever these

charged they overthrew all before them, but ran considerable risk in

entangling themselves in the masses of the enemy, and so finally

desisted from these efforts, deciding that they were not strong enough

to venture against numbers so superior.

Meanwhile Sitalces opened negotiations with Perdiccas on the objects of

his expedition; and finding that the Athenians, not believing that he

would come, did not appear with their fleet, though they sent presents

and envoys, dispatched a large part of his army against the Chalcidians

and Bottiaeans, and shutting them up inside their walls laid waste

their country. While he remained in these parts, the people farther

south, such as the Thessalians, Magnetes, and the other tribes subject

to the Thessalians, and the Hellenes as far as Thermopylae, all feared

that the army might advance against them, and prepared accordingly.

These fears were shared by the Thracians beyond the Strymon to the

north, who inhabited the plains, such as the Panaeans, the Odomanti,

the Droi, and the Dersaeans, all of whom are independent. It was even

matter of conversation among the Hellenes who were enemies of Athens

whether he might not be invited by his ally to advance also against

them. Meanwhile he held Chalcidice and Bottice and Macedonia, and was

ravaging them all; but finding that he was not succeeding in any of the

objects of his invasion, and that his army was without provisions and

was suffering from the severity of the season, he listened to the

advice of Seuthes, son of Spardacus, his nephew and highest officer,

and decided to retreat without delay. This Seuthes had been secretly

gained by Perdiccas by the promise of his sister in marriage with a

rich dowry. In accordance with this advice, and after a stay of thirty

days in all, eight of which were spent in Chalcidice, he retired home

as quickly as he could; and Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister

Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised. Such was the history of the

expedition of Sitalces.

In the course of this winter, after the dispersion of the Peloponnesian

fleet, the Athenians in Naupactus, under Phormio, coasted along to

Astacus and disembarked, and marched into the interior of Acarnania

with four hundred Athenian heavy infantry and four hundred Messenians.

After expelling some suspected persons from Stratus, Coronta, and other

places, and restoring Cynes, son of Theolytus, to Coronta, they

returned to their ships, deciding that it was impossible in the winter

season to march against Oeniadae, a place which, unlike the rest of

Acarnania, had been always hostile to them; for the river Achelous

flowing from Mount Pindus through Dolopia and the country of the

Agraeans and Amphilochians and the plain of Acarnania, past the town of

Stratus in the upper part of its course, forms lakes where it falls

into the sea round Oeniadae, and thus makes it impracticable for an

army in winter by reason of the water. Opposite to Oeniadae lie most of

the islands called Echinades, so close to the mouths of the Achelous

that that powerful stream is constantly forming deposits against them,

and has already joined some of the islands to the continent, and seems

likely in no long while to do the same with the rest. For the current

is strong, deep, and turbid, and the islands are so thick together that

they serve to imprison the alluvial deposit and prevent its dispersing,

lying, as they do, not in one line, but irregularly, so as to leave no

direct passage for the water into the open sea. The islands in question

are uninhabited and of no great size. There is also a story that

Alcmaeon, son of Amphiraus, during his wanderings after the murder of

his mother was bidden by Apollo to inhabit this spot, through an oracle

which intimated that he would have no release from his terrors until he

should find a country to dwell in which had not been seen by the sun,

or existed as land at the time he slew his mother; all else being to

him polluted ground. Perplexed at this, the story goes on to say, he at

last observed this deposit of the Achelous, and considered that a place

sufficient to support life upon, might have been thrown up during the

long interval that had elapsed since the death of his mother and the

beginning of his wanderings. Settling, therefore, in the district round

Oeniadae, he founded a dominion, and left the country its name from his

son Acarnan. Such is the story we have received concerning Alcmaeon.

The Athenians and Phormio putting back from Acarnania and arriving at

Naupactus, sailed home to Athens in the spring, taking with them the

ships that they had captured, and such of the prisoners made in the

late actions as were freemen; who were exchanged, man for man. And so

ended this winter, and the third year of this war, of which Thucydides

was the historian.

CHAPTER IX

Fourth and Fifth Years of the War—Revolt of Mitylene

The next summer, just as the corn was getting ripe, the Peloponnesians

and their allies invaded Attica under the command of Archidamus, son of

Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and sat down and ravaged the

land; the Athenian horse as usual attacking them, wherever it was

practicable, and preventing the mass of the light troops from advancing

from their camp and wasting the parts near the city. After staying the

time for which they had taken provisions, the invaders retired and

dispersed to their several cities.

Immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians all Lesbos, except

Methymna, revolted from the Athenians. The Lesbians had wished to

revolt even before the war, but the Lacedaemonians would not receive

them; and yet now when they did revolt, they were compelled to do so

sooner than they had intended. While they were waiting until the moles

for their harbours and the ships and walls that they had in building

should be finished, and for the arrival of archers and corn and other

things that they were engaged in fetching from the Pontus, the

Tenedians, with whom they were at enmity, and the Methymnians, and some

factious persons in Mitylene itself, who were proxeni of Athens,

informed the Athenians that the Mitylenians were forcibly uniting the

island under their sovereignty, and that the preparations about which

they were so active, were all concerted with the Boeotians their

kindred and the Lacedaemonians with a view to a revolt, and that,

unless they were immediately prevented, Athens would lose Lesbos.

However, the Athenians, distressed by the plague, and by the war that

had recently broken out and was now raging, thought it a serious matter

to add Lesbos with its fleet and untouched resources to the list of

their enemies; and at first would not believe the charge, giving too

much weight to their wish that it might not be true. But when an

embassy which they sent had failed to persuade the Mitylenians to give

up the union and preparations complained of, they became alarmed, and

resolved to strike the first blow. They accordingly suddenly sent off

forty ships that had been got ready to sail round Peloponnese, under

the command of Cleippides, son of Deinias, and two others; word having

been brought them of a festival in honour of the Malean Apollo outside

the town, which is kept by the whole people of Mitylene, and at which,

if haste were made, they might hope to take them by surprise. If this

plan succeeded, well and good; if not, they were to order the

Mitylenians to deliver up their ships and to pull down their walls, and

if they did not obey, to declare war. The ships accordingly set out;

the ten galleys, forming the contingent of the Mitylenians present with

the fleet according to the terms of the alliance, being detained by the

Athenians, and their crews placed in custody. However, the Mitylenians

were informed of the expedition by a man who crossed from Athens to

Euboea, and going overland to Geraestus, sailed from thence by a

merchantman which he found on the point of putting to sea, and so

arrived at Mitylene the third day after leaving Athens. The Mitylenians

accordingly refrained from going out to the temple at Malea, and

moreover barricaded and kept guard round the half-finished parts of

their walls and harbours.

When the Athenians sailed in not long after and saw how things stood,

the generals delivered their orders, and upon the Mitylenians refusing

to obey, commenced hostilities. The Mitylenians, thus compelled to go

to war without notice and unprepared, at first sailed out with their

fleet and made some show of fighting, a little in front of the harbour;

but being driven back by the Athenian ships, immediately offered to

treat with the commanders, wishing, if possible, to get the ships away

for the present upon any tolerable terms. The Athenian commanders

accepted their offers, being themselves fearful that they might not be

able to cope with the whole of Lesbos; and an armistice having been

concluded, the Mitylenians sent to Athens one of the informers, already

repentant of his conduct, and others with him, to try to persuade the

Athenians of the innocence of their intentions and to get the fleet

recalled. In the meantime, having no great hope of a favourable answer

from Athens, they also sent off a galley with envoys to Lacedaemon,

unobserved by the Athenian fleet which was anchored at Malea to the

north of the town.

While these envoys, reaching Lacedaemon after a difficult journey

across the open sea, were negotiating for succours being sent them, the

ambassadors from Athens returned without having effected anything; and

hostilities were at once begun by the Mitylenians and the rest of

Lesbos, with the exception of the Methymnians, who came to the aid of

the Athenians with the Imbrians and Lemnians and some few of the other

allies. The Mitylenians made a sortie with all their forces against the

Athenian camp; and a battle ensued, in which they gained some slight

advantage, but retired notwithstanding, not feeling sufficient

confidence in themselves to spend the night upon the field. After this

they kept quiet, wishing to wait for the chance of reinforcements

arriving from Peloponnese before making a second venture, being

encouraged by the arrival of Meleas, a Laconian, and Hermaeondas, a

Theban, who had been sent off before the insurrection but had been

unable to reach Lesbos before the Athenian expedition, and who now

stole in in a galley after the battle, and advised them to send another

galley and envoys back with them, which the Mitylenians accordingly

did.

Meanwhile the Athenians, greatly encouraged by the inaction of the

Mitylenians, summoned allies to their aid, who came in all the quicker

from seeing so little vigour displayed by the Lesbians, and bringing

round their ships to a new station to the south of the town, fortified

two camps, one on each side of the city, and instituted a blockade of

both the harbours. The sea was thus closed against the Mitylenians,

who, however, commanded the whole country, with the rest of the

Lesbians who had now joined them; the Athenians only holding a limited

area round their camps, and using Malea more as the station for their

ships and their market.

While the war went on in this way at Mitylene, the Athenians, about the

same time in this summer, also sent thirty ships to Peloponnese under

Asopius, son of Phormio; the Acarnanians insisting that the commander

sent should be some son or relative of Phormio. As the ships coasted

along shore they ravaged the seaboard of Laconia; after which Asopius

sent most of the fleet home, and himself went on with twelve vessels to

Naupactus, and afterwards raising the whole Acarnanian population made

an expedition against Oeniadae, the fleet sailing along the Achelous,

while the army laid waste the country. The inhabitants, however,

showing no signs of submitting, he dismissed the land forces and

himself sailed to Leucas, and making a descent upon Nericus was cut off

during his retreat, and most of his troops with him, by the people in

those parts aided by some coastguards; after which the Athenians sailed

away, recovering their dead from the Leucadians under truce.

Meanwhile the envoys of the Mitylenians sent out in the first ship were

told by the Lacedaemonians to come to Olympia, in order that the rest

of the allies might hear them and decide upon their matter, and so they

journeyed thither. It was the Olympiad in which the Rhodian Dorieus

gained his second victory, and the envoys having been introduced to

make their speech after the festival, spoke as follows:

“Lacedaemonians and allies, the rule established among the Hellenes is

not unknown to us. Those who revolt in war and forsake their former

confederacy are favourably regarded by those who receive them, in so

far as they are of use to them, but otherwise are thought less well of,

through being considered traitors to their former friends. Nor is this

an unfair way of judging, where the rebels and the power from whom they

secede are at one in policy and sympathy, and a match for each other in

resources and power, and where no reasonable ground exists for the

rebellion. But with us and the Athenians this was not the case; and no

one need think the worse of us for revolting from them in danger, after

having been honoured by them in time of peace.

“Justice and honesty will be the first topics of our speech, especially

as we are asking for alliance; because we know that there can never be

any solid friendship between individuals, or union between communities

that is worth the name, unless the parties be persuaded of each other’s

honesty, and be generally congenial the one to the other; since from

difference in feeling springs also difference in conduct. Between

ourselves and the Athenians alliance began, when you withdrew from the

Median War and they remained to finish the business. But we did not

become allies of the Athenians for the subjugation of the Hellenes, but

allies of the Hellenes for their liberation from the Mede; and as long

as the Athenians led us fairly we followed them loyally; but when we

saw them relax their hostility to the Mede, to try to compass the

subjection of the allies, then our apprehensions began. Unable,

however, to unite and defend themselves, on account of the number of

confederates that had votes, all the allies were enslaved, except

ourselves and the Chians, who continued to send our contingents as

independent and nominally free. Trust in Athens as a leader, however,

we could no longer feel, judging by the examples already given; it

being unlikely that she would reduce our fellow confederates, and not

do the same by us who were left, if ever she had the power.

“Had we all been still independent, we could have had more faith in

their not attempting any change; but the greater number being their

subjects, while they were treating us as equals, they would naturally

chafe under this solitary instance of independence as contrasted with

the submission of the majority; particularly as they daily grew more

powerful, and we more destitute. Now the only sure basis of an alliance

is for each party to be equally afraid of the other; he who would like

to encroach is then deterred by the reflection that he will not have

odds in his favour. Again, if we were left independent, it was only

because they thought they saw their way to empire more clearly by

specious language and by the paths of policy than by those of force.

Not only were we useful as evidence that powers who had votes, like

themselves, would not, surely, join them in their expeditions, against

their will, without the party attacked being in the wrong; but the same

system also enabled them to lead the stronger states against the weaker

first, and so to leave the former to the last, stripped of their

natural allies, and less capable of resistance. But if they had begun

with us, while all the states still had their resources under their own

control, and there was a centre to rally round, the work of subjugation

would have been found less easy. Besides this, our navy gave them some

apprehension: it was always possible that it might unite with you or

with some other power, and become dangerous to Athens. The court which

we paid to their commons and its leaders for the time being also helped

us to maintain our independence. However, we did not expect to be able

to do so much longer, if this war had not broken out, from the examples

that we had had of their conduct to the rest.

“How then could we put our trust in such friendship or freedom as we

had here? We accepted each other against our inclination; fear made

them court us in war, and us them in peace; sympathy, the ordinary

basis of confidence, had its place supplied by terror, fear having more

share than friendship in detaining us in the alliance; and the first

party that should be encouraged by the hope of impunity was certain to

break faith with the other. So that to condemn us for being the first

to break off, because they delay the blow that we dread, instead of

ourselves delaying to know for certain whether it will be dealt or not,

is to take a false view of the case. For if we were equally able with

them to meet their plots and imitate their delay, we should be their

equals and should be under no necessity of being their subjects; but

the liberty of offence being always theirs, that of defence ought

clearly to be ours.

“Such, Lacedaemonians and allies, are the grounds and the reasons of

our revolt; clear enough to convince our hearers of the fairness of our

conduct, and sufficient to alarm ourselves, and to make us turn to some

means of safety. This we wished to do long ago, when we sent to you on

the subject while the peace yet lasted, but were balked by your

refusing to receive us; and now, upon the Boeotians inviting us, we at

once responded to the call, and decided upon a twofold revolt, from the

Hellenes and from the Athenians, not to aid the latter in harming the

former, but to join in their liberation, and not to allow the Athenians

in the end to destroy us, but to act in time against them. Our revolt,

however, has taken place prematurely and without preparation—a fact

which makes it all the more incumbent on you to receive us into

alliance and to send us speedy relief, in order to show that you

support your friends, and at the same time do harm to your enemies. You

have an opportunity such as you never had before. Disease and

expenditure have wasted the Athenians: their ships are either cruising

round your coasts, or engaged in blockading us; and it is not probable

that they will have any to spare, if you invade them a second time this

summer by sea and land; but they will either offer no resistance to

your vessels, or withdraw from both our shores. Nor must it be thought

that this is a case of putting yourselves into danger for a country

which is not yours. Lesbos may appear far off, but when help is wanted

she will be found near enough. It is not in Attica that the war will be

decided, as some imagine, but in the countries by which Attica is

supported; and the Athenian revenue is drawn from the allies, and will

become still larger if they reduce us; as not only will no other state

revolt, but our resources will be added to theirs, and we shall be

treated worse than those that were enslaved before. But if you will

frankly support us, you will add to your side a state that has a large

navy, which is your great want; you will smooth the way to the

overthrow of the Athenians by depriving them of their allies, who will

be greatly encouraged to come over; and you will free yourselves from

the imputation made against you, of not supporting insurrection. In

short, only show yourselves as liberators, and you may count upon

having the advantage in the war.

“Respect, therefore, the hopes placed in you by the Hellenes, and that

Olympian Zeus, in whose temple we stand as very suppliants; become the

allies and defenders of the Mitylenians, and do not sacrifice us, who

put our lives upon the hazard, in a cause in which general good will

result to all from our success, and still more general harm if we fail

through your refusing to help us; but be the men that the Hellenes

think you, and our fears desire.”

Such were the words of the Mitylenians. After hearing them out, the

Lacedaemonians and confederates granted what they urged, and took the

Lesbians into alliance, and deciding in favour of the invasion of

Attica, told the allies present to march as quickly as possible to the

Isthmus with two-thirds of their forces; and arriving there first

themselves, got ready hauling machines to carry their ships across from

Corinth to the sea on the side of Athens, in order to make their attack

by sea and land at once. However, the zeal which they displayed was not

imitated by the rest of the confederates, who came in but slowly, being

engaged in harvesting their corn and sick of making expeditions.

Meanwhile the Athenians, aware that the preparations of the enemy were

due to his conviction of their weakness, and wishing to show him that

he was mistaken, and that they were able, without moving the Lesbian

fleet, to repel with ease that with which they were menaced from

Peloponnese, manned a hundred ships by embarking the citizens of

Athens, except the knights and Pentacosiomedimni, and the resident

aliens; and putting out to the Isthmus, displayed their power, and made

descents upon Peloponnese wherever they pleased. A disappointment so

signal made the Lacedaemonians think that the Lesbians had not spoken

the truth; and embarrassed by the non-appearance of the confederates,

coupled with the news that the thirty ships round Peloponnese were

ravaging the lands near Sparta, they went back home. Afterwards,

however, they got ready a fleet to send to Lesbos, and ordering a total

of forty ships from the different cities in the league, appointed

Alcidas to command the expedition in his capacity of high admiral.

Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships, upon seeing the

Lacedaemonians go home, went home likewise.

If, at the time that this fleet was at sea, Athens had almost the

largest number of first-rate ships in commission that she ever

possessed at any one moment, she had as many or even more when the war

began. At that time one hundred guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis; a

hundred more were cruising round Peloponnese, besides those employed at

Potidæa and in other places; making a grand total of two hundred and

fifty vessels employed on active service in a single summer. It was

this, with Potidæa, that most exhausted her revenues—Potidæa being

blockaded by a force of heavy infantry (each drawing two drachmae a

day, one for himself and another for his servant), which amounted to

three thousand at first, and was kept at this number down to the end of

the siege; besides sixteen hundred with Phormio who went away before it

was over; and the ships being all paid at the same rate. In this way

her money was wasted at first; and this was the largest number of ships

ever manned by her.

About the same time that the Lacedaemonians were at the Isthmus, the

Mitylenians marched by land with their mercenaries against Methymna,

which they thought to gain by treachery. After assaulting the town, and

not meeting with the success that they anticipated, they withdrew to

Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus; and taking measures for the better

security of these towns and strengthening their walls, hastily returned

home. After their departure the Methymnians marched against Antissa,

but were defeated in a sortie by the Antissians and their mercenaries,

and retreated in haste after losing many of their number. Word of this

reaching Athens, and the Athenians learning that the Mitylenians were

masters of the country and their own soldiers unable to hold them in

check, they sent out about the beginning of autumn Paches, son of

Epicurus, to take the command, and a thousand Athenian heavy infantry;

who worked their own passage and, arriving at Mitylene, built a single

wall all round it, forts being erected at some of the strongest points.

Mitylene was thus blockaded strictly on both sides, by land and by sea;

and winter now drew near.

The Athenians needing money for the siege, although they had for the

first time raised a contribution of two hundred talents from their own

citizens, now sent out twelve ships to levy subsidies from their

allies, with Lysicles and four others in command. After cruising to

different places and laying them under contribution, Lysicles went up

the country from Myus, in Caria, across the plain of the Meander, as

far as the hill of Sandius; and being attacked by the Carians and the

people of Anaia, was slain with many of his soldiers.

The same winter the Plataeans, who were still being besieged by the

Peloponnesians and Boeotians, distressed by the failure of their

provisions, and seeing no hope of relief from Athens, nor any other

means of safety, formed a scheme with the Athenians besieged with them

for escaping, if possible, by forcing their way over the enemy’s walls;

the attempt having been suggested by Theaenetus, son of Tolmides, a

soothsayer, and Eupompides, son of Daimachus, one of their generals. At

first all were to join: afterwards, half hung back, thinking the risk

great; about two hundred and twenty, however, voluntarily persevered in

the attempt, which was carried out in the following way. Ladders were

made to match the height of the enemy’s wall, which they measured by

the layers of bricks, the side turned towards them not being thoroughly

whitewashed. These were counted by many persons at once; and though

some might miss the right calculation, most would hit upon it,

particularly as they counted over and over again, and were no great way

from the wall, but could see it easily enough for their purpose. The

length required for the ladders was thus obtained, being calculated

from the breadth of the brick.

Now the wall of the Peloponnesians was constructed as follows. It

consisted of two lines drawn round the place, one against the

Plataeans, the other against any attack on the outside from Athens,

about sixteen feet apart. The intermediate space of sixteen feet was

occupied by huts portioned out among the soldiers on guard, and built

in one block, so as to give the appearance of a single thick wall with

battlements on either side. At intervals of every ten battlements were

towers of considerable size, and the same breadth as the wall, reaching

right across from its inner to its outer face, with no means of passing

except through the middle. Accordingly on stormy and wet nights the

battlements were deserted, and guard kept from the towers, which were

not far apart and roofed in above.

Such being the structure of the wall by which the Plataeans were

blockaded, when their preparations were completed, they waited for a

stormy night of wind and rain and without any moon, and then set out,

guided by the authors of the enterprise. Crossing first the ditch that

ran round the town, they next gained the wall of the enemy unperceived

by the sentinels, who did not see them in the darkness, or hear them,

as the wind drowned with its roar the noise of their approach; besides

which they kept a good way off from each other, that they might not be

betrayed by the clash of their weapons. They were also lightly

equipped, and had only the left foot shod to preserve them from

slipping in the mire. They came up to the battlements at one of the

intermediate spaces where they knew them to be unguarded: those who

carried the ladders went first and planted them; next twelve

light-armed soldiers with only a dagger and a breastplate mounted, led

by Ammias, son of Coroebus, who was the first on the wall; his

followers getting up after him and going six to each of the towers.

After these came another party of light troops armed with spears, whose

shields, that they might advance the easier, were carried by men

behind, who were to hand them to them when they found themselves in

presence of the enemy. After a good many had mounted they were

discovered by the sentinels in the towers, by the noise made by a tile

which was knocked down by one of the Plataeans as he was laying hold of

the battlements. The alarm was instantly given, and the troops rushed

to the wall, not knowing the nature of the danger, owing to the dark

night and stormy weather; the Plataeans in the town having also chosen

that moment to make a sortie against the wall of the Peloponnesians

upon the side opposite to that on which their men were getting over, in

order to divert the attention of the besiegers. Accordingly they

remained distracted at their several posts, without any venturing to

stir to give help from his own station, and at a loss to guess what was

going on. Meanwhile the three hundred set aside for service on

emergencies went outside the wall in the direction of the alarm.

Fire-signals of an attack were also raised towards Thebes; but the

Plataeans in the town at once displayed a number of others, prepared

beforehand for this very purpose, in order to render the enemy’s

signals unintelligible, and to prevent his friends getting a true idea

of what was passing and coming to his aid before their comrades who had

gone out should have made good their escape and be in safety.

Meanwhile the first of the scaling party that had got up, after

carrying both the towers and putting the sentinels to the sword, posted

themselves inside to prevent any one coming through against them; and

rearing ladders from the wall, sent several men up on the towers, and

from their summit and base kept in check all of the enemy that came up,

with their missiles, while their main body planted a number of ladders

against the wall, and knocking down the battlements, passed over

between the towers; each as soon as he had got over taking up his

station at the edge of the ditch, and plying from thence with arrows

and darts any who came along the wall to stop the passage of his

comrades. When all were over, the party on the towers came down, the

last of them not without difficulty, and proceeded to the ditch, just

as the three hundred came up carrying torches. The Plataeans, standing

on the edge of the ditch in the dark, had a good view of their

opponents, and discharged their arrows and darts upon the unarmed parts

of their bodies, while they themselves could not be so well seen in the

obscurity for the torches; and thus even the last of them got over the

ditch, though not without effort and difficulty; as ice had formed in

it, not strong enough to walk upon, but of that watery kind which

generally comes with a wind more east than north, and the snow which

this wind had caused to fall during the night had made the water in the

ditch rise, so that they could scarcely breast it as they crossed.

However, it was mainly the violence of the storm that enabled them to

effect their escape at all.

Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans went all together along the road

leading to Thebes, keeping the chapel of the hero Androcrates upon

their right; considering that the last road which the Peloponnesians

would suspect them of having taken would be that towards their enemies’

country. Indeed they could see them pursuing with torches upon the

Athens road towards Cithaeron and Druoskephalai or Oakheads. After

going for rather more than half a mile upon the road to Thebes, the

Plataeans turned off and took that leading to the mountain, to Erythrae

and Hysiae, and reaching the hills, made good their escape to Athens,

two hundred and twelve men in all; some of their number having turned

back into the town before getting over the wall, and one archer having

been taken prisoner at the outer ditch. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians

gave up the pursuit and returned to their posts; and the Plataeans in

the town, knowing nothing of what had passed, and informed by those who

had turned back that not a man had escaped, sent out a herald as soon

as it was day to make a truce for the recovery of the dead bodies, and

then, learning the truth, desisted. In this way the Plataean party got

over and were saved.

Towards the close of the same winter, Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian, was

sent out in a galley from Lacedaemon to Mitylene. Going by sea to

Pyrrha, and from thence overland, he passed along the bed of a torrent,

where the line of circumvallation was passable, and thus entering

unperceived into Mitylene told the magistrates that Attica would

certainly be invaded, and the forty ships destined to relieve them

arrive, and that he had been sent on to announce this and to

superintend matters generally. The Mitylenians upon this took courage,

and laid aside the idea of treating with the Athenians; and now this

winter ended, and with it ended the fourth year of the war of which

Thucydides was the historian.

The next summer the Peloponnesians sent off the forty-two ships for

Mitylene, under Alcidas, their high admiral, and themselves and their

allies invaded Attica, their object being to distract the Athenians by

a double movement, and thus to make it less easy for them to act

against the fleet sailing to Mitylene. The commander in this invasion

was Cleomenes, in the place of King Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, his

nephew, who was still a minor. Not content with laying waste whatever

had shot up in the parts which they had before devastated, the invaders

now extended their ravages to lands passed over in their previous

incursions; so that this invasion was more severely felt by the

Athenians than any except the second; the enemy staying on and on until

they had overrun most of the country, in the expectation of hearing

from Lesbos of something having been achieved by their fleet, which

they thought must now have got over. However, as they did not obtain

any of the results expected, and their provisions began to run short,

they retreated and dispersed to their different cities.

In the meantime the Mitylenians, finding their provisions failing,

while the fleet from Peloponnese was loitering on the way instead of

appearing at Mitylene, were compelled to come to terms with the

Athenians in the following manner. Salaethus having himself ceased to

expect the fleet to arrive, now armed the commons with heavy armour,

which they had not before possessed, with the intention of making a

sortie against the Athenians. The commons, however, no sooner found

themselves possessed of arms than they refused any longer to obey their

officers; and forming in knots together, told the authorities to bring

out in public the provisions and divide them amongst them all, or they

would themselves come to terms with the Athenians and deliver up the

city.

The government, aware of their inability to prevent this, and of the

danger they would be in, if left out of the capitulation, publicly

agreed with Paches and the army to surrender Mitylene at discretion and

to admit the troops into the town; upon the understanding that the

Mitylenians should be allowed to send an embassy to Athens to plead

their cause, and that Paches should not imprison, make slaves of, or

put to death any of the citizens until its return. Such were the terms

of the capitulation; in spite of which the chief authors of the

negotiation with Lacedaemon were so completely overcome by terror when

the army entered that they went and seated themselves by the altars,

from which they were raised up by Paches under promise that he would do

them no wrong, and lodged by him in Tenedos, until he should learn the

pleasure of the Athenians concerning them. Paches also sent some

galleys and seized Antissa, and took such other military measures as he

thought advisable.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the forty ships, who ought to have made

all haste to relieve Mitylene, lost time in coming round Peloponnese

itself, and proceeding leisurely on the remainder of the voyage, made

Delos without having been seen by the Athenians at Athens, and from

thence arriving at Icarus and Myconus, there first heard of the fall of

Mitylene. Wishing to know the truth, they put into Embatum, in the

Erythraeid, about seven days after the capture of the town. Here they

learned the truth, and began to consider what they were to do; and

Teutiaplus, an Elean, addressed them as follows:

“Alcidas and Peloponnesians who share with me the command of this

armament, my advice is to sail just as we are to Mitylene, before we

have been heard of. We may expect to find the Athenians as much off

their guard as men generally are who have just taken a city: this will

certainly be so by sea, where they have no idea of any enemy attacking

them, and where our strength, as it happens, mainly lies; while even

their land forces are probably scattered about the houses in the

carelessness of victory. If therefore we were to fall upon them

suddenly and in the night, I have hopes, with the help of the

well-wishers that we may have left inside the town, that we shall

become masters of the place. Let us not shrink from the risk, but let

us remember that this is just the occasion for one of the baseless

panics common in war: and that to be able to guard against these in

one’s own case, and to detect the moment when an attack will find an

enemy at this disadvantage, is what makes a successful general.”

These words of Teutiaplus failing to move Alcidas, some of the Ionian

exiles and the Lesbians with the expedition began to urge him, since

this seemed too dangerous, to seize one of the Ionian cities or the

Aeolic town of Cyme, to use as a base for effecting the revolt of

Ionia. This was by no means a hopeless enterprise, as their coming was

welcome everywhere; their object would be by this move to deprive

Athens of her chief source of revenue, and at the same time to saddle

her with expense, if she chose to blockade them; and they would

probably induce Pissuthnes to join them in the war. However, Alcidas

gave this proposal as bad a reception as the other, being eager, since

he had come too late for Mitylene, to find himself back in Peloponnese

as soon as possible.

Accordingly he put out from Embatum and proceeded along shore; and

touching at the Teian town, Myonnesus, there butchered most of the

prisoners that he had taken on his passage. Upon his coming to anchor

at Ephesus, envoys came to him from the Samians at Anaia, and told him

that he was not going the right way to free Hellas in massacring men

who had never raised a hand against him, and who were not enemies of

his, but allies of Athens against their will, and that if he did not

stop he would turn many more friends into enemies than enemies into

friends. Alcidas agreed to this, and let go all the Chians still in his

hands and some of the others that he had taken; the inhabitants,

instead of flying at the sight of his vessels, rather coming up to

them, taking them for Athenian, having no sort of expectation that

while the Athenians commanded the sea Peloponnesian ships would venture

over to Ionia.

From Ephesus Alcidas set sail in haste and fled. He had been seen by

the Salaminian and Paralian galleys, which happened to be sailing from

Athens, while still at anchor off Clarus; and fearing pursuit he now

made across the open sea, fully determined to touch nowhere, if he

could help it, until he got to Peloponnese. Meanwhile news of him had

come in to Paches from the Erythraeid, and indeed from all quarters. As

Ionia was unfortified, great fears were felt that the Peloponnesians

coasting along shore, even if they did not intend to stay, might make

descents in passing and plunder the towns; and now the Paralian and

Salaminian, having seen him at Clarus, themselves brought intelligence

of the fact. Paches accordingly gave hot chase, and continued the

pursuit as far as the isle of Patmos, and then finding that Alcidas had

got on too far to be overtaken, came back again. Meanwhile he thought

it fortunate that, as he had not fallen in with them out at sea, he had

not overtaken them anywhere where they would have been forced to

encamp, and so give him the trouble of blockading them.

On his return along shore he touched, among other places, at Notium,

the port of Colophon, where the Colophonians had settled after the

capture of the upper town by Itamenes and the barbarians, who had been

called in by certain individuals in a party quarrel. The capture of the

town took place about the time of the second Peloponnesian invasion of

Attica. However, the refugees, after settling at Notium, again split up

into factions, one of which called in Arcadian and barbarian

mercenaries from Pissuthnes and, entrenching these in a quarter apart,

formed a new community with the Median party of the Colophonians who

joined them from the upper town. Their opponents had retired into

exile, and now called in Paches, who invited Hippias, the commander of

the Arcadians in the fortified quarter, to a parley, upon condition

that, if they could not agree, he was to be put back safe and sound in

the fortification. However, upon his coming out to him, he put him into

custody, though not in chains, and attacked suddenly and took by

surprise the fortification, and putting the Arcadians and the

barbarians found in it to the sword, afterwards took Hippias into it as

he had promised, and, as soon as he was inside, seized him and shot him

down. Paches then gave up Notium to the Colophonians not of the Median

party; and settlers were afterwards sent out from Athens, and the place

colonized according to Athenian laws, after collecting all the

Colophonians found in any of the cities.

Arrived at Mitylene, Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus; and finding the

Lacedaemonian, Salaethus, in hiding in the town, sent him off to

Athens, together with the Mitylenians that he had placed in Tenedos,

and any other persons that he thought concerned in the revolt. He also

sent back the greater part of his forces, remaining with the rest to

settle Mitylene and the rest of Lesbos as he thought best.

Upon the arrival of the prisoners with Salaethus, the Athenians at once

put the latter to death, although he offered, among other things, to

procure the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Plataea, which was

still under siege; and after deliberating as to what they should do

with the former, in the fury of the moment determined to put to death

not only the prisoners at Athens, but the whole adult male population

of Mitylene, and to make slaves of the women and children. It was

remarked that Mitylene had revolted without being, like the rest,

subjected to the empire; and what above all swelled the wrath of the

Athenians was the fact of the Peloponnesian fleet having ventured over

to Ionia to her support, a fact which was held to argue a long

meditated rebellion. They accordingly sent a galley to communicate the

decree to Paches, commanding him to lose no time in dispatching the

Mitylenians. The morrow brought repentance with it and reflection on

the horrid cruelty of a decree, which condemned a whole city to the

fate merited only by the guilty. This was no sooner perceived by the

Mitylenian ambassadors at Athens and their Athenian supporters, than

they moved the authorities to put the question again to the vote; which

they the more easily consented to do, as they themselves plainly saw

that most of the citizens wished some one to give them an opportunity

for reconsidering the matter. An assembly was therefore at once called,

and after much expression of opinion upon both sides, Cleon, son of

Cleaenetus, the same who had carried the former motion of putting the

Mitylenians to death, the most violent man at Athens, and at that time

by far the most powerful with the commons, came forward again and spoke

as follows:

“I have often before now been convinced that a democracy is incapable

of empire, and never more so than by your present change of mind in the

matter of Mitylene. Fears or plots being unknown to you in your daily

relations with each other, you feel just the same with regard to your

allies, and never reflect that the mistakes into which you may be led

by listening to their appeals, or by giving way to your own compassion,

are full of danger to yourselves, and bring you no thanks for your

weakness from your allies; entirely forgetting that your empire is a

despotism and your subjects disaffected conspirators, whose obedience

is ensured not by your suicidal concessions, but by the superiority

given you by your own strength and not their loyalty. The most alarming

feature in the case is the constant change of measures with which we

appear to be threatened, and our seeming ignorance of the fact that bad

laws which are never changed are better for a city than good ones that

have no authority; that unlearned loyalty is more serviceable than

quick-witted insubordination; and that ordinary men usually manage

public affairs better than their more gifted fellows. The latter are

always wanting to appear wiser than the laws, and to overrule every

proposition brought forward, thinking that they cannot show their wit

in more important matters, and by such behaviour too often ruin their

country; while those who mistrust their own cleverness are content to

be less learned than the laws, and less able to pick holes in the

speech of a good speaker; and being fair judges rather than rival

athletes, generally conduct affairs successfully. These we ought to

imitate, instead of being led on by cleverness and intellectual rivalry

to advise your people against our real opinions.

“For myself, I adhere to my former opinion, and wonder at those who

have proposed to reopen the case of the Mitylenians, and who are thus

causing a delay which is all in favour of the guilty, by making the

sufferer proceed against the offender with the edge of his anger

blunted; although where vengeance follows most closely upon the wrong,

it best equals it and most amply requites it. I wonder also who will be

the man who will maintain the contrary, and will pretend to show that

the crimes of the Mitylenians are of service to us, and our misfortunes

injurious to the allies. Such a man must plainly either have such

confidence in his rhetoric as to adventure to prove that what has been

once for all decided is still undetermined, or be bribed to try to

delude us by elaborate sophisms. In such contests the state gives the

rewards to others, and takes the dangers for herself. The persons to

blame are you who are so foolish as to institute these contests; who go

to see an oration as you would to see a sight, take your facts on

hearsay, judge of the practicability of a project by the wit of its

advocates, and trust for the truth as to past events not to the fact

which you saw more than to the clever strictures which you heard; the

easy victims of new-fangled arguments, unwilling to follow received

conclusions; slaves to every new paradox, despisers of the commonplace;

the first wish of every man being that he could speak himself, the next

to rival those who can speak by seeming to be quite up with their ideas

by applauding every hit almost before it is made, and by being as quick

in catching an argument as you are slow in foreseeing its consequences;

asking, if I may so say, for something different from the conditions

under which we live, and yet comprehending inadequately those very

conditions; very slaves to the pleasure of the ear, and more like the

audience of a rhetorician than the council of a city.

“In order to keep you from this, I proceed to show that no one state

has ever injured you as much as Mitylene. I can make allowance for

those who revolt because they cannot bear our empire, or who have been

forced to do so by the enemy. But for those who possessed an island

with fortifications; who could fear our enemies only by sea, and there

had their own force of galleys to protect them; who were independent

and held in the highest honour by you—to act as these have done, this

is not revolt—revolt implies oppression; it is deliberate and wanton

aggression; an attempt to ruin us by siding with our bitterest enemies;

a worse offence than a war undertaken on their own account in the

acquisition of power. The fate of those of their neighbours who had

already rebelled and had been subdued was no lesson to them; their own

prosperity could not dissuade them from affronting danger; but blindly

confident in the future, and full of hopes beyond their power though

not beyond their ambition, they declared war and made their decision to

prefer might to right, their attack being determined not by provocation

but by the moment which seemed propitious. The truth is that great good

fortune coming suddenly and unexpectedly tends to make a people

insolent; in most cases it is safer for mankind to have success in

reason than out of reason; and it is easier for them, one may say, to

stave off adversity than to preserve prosperity. Our mistake has been

to distinguish the Mitylenians as we have done: had they been long ago

treated like the rest, they never would have so far forgotten

themselves, human nature being as surely made arrogant by consideration

as it is awed by firmness. Let them now therefore be punished as their

crime requires, and do not, while you condemn the aristocracy, absolve

the people. This is certain, that all attacked you without distinction,

although they might have come over to us and been now again in

possession of their city. But no, they thought it safer to throw in

their lot with the aristocracy and so joined their rebellion! Consider

therefore: if you subject to the same punishment the ally who is forced

to rebel by the enemy, and him who does so by his own free choice,

which of them, think you, is there that will not rebel upon the

slightest pretext; when the reward of success is freedom, and the

penalty of failure nothing so very terrible? We meanwhile shall have to

risk our money and our lives against one state after another; and if

successful, shall receive a ruined town from which we can no longer

draw the revenue upon which our strength depends; while if

unsuccessful, we shall have an enemy the more upon our hands, and shall

spend the time that might be employed in combating our existing foes in

warring with our own allies.

“No hope, therefore, that rhetoric may instil or money purchase, of the

mercy due to human infirmity must be held out to the Mitylenians. Their

offence was not involuntary, but of malice and deliberate; and mercy is

only for unwilling offenders. I therefore, now as before, persist

against your reversing your first decision, or giving way to the three

failings most fatal to empire—pity, sentiment, and indulgence.

Compassion is due to those who can reciprocate the feeling, not to

those who will never pity us in return, but are our natural and

necessary foes: the orators who charm us with sentiment may find other

less important arenas for their talents, in the place of one where the

city pays a heavy penalty for a momentary pleasure, themselves

receiving fine acknowledgments for their fine phrases; while indulgence

should be shown towards those who will be our friends in future,

instead of towards men who will remain just what they were, and as much

our enemies as before. To sum up shortly, I say that if you follow my

advice you will do what is just towards the Mitylenians, and at the

same time expedient; while by a different decision you will not oblige

them so much as pass sentence upon yourselves. For if they were right

in rebelling, you must be wrong in ruling. However, if, right or wrong,

you determine to rule, you must carry out your principle and punish the

Mitylenians as your interest requires; or else you must give up your

empire and cultivate honesty without danger. Make up your minds,

therefore, to give them like for like; and do not let the victims who

escaped the plot be more insensible than the conspirators who hatched

it; but reflect what they would have done if victorious over you,

especially they were the aggressors. It is they who wrong their

neighbour without a cause, that pursue their victim to the death, on

account of the danger which they foresee in letting their enemy

survive; since the object of a wanton wrong is more dangerous, if he

escape, than an enemy who has not this to complain of. Do not,

therefore, be traitors to yourselves, but recall as nearly as possible

the moment of suffering and the supreme importance which you then

attached to their reduction; and now pay them back in their turn,

without yielding to present weakness or forgetting the peril that once

hung over you. Punish them as they deserve, and teach your other allies

by a striking example that the penalty of rebellion is death. Let them

once understand this and you will not have so often to neglect your

enemies while you are fighting with your own confederates.”

Such were the words of Cleon. After him Diodotus, son of Eucrates, who

had also in the previous assembly spoken most strongly against putting

the Mitylenians to death, came forward and spoke as follows:

“I do not blame the persons who have reopened the case of the

Mitylenians, nor do I approve the protests which we have heard against

important questions being frequently debated. I think the two things

most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion; haste usually goes

hand in hand with folly, passion with coarseness and narrowness of

mind. As for the argument that speech ought not to be the exponent of

action, the man who uses it must be either senseless or interested:

senseless if he believes it possible to treat of the uncertain future

through any other medium; interested if, wishing to carry a disgraceful

measure and doubting his ability to speak well in a bad cause, he

thinks to frighten opponents and hearers by well-aimed calumny. What is

still more intolerable is to accuse a speaker of making a display in

order to be paid for it. If ignorance only were imputed, an

unsuccessful speaker might retire with a reputation for honesty, if not

for wisdom; while the charge of dishonesty makes him suspected, if

successful, and thought, if defeated, not only a fool but a rogue. The

city is no gainer by such a system, since fear deprives it of its

advisers; although in truth, if our speakers are to make such

assertions, it would be better for the country if they could not speak

at all, as we should then make fewer blunders. The good citizen ought

to triumph not by frightening his opponents but by beating them fairly

in argument; and a wise city, without over-distinguishing its best

advisers, will nevertheless not deprive them of their due, and, far

from punishing an unlucky counsellor, will not even regard him as

disgraced. In this way successful orators would be least tempted to

sacrifice their convictions to popularity, in the hope of still higher

honours, and unsuccessful speakers to resort to the same popular arts

in order to win over the multitude.

“This is not our way; and, besides, the moment that a man is suspected

of giving advice, however good, from corrupt motives, we feel such a

grudge against him for the gain which after all we are not certain he

will receive, that we deprive the city of its certain benefit. Plain

good advice has thus come to be no less suspected than bad; and the

advocate of the most monstrous measures is not more obliged to use

deceit to gain the people, than the best counsellor is to lie in order

to be believed. The city and the city only, owing to these refinements,

can never be served openly and without disguise; he who does serve it

openly being always suspected of serving himself in some secret way in

return. Still, considering the magnitude of the interests involved, and

the position of affairs, we orators must make it our business to look a

little farther than you who judge offhand; especially as we, your

advisers, are responsible, while you, our audience, are not so. For if

those who gave the advice, and those who took it, suffered equally, you

would judge more calmly; as it is, you visit the disasters into which

the whim of the moment may have led you upon the single person of your

adviser, not upon yourselves, his numerous companions in error.

“However, I have not come forward either to oppose or to accuse in the

matter of Mitylene; indeed, the question before us as sensible men is

not their guilt, but our interests. Though I prove them ever so guilty,

I shall not, therefore, advise their death, unless it be expedient; nor

though they should have claims to indulgence, shall I recommend it,

unless it be dearly for the good of the country. I consider that we are

deliberating for the future more than for the present; and where Cleon

is so positive as to the useful deterrent effects that will follow from

making rebellion capital, I, who consider the interests of the future

quite as much as he, as positively maintain the contrary. And I require

you not to reject my useful considerations for his specious ones: his

speech may have the attraction of seeming the more just in your present

temper against Mitylene; but we are not in a court of justice, but in a

political assembly; and the question is not justice, but how to make

the Mitylenians useful to Athens.

“Now of course communities have enacted the penalty of death for many

offences far lighter than this: still hope leads men to venture, and no

one ever yet put himself in peril without the inward conviction that he

would succeed in his design. Again, was there ever city rebelling that

did not believe that it possessed either in itself or in its alliances

resources adequate to the enterprise? All, states and individuals, are

alike prone to err, and there is no law that will prevent them; or why

should men have exhausted the list of punishments in search of

enactments to protect them from evildoers? It is probable that in early

times the penalties for the greatest offences were less severe, and

that, as these were disregarded, the penalty of death has been by

degrees in most cases arrived at, which is itself disregarded in like

manner. Either then some means of terror more terrible than this must

be discovered, or it must be owned that this restraint is useless; and

that as long as poverty gives men the courage of necessity, or plenty

fills them with the ambition which belongs to insolence and pride, and

the other conditions of life remain each under the thraldom of some

fatal and master passion, so long will the impulse never be wanting to

drive men into danger. Hope also and cupidity, the one leading and the

other following, the one conceiving the attempt, the other suggesting

the facility of succeeding, cause the widest ruin, and, although

invisible agents, are far stronger than the dangers that are seen.

Fortune, too, powerfully helps the delusion and, by the unexpected aid

that she sometimes lends, tempts men to venture with inferior means;

and this is especially the case with communities, because the stakes

played for are the highest, freedom or empire, and, when all are acting

together, each man irrationally magnifies his own capacity. In fine, it

is impossible to prevent, and only great simplicity can hope to

prevent, human nature doing what it has once set its mind upon, by

force of law or by any other deterrent force whatsoever.

“We must not, therefore, commit ourselves to a false policy through a

belief in the efficacy of the punishment of death, or exclude rebels

from the hope of repentance and an early atonement of their error.

Consider a moment. At present, if a city that has already revolted

perceive that it cannot succeed, it will come to terms while it is

still able to refund expenses, and pay tribute afterwards. In the other

case, what city, think you, would not prepare better than is now done,

and hold out to the last against its besiegers, if it is all one

whether it surrender late or soon? And how can it be otherwise than

hurtful to us to be put to the expense of a siege, because surrender is

out of the question; and if we take the city, to receive a ruined town

from which we can no longer draw the revenue which forms our real

strength against the enemy? We must not, therefore, sit as strict

judges of the offenders to our own prejudice, but rather see how by

moderate chastisements we may be enabled to benefit in future by the

revenue-producing powers of our dependencies; and we must make up our

minds to look for our protection not to legal terrors but to careful

administration. At present we do exactly the opposite. When a free

community, held in subjection by force, rises, as is only natural, and

asserts its independence, it is no sooner reduced than we fancy

ourselves obliged to punish it severely; although the right course with

freemen is not to chastise them rigorously when they do rise, but

rigorously to watch them before they rise, and to prevent their ever

entertaining the idea, and, the insurrection suppressed, to make as few

responsible for it as possible.

“Only consider what a blunder you would commit in doing as Cleon

recommends. As things are at present, in all the cities the people is

your friend, and either does not revolt with the oligarchy, or, if

forced to do so, becomes at once the enemy of the insurgents; so that

in the war with the hostile city you have the masses on your side. But

if you butcher the people of Mitylene, who had nothing to do with the

revolt, and who, as soon as they got arms, of their own motion

surrendered the town, first you will commit the crime of killing your

benefactors; and next you will play directly into the hands of the

higher classes, who when they induce their cities to rise, will

immediately have the people on their side, through your having

announced in advance the same punishment for those who are guilty and

for those who are not. On the contrary, even if they were guilty, you

ought to seem not to notice it, in order to avoid alienating the only

class still friendly to us. In short, I consider it far more useful for

the preservation of our empire voluntarily to put up with injustice,

than to put to death, however justly, those whom it is our interest to

keep alive. As for Cleon’s idea that in punishment the claims of

justice and expediency can both be satisfied, facts do not confirm the

possibility of such a combination.

“Confess, therefore, that this is the wisest course, and without

conceding too much either to pity or to indulgence, by neither of which

motives do I any more than Cleon wish you to be influenced, upon the

plain merits of the case before you, be persuaded by me to try calmly

those of the Mitylenians whom Paches sent off as guilty, and to leave

the rest undisturbed. This is at once best for the future, and most

terrible to your enemies at the present moment; inasmuch as good policy

against an adversary is superior to the blind attacks of brute force.”

Such were the words of Diodotus. The two opinions thus expressed were

the ones that most directly contradicted each other; and the Athenians,

notwithstanding their change of feeling, now proceeded to a division,

in which the show of hands was almost equal, although the motion of

Diodotus carried the day. Another galley was at once sent off in haste,

for fear that the first might reach Lesbos in the interval, and the

city be found destroyed; the first ship having about a day and a

night’s start. Wine and barley-cakes were provided for the vessel by

the Mitylenian ambassadors, and great promises made if they arrived in

time; which caused the men to use such diligence upon the voyage that

they took their meals of barley-cakes kneaded with oil and wine as they

rowed, and only slept by turns while the others were at the oar.

Luckily they met with no contrary wind, and the first ship making no

haste upon so horrid an errand, while the second pressed on in the

manner described, the first arrived so little before them, that Paches

had only just had time to read the decree, and to prepare to execute

the sentence, when the second put into port and prevented the massacre.

The danger of Mitylene had indeed been great.

The other party whom Paches had sent off as the prime movers in the

rebellion, were upon Cleon’s motion put to death by the Athenians, the

number being rather more than a thousand. The Athenians also demolished

the walls of the Mitylenians, and took possession of their ships.

Afterwards tribute was not imposed upon the Lesbians; but all their

land, except that of the Methymnians, was divided into three thousand

allotments, three hundred of which were reserved as sacred for the

gods, and the rest assigned by lot to Athenian shareholders, who were

sent out to the island. With these the Lesbians agreed to pay a rent of

two minae a year for each allotment, and cultivated the land

themselves. The Athenians also took possession of the towns on the

continent belonging to the Mitylenians, which thus became for the

future subject to Athens. Such were the events that took place at

Lesbos.

CHAPTER X

Fifth Year of the War—Trial and Execution of the Plataeans— Corcyraean

Revolution

During the same summer, after the reduction of Lesbos, the Athenians

under Nicias, son of Niceratus, made an expedition against the island

of Minoa, which lies off Megara and was used as a fortified post by the

Megarians, who had built a tower upon it. Nicias wished to enable the

Athenians to maintain their blockade from this nearer station instead

of from Budorum and Salamis; to stop the Peloponnesian galleys and

privateers sailing out unobserved from the island, as they had been in

the habit of doing; and at the same time prevent anything from coming

into Megara. Accordingly, after taking two towers projecting on the

side of Nisaea, by engines from the sea, and clearing the entrance into

the channel between the island and the shore, he next proceeded to cut

off all communication by building a wall on the mainland at the point

where a bridge across a morass enabled succours to be thrown into the

island, which was not far off from the continent. A few days sufficing

to accomplish this, he afterwards raised some works in the island also,

and leaving a garrison there, departed with his forces.

About the same time in this summer, the Plataeans, being now without

provisions and unable to support the siege, surrendered to the

Peloponnesians in the following manner. An assault had been made upon

the wall, which the Plataeans were unable to repel. The Lacedaemonian

commander, perceiving their weakness, wished to avoid taking the place

by storm; his instructions from Lacedaemon having been so conceived, in

order that if at any future time peace should be made with Athens, and

they should agree each to restore the places that they had taken in the

war, Plataea might be held to have come over voluntarily, and not be

included in the list. He accordingly sent a herald to them to ask if

they were willing voluntarily to surrender the town to the

Lacedaemonians, and accept them as their judges, upon the understanding

that the guilty should be punished, but no one without form of law. The

Plataeans were now in the last state of weakness, and the herald had no

sooner delivered his message than they surrendered the town. The

Peloponnesians fed them for some days until the judges from Lacedaemon,

who were five in number, arrived. Upon their arrival no charge was

preferred; they simply called up the Plataeans, and asked them whether

they had done the Lacedaemonians and allies any service in the war then

raging. The Plataeans asked leave to speak at greater length, and

deputed two of their number to represent them: Astymachus, son of

Asopolaus, and Lacon, son of Aeimnestus, proxenus of the

Lacedaemonians, who came forward and spoke as follows:

“Lacedaemonians, when we surrendered our city we trusted in you, and

looked forward to a trial more agreeable to the forms of law than the

present, to which we had no idea of being subjected; the judges also in

whose hands we consented to place ourselves were you, and you only

(from whom we thought we were most likely to obtain justice), and not

other persons, as is now the case. As matters stand, we are afraid that

we have been doubly deceived. We have good reason to suspect, not only

that the issue to be tried is the most terrible of all, but that you

will not prove impartial; if we may argue from the fact that no

accusation was first brought forward for us to answer, but we had

ourselves to ask leave to speak, and from the question being put so

shortly, that a true answer to it tells against us, while a false one

can be contradicted. In this dilemma, our safest, and indeed our only

course, seems to be to say something at all risks: placed as we are, we

could scarcely be silent without being tormented by the damning thought

that speaking might have saved us. Another difficulty that we have to

encounter is the difficulty of convincing you. Were we unknown to each

other we might profit by bringing forward new matter with which you

were unacquainted: as it is, we can tell you nothing that you do not

know already, and we fear, not that you have condemned us in your own

minds of having failed in our duty towards you, and make this our

crime, but that to please a third party we have to submit to a trial

the result of which is already decided. Nevertheless, we will place

before you what we can justly urge, not only on the question of the

quarrel which the Thebans have against us, but also as addressing you

and the rest of the Hellenes; and we will remind you of our good

services, and endeavour to prevail with you.

“To your short question, whether we have done the Lacedaemonians and

allies any service in this war, we say, if you ask us as enemies, that

to refrain from serving you was not to do you injury; if as friends,

that you are more in fault for having marched against us. During the

peace, and against the Mede, we acted well: we have not now been the

first to break the peace, and we were the only Boeotians who then

joined in defending against the Mede the liberty of Hellas. Although an

inland people, we were present at the action at Artemisium; in the

battle that took place in our territory we fought by the side of

yourselves and Pausanias; and in all the other Hellenic exploits of the

time we took a part quite out of proportion to our strength. Besides,

you, as Lacedaemonians, ought not to forget that at the time of the

great panic at Sparta, after the earthquake, caused by the secession of

the Helots to Ithome, we sent the third part of our citizens to assist

you.

“On these great and historical occasions such was the part that we

chose, although afterwards we became your enemies. For this you were to

blame. When we asked for your alliance against our Theban oppressors,

you rejected our petition, and told us to go to the Athenians who were

our neighbours, as you lived too far off. In the war we never have done

to you, and never should have done to you, anything unreasonable. If we

refused to desert the Athenians when you asked us, we did no wrong;

they had helped us against the Thebans when you drew back, and we could

no longer give them up with honour; especially as we had obtained their

alliance and had been admitted to their citizenship at our own request,

and after receiving benefits at their hands; but it was plainly our

duty loyally to obey their orders. Besides, the faults that either of

you may commit in your supremacy must be laid, not upon the followers,

but on the chiefs that lead them astray.

“With regard to the Thebans, they have wronged us repeatedly, and their

last aggression, which has been the means of bringing us into our

present position, is within your own knowledge. In seizing our city in

time of peace, and what is more at a holy time in the month, they

justly encountered our vengeance, in accordance with the universal law

which sanctions resistance to an invader; and it cannot now be right

that we should suffer on their account. By taking your own immediate

interest and their animosity as the test of justice, you will prove

yourselves to be rather waiters on expediency than judges of right;

although if they seem useful to you now, we and the rest of the

Hellenes gave you much more valuable help at a time of greater need.

Now you are the assailants, and others fear you; but at the crisis to

which we allude, when the barbarian threatened all with slavery, the

Thebans were on his side. It is just, therefore, to put our patriotism

then against our error now, if error there has been; and you will find

the merit outweighing the fault, and displayed at a juncture when there

were few Hellenes who would set their valour against the strength of

Xerxes, and when greater praise was theirs who preferred the dangerous

path of honour to the safe course of consulting their own interest with

respect to the invasion. To these few we belonged, and highly were we

honoured for it; and yet we now fear to perish by having again acted on

the same principles, and chosen to act well with Athens sooner than

wisely with Sparta. Yet in justice the same cases should be decided in

the same way, and policy should not mean anything else than lasting

gratitude for the service of good ally combined with a proper attention

to one’s own immediate interest.

“Consider also that at present the Hellenes generally regard you as a

pattern of worth and honour; and if you pass an unjust sentence upon us

in this which is no obscure cause, but one in which you, the judges,

are as illustrious as we, the prisoners, are blameless, take care that

displeasure be not felt at an unworthy decision in the matter of

honourable men made by men yet more honourable than they, and at the

consecration in the national temples of spoils taken from the

Plataeans, the benefactors of Hellas. Shocking indeed will it seem for

Lacedaemonians to destroy Plataea, and for the city whose name your

fathers inscribed upon the tripod at Delphi for its good service, to be

by you blotted out from the map of Hellas, to please the Thebans. To

such a depth of misfortune have we fallen that, while the Medes’

success had been our ruin, Thebans now supplant us in your once fond

regards; and we have been subjected to two dangers, the greatest of

any—that of dying of starvation then, if we had not surrendered our

town, and now of being tried for our lives. So that we Plataeans, after

exertions beyond our power in the cause of the Hellenes, are rejected

by all, forsaken and unassisted; helped by none of our allies, and

reduced to doubt the stability of our only hope, yourselves.

“Still, in the name of the gods who once presided over our confederacy,

and of our own good service in the Hellenic cause, we adjure you to

relent; to recall the decision which we fear that the Thebans may have

obtained from you; to ask back the gift that you have given them, that

they disgrace not you by slaying us; to gain a pure instead of a guilty

gratitude, and not to gratify others to be yourselves rewarded with

shame. Our lives may be quickly taken, but it will be a heavy task to

wipe away the infamy of the deed; as we are no enemies whom you might

justly punish, but friends forced into taking arms against you. To

grant us our lives would be, therefore, a righteous judgment; if you

consider also that we are prisoners who surrendered of their own

accord, stretching out our hands for quarter, whose slaughter Hellenic

law forbids, and who besides were always your benefactors. Look at the

sepulchres of your fathers, slain by the Medes and buried in our

country, whom year by year we honoured with garments and all other

dues, and the first-fruits of all that our land produced in their

season, as friends from a friendly country and allies to our old

companions in arms. Should you not decide aright, your conduct would be

the very opposite to ours. Consider only: Pausanias buried them

thinking that he was laying them in friendly ground and among men as

friendly; but you, if you kill us and make the Plataean territory

Theban, will leave your fathers and kinsmen in a hostile soil and among

their murderers, deprived of the honours which they now enjoy. What is

more, you will enslave the land in which the freedom of the Hellenes

was won, make desolate the temples of the gods to whom they prayed

before they overcame the Medes, and take away your ancestral sacrifices

from those who founded and instituted them.

“It were not to your glory, Lacedaemonians, either to offend in this

way against the common law of the Hellenes and against your own

ancestors, or to kill us your benefactors to gratify another’s hatred

without having been wronged yourselves: it were more so to spare us and

to yield to the impressions of a reasonable compassion; reflecting not

merely on the awful fate in store for us, but also on the character of

the sufferers, and on the impossibility of predicting how soon

misfortune may fall even upon those who deserve it not. We, as we have

a right to do and as our need impels us, entreat you, calling aloud

upon the gods at whose common altar all the Hellenes worship, to hear

our request, to be not unmindful of the oaths which your fathers swore,

and which we now plead—we supplicate you by the tombs of your fathers,

and appeal to those that are gone to save us from falling into the

hands of the Thebans and their dearest friends from being given up to

their most detested foes. We also remind you of that day on which we

did the most glorious deeds, by your fathers’ sides, we who now on this

are like to suffer the most dreadful fate. Finally, to do what is

necessary and yet most difficult for men in our situation—that is, to

make an end of speaking, since with that ending the peril of our lives

draws near—in conclusion we say that we did not surrender our city to

the Thebans (to that we would have preferred inglorious starvation),

but trusted in and capitulated to you; and it would be just, if we fail

to persuade you, to put us back in the same position and let us take

the chance that falls to us. And at the same time we adjure you not to

give us up—your suppliants, Lacedaemonians, out of your hands and

faith, Plataeans foremost of the Hellenic patriots, to Thebans, our

most hated enemies—but to be our saviours, and not, while you free the

rest of the Hellenes, to bring us to destruction.”

Such were the words of the Plataeans. The Thebans, afraid that the

Lacedaemonians might be moved by what they had heard, came forward and

said that they too desired to address them, since the Plataeans had,

against their wish, been allowed to speak at length instead of being

confined to a simple answer to the question. Leave being granted, the

Thebans spoke as follows:

“We should never have asked to make this speech if the Plataeans on

their side had contented themselves with shortly answering the

question, and had not turned round and made charges against us, coupled

with a long defence of themselves upon matters outside the present

inquiry and not even the subject of accusation, and with praise of what

no one finds fault with. However, since they have done so, we must

answer their charges and refute their self-praise, in order that

neither our bad name nor their good may help them, but that you may

hear the real truth on both points, and so decide.

“The origin of our quarrel was this. We settled Plataea some time after

the rest of Boeotia, together with other places out of which we had

driven the mixed population. The Plataeans not choosing to recognize

our supremacy, as had been first arranged, but separating themselves

from the rest of the Boeotians, and proving traitors to their

nationality, we used compulsion; upon which they went over to the

Athenians, and with them did as much harm, for which we retaliated.

“Next, when the barbarian invaded Hellas, they say that they were the

only Boeotians who did not Medize; and this is where they most glorify

themselves and abuse us. We say that if they did not Medize, it was

because the Athenians did not do so either; just as afterwards when the

Athenians attacked the Hellenes they, the Plataeans, were again the

only Boeotians who Atticized. And yet consider the forms of our

respective governments when we so acted. Our city at that juncture had

neither an oligarchical constitution in which all the nobles enjoyed

equal rights, nor a democracy, but that which is most opposed to law

and good government and nearest a tyranny—the rule of a close cabal.

These, hoping to strengthen their individual power by the success of

the Mede, kept down by force the people, and brought him into the town.

The city as a whole was not its own mistress when it so acted, and

ought not to be reproached for the errors that it committed while

deprived of its constitution. Examine only how we acted after the

departure of the Mede and the recovery of the constitution; when the

Athenians attacked the rest of Hellas and endeavoured to subjugate our

country, of the greater part of which faction had already made them

masters. Did not we fight and conquer at Coronea and liberate Boeotia,

and do we not now actively contribute to the liberation of the rest,

providing horses to the cause and a force unequalled by that of any

other state in the confederacy?

“Let this suffice to excuse us for our Medism. We will now endeavour to

show that you have injured the Hellenes more than we, and are more

deserving of condign punishment. It was in defence against us, say you,

that you became allies and citizens of Athens. If so, you ought only to

have called in the Athenians against us, instead of joining them in

attacking others: it was open to you to do this if you ever felt that

they were leading you where you did not wish to follow, as Lacedaemon

was already your ally against the Mede, as you so much insist; and this

was surely sufficient to keep us off, and above all to allow you to

deliberate in security. Nevertheless, of your own choice and without

compulsion you chose to throw your lot in with Athens. And you say that

it had been base for you to betray your benefactors; but it was surely

far baser and more iniquitous to sacrifice the whole body of the

Hellenes, your fellow confederates, who were liberating Hellas, than

the Athenians only, who were enslaving it. The return that you made

them was therefore neither equal nor honourable, since you called them

in, as you say, because you were being oppressed yourselves, and then

became their accomplices in oppressing others; although baseness rather

consists in not returning like for like than in not returning what is

justly due but must be unjustly paid.

“Meanwhile, after thus plainly showing that it was not for the sake of

the Hellenes that you alone then did not Medize, but because the

Athenians did not do so either, and you wished to side with them and to

be against the rest; you now claim the benefit of good deeds done to

please your neighbours. This cannot be admitted: you chose the

Athenians, and with them you must stand or fall. Nor can you plead the

league then made and claim that it should now protect you. You

abandoned that league, and offended against it by helping instead of

hindering the subjugation of the Aeginetans and others of its members,

and that not under compulsion, but while in enjoyment of the same

institutions that you enjoy to the present hour, and no one forcing you

as in our case. Lastly, an invitation was addressed to you before you

were blockaded to be neutral and join neither party: this you did not

accept. Who then merit the detestation of the Hellenes more justly than

you, you who sought their ruin under the mask of honour? The former

virtues that you allege you now show not to be proper to your

character; the real bent of your nature has been at length damningly

proved: when the Athenians took the path of injustice you followed

them.

“Of our unwilling Medism and your wilful Atticizing this then is our

explanation. The last wrong wrong of which you complain consists in our

having, as you say, lawlessly invaded your town in time of peace and

festival. Here again we cannot think that we were more in fault than

yourselves. If of our own proper motion we made an armed attack upon

your city and ravaged your territory, we are guilty; but if the first

men among you in estate and family, wishing to put an end to the

foreign connection and to restore you to the common Boeotian country,

of their own free will invited us, wherein is our crime? Where wrong is

done, those who lead, as you say, are more to blame than those who

follow. Not that, in our judgment, wrong was done either by them or by

us. Citizens like yourselves, and with more at stake than you, they

opened their own walls and introduced us into their own city, not as

foes but as friends, to prevent the bad among you from becoming worse;

to give honest men their due; to reform principles without attacking

persons, since you were not to be banished from your city, but brought

home to your kindred, nor to be made enemies to any, but friends alike

to all.

“That our intention was not hostile is proved by our behaviour. We did

no harm to any one, but publicly invited those who wished to live under

a national, Boeotian government to come over to us; which as first you

gladly did, and made an agreement with us and remained tranquil, until

you became aware of the smallness of our numbers. Now it is possible

that there may have been something not quite fair in our entering

without the consent of your commons. At any rate you did not repay us

in kind. Instead of refraining, as we had done, from violence, and

inducing us to retire by negotiation, you fell upon us in violation of

your agreement, and slew some of us in fight, of which we do not so

much complain, for in that there was a certain justice; but others who

held out their hands and received quarter, and whose lives you

subsequently promised us, you lawlessly butchered. If this was not

abominable, what is? And after these three crimes committed one after

the other—the violation of your agreement, the murder of the men

afterwards, and the lying breach of your promise not to kill them, if

we refrained from injuring your property in the country—you still

affirm that we are the criminals and yourselves pretend to escape

justice. Not so, if these your judges decide aright, but you will be

punished for all together.

“Such, Lacedaemonians, are the facts. We have gone into them at some

length both on your account and on our own, that you may fed that you

will justly condemn the prisoners, and we, that we have given an

additional sanction to our vengeance. We would also prevent you from

being melted by hearing of their past virtues, if any such they had:

these may be fairly appealed to by the victims of injustice, but only

aggravate the guilt of criminals, since they offend against their

better nature. Nor let them gain anything by crying and wailing, by

calling upon your fathers’ tombs and their own desolate condition.

Against this we point to the far more dreadful fate of our youth,

butchered at their hands; the fathers of whom either fell at Coronea,

bringing Boeotia over to you, or seated, forlorn old men by desolate

hearths, with far more reason implore your justice upon the prisoners.

The pity which they appeal to is rather due to men who suffer

unworthily; those who suffer justly as they do are on the contrary

subjects for triumph. For their present desolate condition they have

themselves to blame, since they wilfully rejected the better alliance.

Their lawless act was not provoked by any action of ours: hate, not

justice, inspired their decision; and even now the satisfaction which

they afford us is not adequate; they will suffer by a legal sentence,

not as they pretend as suppliants asking for quarter in battle, but as

prisoners who have surrendered upon agreement to take their trial.

Vindicate, therefore, Lacedaemonians, the Hellenic law which they have

broken; and to us, the victims of its violation, grant the reward

merited by our zeal. Nor let us be supplanted in your favour by their

harangues, but offer an example to the Hellenes, that the contests to

which you invite them are of deeds, not words: good deeds can be

shortly stated, but where wrong is done a wealth of language is needed

to veil its deformity. However, if leading powers were to do what you

are now doing, and putting one short question to all alike were to

decide accordingly, men would be less tempted to seek fine phrases to

cover bad actions.”

Such were the words of the Thebans. The Lacedaemonian judges decided

that the question whether they had received any service from the

Plataeans in the war, was a fair one for them to put; as they had

always invited them to be neutral, agreeably to the original covenant

of Pausanias after the defeat of the Mede, and had again definitely

offered them the same conditions before the blockade. This offer having

been refused, they were now, they conceived, by the loyalty of their

intention released from their covenant; and having, as they considered,

suffered evil at the hands of the Plataeans, they brought them in again

one by one and asked each of them the same question, that is to say,

whether they had done the Lacedaemonians and allies any service in the

war; and upon their saying that they had not, took them out and slew

them, all without exception. The number of Plataeans thus massacred was

not less than two hundred, with twenty-five Athenians who had shared in

the siege. The women were taken as slaves. The city the Thebans gave

for about a year to some political emigrants from Megara and to the

surviving Plataeans of their own party to inhabit, and afterwards razed

it to the ground from the very foundations, and built on to the

precinct of Hera an inn two hundred feet square, with rooms all round

above and below, making use for this purpose of the roofs and doors of

the Plataeans: of the rest of the materials in the wall, the brass and

the iron, they made couches which they dedicated to Hera, for whom they

also built a stone chapel of a hundred feet square. The land they

confiscated and let out on a ten years’ lease to Theban occupiers. The

adverse attitude of the Lacedaemonians in the whole Plataean affair was

mainly adopted to please the Thebans, who were thought to be useful in

the war at that moment raging. Such was the end of Plataea, in the

ninety-third year after she became the ally of Athens.

Meanwhile, the forty ships of the Peloponnesians that had gone to the

relief of the Lesbians, and which we left flying across the open sea,

pursued by the Athenians, were caught in a storm off Crete, and

scattering from thence made their way to Peloponnese, where they found

at Cyllene thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot galleys, with Brasidas, son

of Tellis, lately arrived as counsellor to Alcidas; the Lacedaemonians,

upon the failure of the Lesbian expedition, having resolved to

strengthen their fleet and sail to Corcyra, where a revolution had

broken out, so as to arrive there before the twelve Athenian ships at

Naupactus could be reinforced from Athens. Brasidas and Alcidas began

to prepare accordingly.

The Corcyraean revolution began with the return of the prisoners taken

in the sea-fights off Epidamnus. These the Corinthians had released,

nominally upon the security of eight hundred talents given by their

proxeni, but in reality upon their engagement to bring over Corcyra to

Corinth. These men proceeded to canvass each of the citizens, and to

intrigue with the view of detaching the city from Athens. Upon the

arrival of an Athenian and a Corinthian vessel, with envoys on board, a

conference was held in which the Corcyraeans voted to remain allies of

the Athenians according to their agreement, but to be friends of the

Peloponnesians as they had been formerly. Meanwhile, the returned

prisoners brought Peithias, a volunteer proxenus of the Athenians and

leader of the commons, to trial, upon the charge of enslaving Corcyra

to Athens. He, being acquitted, retorted by accusing five of the

richest of their number of cutting stakes in the ground sacred to Zeus

and Alcinous; the legal penalty being a stater for each stake. Upon

their conviction, the amount of the penalty being very large, they

seated themselves as suppliants in the temples to be allowed to pay it

by instalments; but Peithias, who was one of the senate, prevailed upon

that body to enforce the law; upon which the accused, rendered

desperate by the law, and also learning that Peithias had the

intention, while still a member of the senate, to persuade the people

to conclude a defensive and offensive alliance with Athens, banded

together armed with daggers, and suddenly bursting into the senate

killed Peithias and sixty others, senators and private persons; some

few only of the party of Peithias taking refuge in the Athenian galley,

which had not yet departed.

After this outrage, the conspirators summoned the Corcyraeans to an

assembly, and said that this would turn out for the best, and would

save them from being enslaved by Athens: for the future, they moved to

receive neither party unless they came peacefully in a single ship,

treating any larger number as enemies. This motion made, they compelled

it to be adopted, and instantly sent off envoys to Athens to justify

what had been done and to dissuade the refugees there from any hostile

proceedings which might lead to a reaction.

Upon the arrival of the embassy, the Athenians arrested the envoys and

all who listened to them, as revolutionists, and lodged them in Aegina.

Meanwhile a Corinthian galley arriving in the island with Lacedaemonian

envoys, the dominant Corcyraean party attacked the commons and defeated

them in battle. Night coming on, the commons took refuge in the

Acropolis and the higher parts of the city, and concentrated themselves

there, having also possession of the Hyllaic harbour; their adversaries

occupying the market-place, where most of them lived, and the harbour

adjoining, looking towards the mainland.

The next day passed in skirmishes of little importance, each party

sending into the country to offer freedom to the slaves and to invite

them to join them. The mass of the slaves answered the appeal of the

commons; their antagonists being reinforced by eight hundred

mercenaries from the continent.

After a day’s interval hostilities recommenced, victory remaining with

the commons, who had the advantage in numbers and position, the women

also valiantly assisting them, pelting with tiles from the houses, and

supporting the melee with a fortitude beyond their sex. Towards dusk,

the oligarchs in full rout, fearing that the victorious commons might

assault and carry the arsenal and put them to the sword, fired the

houses round the marketplace and the lodging-houses, in order to bar

their advance; sparing neither their own, nor those of their

neighbours; by which much stuff of the merchants was consumed and the

city risked total destruction, if a wind had come to help the flame by

blowing on it. Hostilities now ceasing, both sides kept quiet, passing

the night on guard, while the Corinthian ship stole out to sea upon the

victory of the commons, and most of the mercenaries passed over

secretly to the continent.

The next day the Athenian general, Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes, came

up from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred Messenian heavy

infantry. He at once endeavoured to bring about a settlement, and

persuaded the two parties to agree together to bring to trial ten of

the ringleaders, who presently fled, while the rest were to live in

peace, making terms with each other, and entering into a defensive and

offensive alliance with the Athenians. This arranged, he was about to

sail away, when the leaders of the commons induced him to leave them

five of his ships to make their adversaries less disposed to move,

while they manned and sent with him an equal number of their own. He

had no sooner consented, than they began to enroll their enemies for

the ships; and these, fearing that they might be sent off to Athens,

seated themselves as suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri. An

attempt on the part of Nicostratus to reassure them and to persuade

them to rise proving unsuccessful, the commons armed upon this pretext,

alleging the refusal of their adversaries to sail with them as a proof

of the hollowness of their intentions, and took their arms out of their

houses, and would have dispatched some whom they fell in with, if

Nicostratus had not prevented it. The rest of the party, seeing what

was going on, seated themselves as suppliants in the temple of Hera,

being not less than four hundred in number; until the commons, fearing

that they might adopt some desperate resolution, induced them to rise,

and conveyed them over to the island in front of the temple, where

provisions were sent across to them.

At this stage in the revolution, on the fourth or fifth day after the

removal of the men to the island, the Peloponnesian ships arrived from

Cyllene where they had been stationed since their return from Ionia,

fifty-three in number, still under the command of Alcidas, but with

Brasidas also on board as his adviser; and dropping anchor at Sybota, a

harbour on the mainland, at daybreak made sail for Corcyra.

The Corcyraeans in great confusion and alarm at the state of things in

the city and at the approach of the invader, at once proceeded to equip

sixty vessels, which they sent out, as fast as they were manned,

against the enemy, in spite of the Athenians recommending them to let

them sail out first, and to follow themselves afterwards with all their

ships together. Upon their vessels coming up to the enemy in this

straggling fashion, two immediately deserted: in others the crews were

fighting among themselves, and there was no order in anything that was

done; so that the Peloponnesians, seeing their confusion, placed twenty

ships to oppose the Corcyraeans, and ranged the rest against the twelve

Athenian ships, amongst which were the two vessels Salaminia and

Paralus.

While the Corcyraeans, attacking without judgment and in small

detachments, were already crippled by their own misconduct, the

Athenians, afraid of the numbers of the enemy and of being surrounded,

did not venture to attack the main body or even the centre of the

division opposed to them, but fell upon its wing and sank one vessel;

after which the Peloponnesians formed in a circle, and the Athenians

rowed round them and tried to throw them into disorder. Perceiving

this, the division opposed to the Corcyraeans, fearing a repetition of

the disaster of Naupactus, came to support their friends, and the whole

fleet now bore down, united, upon the Athenians, who retired before it,

backing water, retiring as leisurely as possible in order to give the

Corcyraeans time to escape, while the enemy was thus kept occupied.

Such was the character of this sea-fight, which lasted until sunset.

The Corcyraeans now feared that the enemy would follow up their victory

and sail against the town and rescue the men in the island, or strike

some other blow equally decisive, and accordingly carried the men over

again to the temple of Hera, and kept guard over the city. The

Peloponnesians, however, although victorious in the sea-fight, did not

venture to attack the town, but took the thirteen Corcyraean vessels

which they had captured, and with them sailed back to the continent

from whence they had put out. The next day equally they refrained from

attacking the city, although the disorder and panic were at their

height, and though Brasidas, it is said, urged Alcidas, his superior

officer, to do so, but they landed upon the promontory of Leukimme and

laid waste the country.

Meanwhile the commons in Corcyra, being still in great fear of the

fleet attacking them, came to a parley with the suppliants and their

friends, in order to save the town; and prevailed upon some of them to

go on board the ships, of which they still manned thirty, against the

expected attack. But the Peloponnesians after ravaging the country

until midday sailed away, and towards nightfall were informed by beacon

signals of the approach of sixty Athenian vessels from Leucas, under

the command of Eurymedon, son of Thucles; which had been sent off by

the Athenians upon the news of the revolution and of the fleet with

Alcidas being about to sail for Corcyra.

The Peloponnesians accordingly at once set off in haste by night for

home, coasting along shore; and hauling their ships across the Isthmus

of Leucas, in order not to be seen doubling it, so departed. The

Corcyraeans, made aware of the approach of the Athenian fleet and of

the departure of the enemy, brought the Messenians from outside the

walls into the town, and ordered the fleet which they had manned to

sail round into the Hyllaic harbour; and while it was so doing, slew

such of their enemies as they laid hands on, dispatching afterwards, as

they landed them, those whom they had persuaded to go on board the

ships. Next they went to the sanctuary of Hera and persuaded about

fifty men to take their trial, and condemned them all to death. The

mass of the suppliants who had refused to do so, on seeing what was

taking place, slew each other there in the consecrated ground; while

some hanged themselves upon the trees, and others destroyed themselves

as they were severally able. During seven days that Eurymedon stayed

with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans were engaged in butchering those

of their fellow citizens whom they regarded as their enemies: and

although the crime imputed was that of attempting to put down the

democracy, some were slain also for private hatred, others by their

debtors because of the moneys owed to them. Death thus raged in every

shape; and, as usually happens at such times, there was no length to

which violence did not go; sons were killed by their fathers, and

suppliants dragged from the altar or slain upon it; while some were

even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and died there.

So bloody was the march of the revolution, and the impression which it

made was the greater as it was one of the first to occur. Later on, one

may say, the whole Hellenic world was convulsed; struggles being every,

where made by the popular chiefs to bring in the Athenians, and by the

oligarchs to introduce the Lacedaemonians. In peace there would have

been neither the pretext nor the wish to make such an invitation; but

in war, with an alliance always at the command of either faction for

the hurt of their adversaries and their own corresponding advantage,

opportunities for bringing in the foreigner were never wanting to the

revolutionary parties. The sufferings which revolution entailed upon

the cities were many and terrible, such as have occurred and always

will occur, as long as the nature of mankind remains the same; though

in a severer or milder form, and varying in their symptoms, according

to the variety of the particular cases. In peace and prosperity, states

and individuals have better sentiments, because they do not find

themselves suddenly confronted with imperious necessities; but war

takes away the easy supply of daily wants, and so proves a rough

master, that brings most men’s characters to a level with their

fortunes. Revolution thus ran its course from city to city, and the

places which it arrived at last, from having heard what had been done

before, carried to a still greater excess the refinement of their

inventions, as manifested in the cunning of their enterprises and the

atrocity of their reprisals. Words had to change their ordinary meaning

and to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be

considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious

cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability

to see all sides of a question, inaptness to act on any. Frantic

violence became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting, a

justifiable means of self-defence. The advocate of extreme measures was

always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected. To succeed in a

plot was to have a shrewd head, to divine a plot a still shrewder; but

to try to provide against having to do either was to break up your

party and to be afraid of your adversaries. In fine, to forestall an

intending criminal, or to suggest the idea of a crime where it was

wanting, was equally commended until even blood became a weaker tie

than party, from the superior readiness of those united by the latter

to dare everything without reserve; for such associations had not in

view the blessings derivable from established institutions but were

formed by ambition for their overthrow; and the confidence of their

members in each other rested less on any religious sanction than upon

complicity in crime. The fair proposals of an adversary were met with

jealous precautions by the stronger of the two, and not with a generous

confidence. Revenge also was held of more account than

self-preservation. Oaths of reconciliation, being only proffered on

either side to meet an immediate difficulty, only held good so long as

no other weapon was at hand; but when opportunity offered, he who first

ventured to seize it and to take his enemy off his guard, thought this

perfidious vengeance sweeter than an open one, since, considerations of

safety apart, success by treachery won him the palm of superior

intelligence. Indeed it is generally the case that men are readier to

call rogues clever than simpletons honest, and are as ashamed of being

the second as they are proud of being the first. The cause of all these

evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition; and from

these passions proceeded the violence of parties once engaged in

contention. The leaders in the cities, each provided with the fairest

professions, on the one side with the cry of political equality of the

people, on the other of a moderate aristocracy, sought prizes for

themselves in those public interests which they pretended to cherish,

and, recoiling from no means in their struggles for ascendancy engaged

in the direst excesses; in their acts of vengeance they went to even

greater lengths, not stopping at what justice or the good of the state

demanded, but making the party caprice of the moment their only

standard, and invoking with equal readiness the condemnation of an

unjust verdict or the authority of the strong arm to glut the

animosities of the hour. Thus religion was in honour with neither

party; but the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high

reputation. Meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished

between the two, either for not joining in the quarrel, or because envy

would not suffer them to escape.

Thus every form of iniquity took root in the Hellenic countries by

reason of the troubles. The ancient simplicity into which honour so

largely entered was laughed down and disappeared; and society became

divided into camps in which no man trusted his fellow. To put an end to

this, there was neither promise to be depended upon, nor oath that

could command respect; but all parties dwelling rather in their

calculation upon the hopelessness of a permanent state of things, were

more intent upon self-defence than capable of confidence. In this

contest the blunter wits were most successful. Apprehensive of their

own deficiencies and of the cleverness of their antagonists, they

feared to be worsted in debate and to be surprised by the combinations

of their more versatile opponents, and so at once boldly had recourse

to action: while their adversaries, arrogantly thinking that they

should know in time, and that it was unnecessary to secure by action

what policy afforded, often fell victims to their want of precaution.

Meanwhile Corcyra gave the first example of most of the crimes alluded

to; of the reprisals exacted by the governed who had never experienced

equitable treatment or indeed aught but insolence from their

rulers—when their hour came; of the iniquitous resolves of those who

desired to get rid of their accustomed poverty, and ardently coveted

their neighbours’ goods; and lastly, of the savage and pitiless

excesses into which men who had begun the struggle, not in a class but

in a party spirit, were hurried by their ungovernable passions. In the

confusion into which life was now thrown in the cities, human nature,

always rebelling against the law and now its master, gladly showed

itself ungoverned in passion, above respect for justice, and the enemy

of all superiority; since revenge would not have been set above

religion, and gain above justice, had it not been for the fatal power

of envy. Indeed men too often take upon themselves in the prosecution

of their revenge to set the example of doing away with those general

laws to which all alike can look for salvation in adversity, instead of

allowing them to subsist against the day of danger when their aid may

be required.

While the revolutionary passions thus for the first time displayed

themselves in the factions of Corcyra, Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet

sailed away; after which some five hundred Corcyraean exiles who had

succeeded in escaping, took some forts on the mainland, and becoming

masters of the Corcyraean territory over the water, made this their

base to Plunder their countrymen in the island, and did so much damage

as to cause a severe famine in the town. They also sent envoys to

Lacedaemon and Corinth to negotiate their restoration; but meeting with

no success, afterwards got together boats and mercenaries and crossed

over to the island, being about six hundred in all; and burning their

boats so as to have no hope except in becoming masters of the country,

went up to Mount Istone, and fortifying themselves there, began to

annoy those in the city and obtained command of the country.

At the close of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty ships under

the command of Laches, son of Melanopus, and Charoeades, son of

Euphiletus, to Sicily, where the Syracusans and Leontines were at war.

The Syracusans had for allies all the Dorian cities except

Camarina—these had been included in the Lacedaemonian confederacy from

the commencement of the war, though they had not taken any active part

in it—the Leontines had Camarina and the Chalcidian cities. In Italy

the Locrians were for the Syracusans, the Rhegians for their Leontine

kinsmen. The allies of the Leontines now sent to Athens and appealed to

their ancient alliance and to their Ionian origin, to persuade the

Athenians to send them a fleet, as the Syracusans were blockading them

by land and sea. The Athenians sent it upon the plea of their common

descent, but in reality to prevent the exportation of Sicilian corn to

Peloponnese and to test the possibility of bringing Sicily into

subjection. Accordingly they established themselves at Rhegium in

Italy, and from thence carried on the war in concert with their allies.

CHAPTER XI

Year of the War—Campaigns of Demosthenes in Western Greece—Ruin of

Ambracia

Summer was now over. The winter following, the plague a second time

attacked the Athenians; for although it had never entirely left them,

still there had been a notable abatement in its ravages. The second

visit lasted no less than a year, the first having lasted two; and

nothing distressed the Athenians and reduced their power more than

this. No less than four thousand four hundred heavy infantry in the

ranks died of it and three hundred cavalry, besides a number of the

multitude that was never ascertained. At the same time took place the

numerous earthquakes in Athens, Euboea, and Boeotia, particularly at

Orchomenus in the last-named country.

The same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians, with thirty

ships, made an expedition against the islands of Aeolus; it being

impossible to invade them in summer, owing to the want of water. These

islands are occupied by the Liparaeans, a Cnidian colony, who live in

one of them of no great size called Lipara; and from this as their

headquarters cultivate the rest, Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera. In Hiera

the people in those parts believe that Hephaestus has his forge, from

the quantity of flame which they see it send out by night, and of smoke

by day. These islands lie off the coast of the Sicels and Messinese,

and were allies of the Syracusans. The Athenians laid waste their land,

and as the inhabitants did not submit, sailed back to Rhegium. Thus the

winter ended, and with it ended the fifth year of this war, of which

Thucydides was the historian.

The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies set out to invade

Attica under the command of Agis, son of Archidamus, and went as far as

the Isthmus, but numerous earthquakes occurring, turned back again

without the invasion taking place. About the same time that these

earthquakes were so common, the sea at Orobiae, in Euboea, retiring

from the then line of coast, returned in a huge wave and invaded a

great part of the town, and retreated leaving some of it still under

water; so that what was once land is now sea; such of the inhabitants

perishing as could not run up to the higher ground in time. A similar

inundation also occurred at Atalanta, the island off the Opuntian

Locrian coast, carrying away part of the Athenian fort and wrecking one

of two ships which were drawn up on the beach. At Peparethus also the

sea retreated a little, without however any inundation following; and

an earthquake threw down part of the wall, the town hall, and a few

other buildings. The cause, in my opinion, of this phenomenon must be

sought in the earthquake. At the point where its shock has been the

most violent, the sea is driven back and, suddenly recoiling with

redoubled force, causes the inundation. Without an earthquake I do not

see how such an accident could happen.

During the same summer different operations were carried on by the

different belligerents in Sicily; by the Siceliots themselves against

each other, and by the Athenians and their allies: I shall however

confine myself to the actions in which the Athenians took part,

choosing the most important. The death of the Athenian general

Charoeades, killed by the Syracusans in battle, left Laches in the sole

command of the fleet, which he now directed in concert with the allies

against Mylae, a place belonging to the Messinese. Two Messinese

battalions in garrison at Mylae laid an ambush for the party landing

from the ships, but were routed with great slaughter by the Athenians

and their allies, who thereupon assaulted the fortification and

compelled them to surrender the Acropolis and to march with them upon

Messina. This town afterwards also submitted upon the approach of the

Athenians and their allies, and gave hostages and all other securities

required.

The same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships round Peloponnese under

Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and Procles, son of Theodorus, and

sixty others, with two thousand heavy infantry, against Melos, under

Nicias, son of Niceratus; wishing to reduce the Melians, who, although

islanders, refused to be subjects of Athens or even to join her

confederacy. The devastation of their land not procuring their

submission, the fleet, weighing from Melos, sailed to Oropus in the

territory of Graea, and landing at nightfall, the heavy infantry

started at once from the ships by land for Tanagra in Boeotia, where

they were met by the whole levy from Athens, agreeably to a concerted

signal, under the command of Hipponicus, son of Callias, and Eurymedon,

son of Thucles. They encamped, and passing that day in ravaging the

Tanagraean territory, remained there for the night; and next day, after

defeating those of the Tanagraeans who sailed out against them and some

Thebans who had come up to help the Tanagraeans, took some arms, set up

a trophy, and retired, the troops to the city and the others to the

ships. Nicias with his sixty ships coasted alongshore and ravaged the

Locrian seaboard, and so returned home.

About this time the Lacedaemonians founded their colony of Heraclea in

Trachis, their object being the following: the Malians form in all

three tribes, the Paralians, the Hiereans, and the Trachinians. The

last of these having suffered severely in a war with their neighbours

the Oetaeans, at first intended to give themselves up to Athens; but

afterwards fearing not to find in her the security that they sought,

sent to Lacedaemon, having chosen Tisamenus for their ambassador. In

this embassy joined also the Dorians from the mother country of the

Lacedaemonians, with the same request, as they themselves also suffered

from the same enemy. After hearing them, the Lacedaemonians determined

to send out the colony, wishing to assist the Trachinians and Dorians,

and also because they thought that the proposed town would lie

conveniently for the purposes of the war against the Athenians. A fleet

might be got ready there against Euboea, with the advantage of a short

passage to the island; and the town would also be useful as a station

on the road to Thrace. In short, everything made the Lacedaemonians

eager to found the place. After first consulting the god at Delphi and

receiving a favourable answer, they sent off the colonists, Spartans,

and Perioeci, inviting also any of the rest of the Hellenes who might

wish to accompany them, except Ionians, Achaeans, and certain other

nationalities; three Lacedaemonians leading as founders of the colony,

Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. The settlement effected, they fortified

anew the city, now called Heraclea, distant about four miles and a half

from Thermopylae and two miles and a quarter from the sea, and

commenced building docks, closing the side towards Thermopylae just by

the pass itself, in order that they might be easily defended.

The foundation of this town, evidently meant to annoy Euboea (the

passage across to Cenaeum in that island being a short one), at first

caused some alarm at Athens, which the event however did nothing to

justify, the town never giving them any trouble. The reason of this was

as follows. The Thessalians, who were sovereign in those parts, and

whose territory was menaced by its foundation, were afraid that it

might prove a very powerful neighbour, and accordingly continually

harassed and made war upon the new settlers, until they at last wore

them out in spite of their originally considerable numbers, people

flocking from all quarters to a place founded by the Lacedaemonians,

and thus thought secure of prosperity. On the other hand the

Lacedaemonians themselves, in the persons of their governors, did their

full share towards ruining its prosperity and reducing its population,

as they frightened away the greater part of the inhabitants by

governing harshly and in some cases not fairly, and thus made it easier

for their neighbours to prevail against them.

The same summer, about the same time that the Athenians were detained

at Melos, their fellow citizens in the thirty ships cruising round

Peloponnese, after cutting off some guards in an ambush at Ellomenus in

Leucadia, subsequently went against Leucas itself with a large

armament, having been reinforced by the whole levy of the Acarnanians

except Oeniadae, and by the Zacynthians and Cephallenians and fifteen

ships from Corcyra. While the Leucadians witnessed the devastation of

their land, without and within the isthmus upon which the town of

Leucas and the temple of Apollo stand, without making any movement on

account of the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, the Acarnanians urged

Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to build a wall so as to cut off the

town from the continent, a measure which they were convinced would

secure its capture and rid them once and for all of a most troublesome

enemy.

Demosthenes however had in the meanwhile been persuaded by the

Messenians that it was a fine opportunity for him, having so large an

army assembled, to attack the Aetolians, who were not only the enemies

of Naupactus, but whose reduction would further make it easy to gain

the rest of that part of the continent for the Athenians. The Aetolian

nation, although numerous and warlike, yet dwelt in unwalled villages

scattered far apart, and had nothing but light armour, and might,

according to the Messenians, be subdued without much difficulty before

succours could arrive. The plan which they recommended was to attack

first the Apodotians, next the Ophionians, and after these the

Eurytanians, who are the largest tribe in Aetolia, and speak, as is

said, a language exceedingly difficult to understand, and eat their

flesh raw. These once subdued, the rest would easily come in.

To this plan Demosthenes consented, not only to please the Messenians,

but also in the belief that by adding the Aetolians to his other

continental allies he would be able, without aid from home, to march

against the Boeotians by way of Ozolian Locris to Kytinium in Doris,

keeping Parnassus on his right until he descended to the Phocians, whom

he could force to join him if their ancient friendship for Athens did

not, as he anticipated, at once decide them to do so. Arrived in Phocis

he was already upon the frontier of Boeotia. He accordingly weighed

from Leucas, against the wish of the Acarnanians, and with his whole

armament sailed along the coast to Sollium, where he communicated to

them his intention; and upon their refusing to agree to it on account

of the non-investment of Leucas, himself with the rest of the forces,

the Cephallenians, the Messenians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred

Athenian marines from his own ships (the fifteen Corcyraean vessels

having departed), started on his expedition against the Aetolians. His

base he established at Oeneon in Locris, as the Ozolian Locrians were

allies of Athens and were to meet him with all their forces in the

interior. Being neighbours of the Aetolians and armed in the same way,

it was thought that they would be of great service upon the expedition,

from their acquaintance with the localities and the warfare of the

inhabitants.

After bivouacking with the army in the precinct of Nemean Zeus, in

which the poet Hesiod is said to have been killed by the people of the

country, according to an oracle which had foretold that he should die

in Nemea, Demosthenes set out at daybreak to invade Aetolia. The first

day he took Potidania, the next Krokyle, and the third Tichium, where

he halted and sent back the booty to Eupalium in Locris, having

determined to pursue his conquests as far as the Ophionians, and, in

the event of their refusing to submit, to return to Naupactus and make

them the objects of a second expedition. Meanwhile the Aetolians had

been aware of his design from the moment of its formation, and as soon

as the army invaded their country came up in great force with all their

tribes; even the most remote Ophionians, the Bomiensians, and

Calliensians, who extend towards the Malian Gulf, being among the

number.

The Messenians, however, adhered to their original advice. Assuring

Demosthenes that the Aetolians were an easy conquest, they urged him to

push on as rapidly as possible, and to try to take the villages as fast

as he came up to them, without waiting until the whole nation should be

in arms against him. Led on by his advisers and trusting in his

fortune, as he had met with no opposition, without waiting for his

Locrian reinforcements, who were to have supplied him with the

light-armed darters in which he was most deficient, he advanced and

stormed Aegitium, the inhabitants flying before him and posting

themselves upon the hills above the town, which stood on high ground

about nine miles from the sea. Meanwhile the Aetolians had gathered to

the rescue, and now attacked the Athenians and their allies, running

down from the hills on every side and darting their javelins, falling

back when the Athenian army advanced, and coming on as it retired; and

for a long while the battle was of this character, alternate advance

and retreat, in both which operations the Athenians had the worst.

Still as long as their archers had arrows left and were able to use

them, they held out, the light-armed Aetolians retiring before the

arrows; but after the captain of the archers had been killed and his

men scattered, the soldiers, wearied out with the constant repetition

of the same exertions and hard pressed by the Aetolians with their

javelins, at last turned and fled, and falling into pathless gullies

and places that they were unacquainted with, thus perished, the

Messenian Chromon, their guide, having also unfortunately been killed.

A great many were overtaken in the pursuit by the swift-footed and

light-armed Aetolians, and fell beneath their javelins; the greater

number however missed their road and rushed into the wood, which had no

ways out, and which was soon fired and burnt round them by the enemy.

Indeed the Athenian army fell victims to death in every form, and

suffered all the vicissitudes of flight; the survivors escaped with

difficulty to the sea and Oeneon in Locris, whence they had set out.

Many of the allies were killed, and about one hundred and twenty

Athenian heavy infantry, not a man less, and all in the prime of life.

These were by far the best men in the city of Athens that fell during

this war. Among the slain was also Procles, the colleague of

Demosthenes. Meanwhile the Athenians took up their dead under truce

from the Aetolians, and retired to Naupactus, and from thence went in

their ships to Athens; Demosthenes staying behind in Naupactus and in

the neighbourhood, being afraid to face the Athenians after the

disaster.

About the same time the Athenians on the coast of Sicily sailed to

Locris, and in a descent which they made from the ships defeated the

Locrians who came against them, and took a fort upon the river Halex.

The same summer the Aetolians, who before the Athenian expedition had

sent an embassy to Corinth and Lacedaemon, composed of Tolophus, an

Ophionian, Boriades, an Eurytanian, and Tisander, an Apodotian,

obtained that an army should be sent them against Naupactus, which had

invited the Athenian invasion. The Lacedaemonians accordingly sent off

towards autumn three thousand heavy infantry of the allies, five

hundred of whom were from Heraclea, the newly founded city in Trachis,

under the command of Eurylochus, a Spartan, accompanied by Macarius and

Menedaius, also Spartans.

The army having assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the

Ozolian Locrians; the road to Naupactus lying through their territory,

and he having besides conceived the idea of detaching them from Athens.

His chief abettors in Locris were the Amphissians, who were alarmed at

the hostility of the Phocians. These first gave hostages themselves,

and induced the rest to do the same for fear of the invading army;

first, their neighbours the Myonians, who held the most difficult of

the passes, and after them the Ipnians, Messapians, Tritaeans,

Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oeanthians, all of whom joined

in the expedition; the Olpaeans contenting themselves with giving

hostages, without accompanying the invasion; and the Hyaeans refusing

to do either, until the capture of Polis, one of their villages.

His preparations completed, Eurylochus lodged the hostages in Kytinium,

in Doris, and advanced upon Naupactus through the country of the

Locrians, taking upon his way Oeneon and Eupalium, two of their towns

that refused to join him. Arrived in the Naupactian territory, and

having been now joined by the Aetolians, the army laid waste the land

and took the suburb of the town, which was unfortified; and after this

Molycrium also, a Corinthian colony subject to Athens. Meanwhile the

Athenian Demosthenes, who since the affair in Aetolia had remained near

Naupactus, having had notice of the army and fearing for the town, went

and persuaded the Acarnanians, although not without difficulty because

of his departure from Leucas, to go to the relief of Naupactus. They

accordingly sent with him on board his ships a thousand heavy infantry,

who threw themselves into the place and saved it; the extent of its

wall and the small number of its defenders otherwise placing it in the

greatest danger. Meanwhile Eurylochus and his companions, finding that

this force had entered and that it was impossible to storm the town,

withdrew, not to Peloponnese, but to the country once called Aeolis,

and now Calydon and Pleuron, and to the places in that neighbourhood,

and Proschium in Aetolia; the Ambraciots having come and urged them to

combine with them in attacking Amphilochian Argos and the rest of

Amphilochia and Acarnania; affirming that the conquest of these

countries would bring all the continent into alliance with Lacedaemon.

To this Eurylochus consented, and dismissing the Aetolians, now

remained quiet with his army in those parts, until the time should come

for the Ambraciots to take the field, and for him to join them before

Argos.

Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the Athenians in Sicily with

their Hellenic allies, and such of the Sicel subjects or allies of

Syracuse as had revolted from her and joined their army, marched

against the Sicel town Inessa, the acropolis of which was held by the

Syracusans, and after attacking it without being able to take it,

retired. In the retreat, the allies retreating after the Athenians were

attacked by the Syracusans from the fort, and a large part of their

army routed with great slaughter. After this, Laches and the Athenians

from the ships made some descents in Locris, and defeating the

Locrians, who came against them with Proxenus, son of Capaton, upon the

river Caicinus, took some arms and departed.

The same winter the Athenians purified Delos, in compliance, it

appears, with a certain oracle. It had been purified before by

Pisistratus the tyrant; not indeed the whole island, but as much of it

as could be seen from the temple. All of it was, however, now purified

in the following way. All the sepulchres of those that had died in

Delos were taken up, and for the future it was commanded that no one

should be allowed either to die or to give birth to a child in the

island; but that they should be carried over to Rhenea, which is so

near to Delos that Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, having added Rhenea to

his other island conquests during his period of naval ascendancy,

dedicated it to the Delian Apollo by binding it to Delos with a chain.

The Athenians, after the purification, celebrated, for the first time,

the quinquennial festival of the Delian games. Once upon a time,

indeed, there was a great assemblage of the Ionians and the

neighbouring islanders at Delos, who used to come to the festival, as

the Ionians now do to that of Ephesus, and athletic and poetical

contests took place there, and the cities brought choirs of dancers.

Nothing can be clearer on this point than the following verses of

Homer, taken from a hymn to Apollo:

Phœbus, wherever thou strayest, far or near,

Delos was still of all thy haunts most dear.

Thither the robed Ionians take their way

With wife and child to keep thy holiday,

Invoke thy favour on each manly game,

And dance and sing in honour of thy name.

That there was also a poetical contest in which the Ionians went to

contend, again is shown by the following, taken from the same hymn.

After celebrating the Delian dance of the women, he ends his song of

praise with these verses, in which he also alludes to himself:

Well, may Apollo keep you all! and so,

Sweethearts, good-bye—yet tell me not I go

Out from your hearts; and if in after hours

Some other wanderer in this world of ours

Touch at your shores, and ask your maidens here

Who sings the songs the sweetest to your ear,

Think of me then, and answer with a smile,

‘A blind old man of Scio’s rocky isle.’

Homer thus attests that there was anciently a great assembly and

festival at Delos. In later times, although the islanders and the

Athenians continued to send the choirs of dancers with sacrifices, the

contests and most of the ceremonies were abolished, probably through

adversity, until the Athenians celebrated the games upon this occasion

with the novelty of horse-races.

The same winter the Ambraciots, as they had promised Eurylochus when

they retained his army, marched out against Amphilochian Argos with

three thousand heavy infantry, and invading the Argive territory

occupied Olpae, a stronghold on a hill near the sea, which had been

formerly fortified by the Acarnanians and used as the place of assizes

for their nation, and which is about two miles and three-quarters from

the city of Argos upon the sea-coast. Meanwhile the Acarnanians went

with a part of their forces to the relief of Argos, and with the rest

encamped in Amphilochia at the place called Crenae, or the Wells, to

watch for Eurylochus and his Peloponnesians, and to prevent their

passing through and effecting their junction with the Ambraciots; while

they also sent for Demosthenes, the commander of the Aetolian

expedition, to be their leader, and for the twenty Athenian ships that

were cruising off Peloponnese under the command of Aristotle, son of

Timocrates, and Hierophon, son of Antimnestus. On their part, the

Ambraciots at Olpae sent a messenger to their own city, to beg them to

come with their whole levy to their assistance, fearing that the army

of Eurylochus might not be able to pass through the Acarnanians, and

that they might themselves be obliged to fight single-handed, or be

unable to retreat, if they wished it, without danger.

Meanwhile Eurylochus and his Peloponnesians, learning that the

Ambraciots at Olpae had arrived, set out from Proschium with all haste

to join them, and crossing the Achelous advanced through Acarnania,

which they found deserted by its population, who had gone to the relief

of Argos; keeping on their right the city of the Stratians and its

garrison, and on their left the rest of Acarnania. Traversing the

territory of the Stratians, they advanced through Phytia, next,

skirting Medeon, through Limnaea; after which they left Acarnania

behind them and entered a friendly country, that of the Agraeans. From

thence they reached and crossed Mount Thymaus, which belongs to the

Agraeans, and descended into the Argive territory after nightfall, and

passing between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian posts at Crenae,

joined the Ambraciots at Olpae.

Uniting here at daybreak, they sat down at the place called Metropolis,

and encamped. Not long afterwards the Athenians in the twenty ships

came into the Ambracian Gulf to support the Argives, with Demosthenes

and two hundred Messenian heavy infantry, and sixty Athenian archers.

While the fleet off Olpae blockaded the hill from the sea, the

Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilochians, most of whom were kept back

by force by the Ambraciots, had already arrived at Argos, and were

preparing to give battle to the enemy, having chosen Demosthenes to

command the whole of the allied army in concert with their own

generals. Demosthenes led them near to Olpae and encamped, a great

ravine separating the two armies. During five days they remained

inactive; on the sixth both sides formed in order of battle. The army

of the Peloponnesians was the largest and outflanked their opponents;

and Demosthenes fearing that his right might be surrounded, placed in

ambush in a hollow way overgrown with bushes some four hundred heavy

infantry and light troops, who were to rise up at the moment of the

onset behind the projecting left wing of the enemy, and to take them in

the rear. When both sides were ready they joined battle; Demosthenes

being on the right wing with the Messenians and a few Athenians, while

the rest of the line was made up of the different divisions of the

Acarnanians, and of the Amphilochian carters. The Peloponnesians and

Ambraciots were drawn up pell-mell together, with the exception of the

Mantineans, who were massed on the left, without however reaching to

the extremity of the wing, where Eurylochus and his men confronted the

Messenians and Demosthenes.

The Peloponnesians were now well engaged and with their outflanking

wing were upon the point of turning their enemy’s right; when the

Acarnanians from the ambuscade set upon them from behind, and broke

them at the first attack, without their staying to resist; while the

panic into which they fell caused the flight of most of their army,

terrified beyond measure at seeing the division of Eurylochus and their

best troops cut to pieces. Most of the work was done by Demosthenes and

his Messenians, who were posted in this part of the field. Meanwhile

the Ambraciots (who are the best soldiers in those countries) and the

troops upon the right wing, defeated the division opposed to them and

pursued it to Argos. Returning from the pursuit, they found their main

body defeated; and hard pressed by the Acarnanians, with difficulty

made good their passage to Olpae, suffering heavy loss on the way, as

they dashed on without discipline or order, the Mantineans excepted,

who kept their ranks best of any in the army during the retreat.

The battle did not end until the evening. The next day Menedaius, who

on the death of Eurylochus and Macarius had succeeded to the sole

command, being at a loss after so signal a defeat how to stay and

sustain a siege, cut off as he was by land and by the Athenian fleet by

sea, and equally so how to retreat in safety, opened a parley with

Demosthenes and the Acarnanian generals for a truce and permission to

retreat, and at the same time for the recovery of the dead. The dead

they gave back to him, and setting up a trophy took up their own also

to the number of about three hundred. The retreat demanded they refused

publicly to the army; but permission to depart without delay was

secretly granted to the Mantineans and to Menedaius and the other

commanders and principal men of the Peloponnesians by Demosthenes and

his Acarnanian colleagues; who desired to strip the Ambraciots and the

mercenary host of foreigners of their supporters; and, above all, to

discredit the Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesians with the Hellenes in

those parts, as traitors and self-seekers.

While the enemy was taking up his dead and hastily burying them as he

could, and those who obtained permission were secretly planning their

retreat, word was brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians that the

Ambraciots from the city, in compliance with the first message from

Olpae, were on the march with their whole levy through Amphilochia to

join their countrymen at Olpae, knowing nothing of what had occurred.

Demosthenes prepared to march with his army against them, and meanwhile

sent on at once a strong division to beset the roads and occupy the

strong positions. In the meantime the Mantineans and others included in

the agreement went out under the pretence of gathering herbs and

firewood, and stole off by twos and threes, picking on the way the

things which they professed to have come out for, until they had gone

some distance from Olpae, when they quickened their pace. The

Ambraciots and such of the rest as had accompanied them in larger

parties, seeing them going on, pushed on in their turn, and began

running in order to catch them up. The Acarnanians at first thought

that all alike were departing without permission, and began to pursue

the Peloponnesians; and believing that they were being betrayed, even

threw a dart or two at some of their generals who tried to stop them

and told them that leave had been given. Eventually, however, they let

pass the Mantineans and Peloponnesians, and slew only the Ambraciots,

there being much dispute and difficulty in distinguishing whether a man

was an Ambraciot or a Peloponnesian. The number thus slain was about

two hundred; the rest escaped into the bordering territory of Agraea,

and found refuge with Salynthius, the friendly king of the Agraeans.

Meanwhile the Ambraciots from the city arrived at Idomene. Idomene

consists of two lofty hills, the higher of which the troops sent on by

Demosthenes succeeded in occupying after nightfall, unobserved by the

Ambraciots, who had meanwhile ascended the smaller and bivouacked under

it. After supper Demosthenes set out with the rest of the army, as soon

as it was evening; himself with half his force making for the pass, and

the remainder going by the Amphilochian hills. At dawn he fell upon the

Ambraciots while they were still abed, ignorant of what had passed, and

fully thinking that it was their own countrymen—Demosthenes having

purposely put the Messenians in front with orders to address them in

the Doric dialect, and thus to inspire confidence in the sentinels, who

would not be able to see them as it was still night. In this way he

routed their army as soon as he attacked it, slaying most of them where

they were, the rest breaking away in flight over the hills. The roads,

however, were already occupied, and while the Amphilochians knew their

own country, the Ambraciots were ignorant of it and could not tell

which way to turn, and had also heavy armour as against a light-armed

enemy, and so fell into ravines and into the ambushes which had been

set for them, and perished there. In their manifold efforts to escape

some even turned to the sea, which was not far off, and seeing the

Athenian ships coasting alongshore just while the action was going on,

swam off to them, thinking it better in the panic they were in, to

perish, if perish they must, by the hands of the Athenians, than by

those of the barbarous and detested Amphilochians. Of the large

Ambraciot force destroyed in this manner, a few only reached the city

in safety; while the Acarnanians, after stripping the dead and setting

up a trophy, returned to Argos.

The next day arrived a herald from the Ambraciots who had fled from

Olpae to the Agraeans, to ask leave to take up the dead that had fallen

after the first engagement, when they left the camp with the Mantineans

and their companions, without, like them, having had permission to do

so. At the sight of the arms of the Ambraciots from the city, the

herald was astonished at their number, knowing nothing of the disaster

and fancying that they were those of their own party. Some one asked

him what he was so astonished at, and how many of them had been killed,

fancying in his turn that this was the herald from the troops at

Idomene. He replied: “About two hundred”; upon which his interrogator

took him up, saying: “Why, the arms you see here are of more than a

thousand.” The herald replied: “Then they are not the arms of those who

fought with us?” The other answered: “Yes, they are, if at least you

fought at Idomene yesterday.” “But we fought with no one yesterday; but

the day before in the retreat.” “However that may be, we fought

yesterday with those who came to reinforce you from the city of the

Ambraciots.” When the herald heard this and knew that the reinforcement

from the city had been destroyed, he broke into wailing and, stunned at

the magnitude of the present evils, went away at once without having

performed his errand, or again asking for the dead bodies. Indeed, this

was by far the greatest disaster that befell any one Hellenic city in

an equal number of days during this war; and I have not set down the

number of the dead, because the amount stated seems so out of

proportion to the size of the city as to be incredible. In any case I

know that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had wished to take

Ambracia as the Athenians and Demosthenes advised, they would have done

so without a blow; as it was, they feared that if the Athenians had it

they would be worse neighbours to them than the present.

After this the Acarnanians allotted a third of the spoils to the

Athenians, and divided the rest among their own different towns. The

share of the Athenians was captured on the voyage home; the arms now

deposited in the Attic temples are three hundred panoplies, which the

Acarnanians set apart for Demosthenes, and which he brought to Athens

in person, his return to his country after the Aetolian disaster being

rendered less hazardous by this exploit. The Athenians in the twenty

ships also went off to Naupactus. The Acarnanians and Amphilochians,

after the departure of Demosthenes and the Athenians, granted the

Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had taken refuge with Salynthius and

the Agraeans a free retreat from Oeniadae, to which place they had

removed from the country of Salynthius, and for the future concluded

with the Ambraciots a treaty and alliance for one hundred years, upon

the terms following. It was to be a defensive, not an offensive

alliance; the Ambraciots could not be required to march with the

Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the

Ambraciots against the Athenians; for the rest the Ambraciots were to

give up the places and hostages that they held of the Amphilochians,

and not to give help to Anactorium, which was at enmity with the

Acarnanians. With this arrangement they put an end to the war. After

this the Corinthians sent a garrison of their own citizens to Ambracia,

composed of three hundred heavy infantry, under the command of

Xenocleides, son of Euthycles, who reached their destination after a

difficult journey across the continent. Such was the history of the

affair of Ambracia.

The same winter the Athenians in Sicily made a descent from their ships

upon the territory of Himera, in concert with the Sicels, who had

invaded its borders from the interior, and also sailed to the islands

of Aeolus. Upon their return to Rhegium they found the Athenian

general, Pythodorus, son of Isolochus, come to supersede Laches in the

command of the fleet. The allies in Sicily had sailed to Athens and

induced the Athenians to send out more vessels to their assistance,

pointing out that the Syracusans who already commanded their land were

making efforts to get together a navy, to avoid being any longer

excluded from the sea by a few vessels. The Athenians proceeded to man

forty ships to send to them, thinking that the war in Sicily would thus

be the sooner ended, and also wishing to exercise their navy. One of

the generals, Pythodorus, was accordingly sent out with a few ships;

Sophocles, son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles, being

destined to follow with the main body. Meanwhile Pythodorus had taken

the command of Laches’ ships, and towards the end of winter sailed

against the Locrian fort, which Laches had formerly taken, and returned

after being defeated in battle by the Locrians.

In the first days of this spring, the stream of fire issued from Etna,

as on former occasions, and destroyed some land of the Catanians, who

live upon Mount Etna, which is the largest mountain in Sicily. Fifty

years, it is said, had elapsed since the last eruption, there having

been three in all since the Hellenes have inhabited Sicily. Such were

the events of this winter; and with it ended the sixth year of this

war, of which Thucydides was the historian.

CHAPTER XII

Seventh Year of the War—Occupation of Pylos—Surrender of the Spartan

Army in Sphacteria

Next summer, about the time of the corn’s coming into ear, ten

Syracusan and as many Locrian vessels sailed to Messina, in Sicily, and

occupied the town upon the invitation of the inhabitants; and Messina

revolted from the Athenians. The Syracusans contrived this chiefly

because they saw that the place afforded an approach to Sicily, and

feared that the Athenians might hereafter use it as a base for

attacking them with a larger force; the Locrians because they wished to

carry on hostilities from both sides of the strait and to reduce their

enemies, the people of Rhegium. Meanwhile, the Locrians had invaded the

Rhegian territory with all their forces, to prevent their succouring

Messina, and also at the instance of some exiles from Rhegium who were

with them; the long factions by which that town had been torn rendering

it for the moment incapable of resistance, and thus furnishing an

additional temptation to the invaders. After devastating the country

the Locrian land forces retired, their ships remaining to guard

Messina, while others were being manned for the same destination to

carry on the war from thence.

About the same time in the spring, before the corn was ripe, the

Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica under Agis, the son of

Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and sat down and laid waste the

country. Meanwhile the Athenians sent off the forty ships which they

had been preparing to Sicily, with the remaining generals Eurymedon and

Sophocles; their colleague Pythodorus having already preceded them

thither. These had also instructions as they sailed by to look to the

Corcyraeans in the town, who were being plundered by the exiles in the

mountain. To support these exiles sixty Peloponnesian vessels had

lately sailed, it being thought that the famine raging in the city

would make it easy for them to reduce it. Demosthenes also, who had

remained without employment since his return from Acarnania, applied

and obtained permission to use the fleet, if he wished it, upon the

coast of Peloponnese.

Off Laconia they heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at

Corcyra, upon which Eurymedon and Sophocles wished to hasten to the

island, but Demosthenes required them first to touch at Pylos and do

what was wanted there, before continuing their voyage. While they were

making objections, a squall chanced to come on and carried the fleet

into Pylos. Demosthenes at once urged them to fortify the place, it

being for this that he had come on the voyage, and made them observe

there was plenty of stone and timber on the spot, and that the place

was strong by nature, and together with much of the country round

unoccupied; Pylos, or Coryphasium, as the Lacedaemonians call it, being

about forty-five miles distant from Sparta, and situated in the old

country of the Messenians. The commanders told him that there was no

lack of desert headlands in Peloponnese if he wished to put the city to

expense by occupying them. He, however, thought that this place was

distinguished from others of the kind by having a harbour close by;

while the Messenians, the old natives of the country, speaking the same

dialect as the Lacedaemonians, could do them the greatest mischief by

their incursions from it, and would at the same time be a trusty

garrison.

After speaking to the captains of companies on the subject, and failing

to persuade either the generals or the soldiers, he remained inactive

with the rest from stress of weather; until the soldiers themselves

wanting occupation were seized with a sudden impulse to go round and

fortify the place. Accordingly they set to work in earnest, and having

no iron tools, picked up stones, and put them together as they happened

to fit, and where mortar was needed, carried it on their backs for want

of hods, stooping down to make it stay on, and clasping their hands

together behind to prevent it falling off; sparing no effort to be able

to complete the most vulnerable points before the arrival of the

Lacedaemonians, most of the place being sufficiently strong by nature

without further fortifications.

Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians were celebrating a festival, and also at

first made light of the news, in the idea that whenever they chose to

take the field the place would be immediately evacuated by the enemy or

easily taken by force; the absence of their army before Athens having

also something to do with their delay. The Athenians fortified the

place on the land side, and where it most required it, in six days, and

leaving Demosthenes with five ships to garrison it, with the main body

of the fleet hastened on their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

As soon as the Peloponnesians in Attica heard of the occupation of

Pylos, they hurried back home; the Lacedaemonians and their king Agis

thinking that the matter touched them nearly. Besides having made their

invasion early in the season, and while the corn was still green, most

of their troops were short of provisions: the weather also was

unusually bad for the time of year, and greatly distressed their army.

Many reasons thus combined to hasten their departure and to make this

invasion a very short one; indeed they only stayed fifteen days in

Attica.

About the same time the Athenian general Simonides getting together a

few Athenians from the garrisons, and a number of the allies in those

parts, took Eion in Thrace, a Mendaean colony and hostile to Athens, by

treachery, but had no sooner done so than the Chalcidians and

Bottiaeans came up and beat him out of it, with the loss of many of his

soldiers.

On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans

themselves and the nearest of the Perioeci at once set out for Pylos,

the other Lacedaemonians following more slowly, as they had just come

in from another campaign. Word was also sent round Peloponnese to come

up as quickly as possible to Pylos; while the sixty Peloponnesian ships

were sent for from Corcyra, and being dragged by their crews across the

isthmus of Leucas, passed unperceived by the Athenian squadron at

Zacynthus, and reached Pylos, where the land forces had arrived before

them. Before the Peloponnesian fleet sailed in, Demosthenes found time

to send out unobserved two ships to inform Eurymedon and the Athenians

on board the fleet at Zacynthus of the danger of Pylos and to summon

them to his assistance. While the ships hastened on their voyage in

obedience to the orders of Demosthenes, the Lacedaemonians prepared to

assault the fort by land and sea, hoping to capture with ease a work

constructed in haste, and held by a feeble garrison. Meanwhile, as they

expected the Athenian ships to arrive from Zacynthus, they intended, if

they failed to take the place before, to block up the entrances of the

harbour to prevent their being able to anchor inside it. For the island

of Sphacteria, stretching along in a line close in front of the

harbour, at once makes it safe and narrows its entrances, leaving a

passage for two ships on the side nearest Pylos and the Athenian

fortifications, and for eight or nine on that next the rest of the

mainland: for the rest, the island was entirely covered with wood, and

without paths through not being inhabited, and about one mile and five

furlongs in length. The inlets the Lacedaemonians meant to close with a

line of ships placed close together, with their prows turned towards

the sea, and, meanwhile, fearing that the enemy might make use of the

island to operate against them, carried over some heavy infantry

thither, stationing others along the coast. By this means the island

and the continent would be alike hostile to the Athenians, as they

would be unable to land on either; and the shore of Pylos itself

outside the inlet towards the open sea having no harbour, and,

therefore, presenting no point which they could use as a base to

relieve their countrymen, they, the Lacedaemonians, without sea-fight

or risk would in all probability become masters of the place, occupied

as it had been on the spur of the moment, and unfurnished with

provisions. This being determined, they carried over to the island the

heavy infantry, drafted by lot from all the companies. Some others had

crossed over before in relief parties, but these last who were left

there were four hundred and twenty in number, with their Helot

attendants, commanded by Epitadas, son of Molobrus.

Meanwhile Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedaemonians about to attack him by

sea and land at once, himself was not idle. He drew up under the

fortification and enclosed in a stockade the galleys remaining to him

of those which had been left him, arming the sailors taken out of them

with poor shields made most of them of osier, it being impossible to

procure arms in such a desert place, and even these having been

obtained from a thirty-oared Messenian privateer and a boat belonging

to some Messenians who happened to have come to them. Among these

Messenians were forty heavy infantry, whom he made use of with the

rest. Posting most of his men, unarmed and armed, upon the best

fortified and strong points of the place towards the interior, with

orders to repel any attack of the land forces, he picked sixty heavy

infantry and a few archers from his whole force, and with these went

outside the wall down to the sea, where he thought that the enemy would

most likely attempt to land. Although the ground was difficult and

rocky, looking towards the open sea, the fact that this was the weakest

part of the wall would, he thought, encourage their ardour, as the

Athenians, confident in their naval superiority, had here paid little

attention to their defences, and the enemy if he could force a landing

might feel secure of taking the place. At this point, accordingly,

going down to the water’s edge, he posted his heavy infantry to

prevent, if possible, a landing, and encouraged them in the following

terms:

“Soldiers and comrades in this adventure, I hope that none of you in

our present strait will think to show his wit by exactly calculating

all the perils that encompass us, but that you will rather hasten to

close with the enemy, without staying to count the odds, seeing in this

your best chance of safety. In emergencies like ours calculation is out

of place; the sooner the danger is faced the better. To my mind also

most of the chances are for us, if we will only stand fast and not

throw away our advantages, overawed by the numbers of the enemy. One of

the points in our favour is the awkwardness of the landing. This,

however, only helps us if we stand our ground. If we give way it will

be practicable enough, in spite of its natural difficulty, without a

defender; and the enemy will instantly become more formidable from the

difficulty he will have in retreating, supposing that we succeed in

repulsing him, which we shall find it easier to do, while he is on

board his ships, than after he has landed and meets us on equal terms.

As to his numbers, these need not too much alarm you. Large as they may

be he can only engage in small detachments, from the impossibility of

bringing to. Besides, the numerical superiority that we have to meet is

not that of an army on land with everything else equal, but of troops

on board ship, upon an element where many favourable accidents are

required to act with effect. I therefore consider that his difficulties

may be fairly set against our numerical deficiencies, and at the same

time I charge you, as Athenians who know by experience what landing

from ships on a hostile territory means, and how impossible it is to

drive back an enemy determined enough to stand his ground and not to be

frightened away by the surf and the terrors of the ships sailing in, to

stand fast in the present emergency, beat back the enemy at the water’s

edge, and save yourselves and the place.”

Thus encouraged by Demosthenes, the Athenians felt more confident, and

went down to meet the enemy, posting themselves along the edge of the

sea. The Lacedaemonians now put themselves in movement and

simultaneously assaulted the fortification with their land forces and

with their ships, forty-three in number, under their admiral,

Thrasymelidas, son of Cratesicles, a Spartan, who made his attack just

where Demosthenes expected. The Athenians had thus to defend themselves

on both sides, from the land and from the sea; the enemy rowing up in

small detachments, the one relieving the other—it being impossible for

many to bring to at once—and showing great ardour and cheering each

other on, in the endeavour to force a passage and to take the

fortification. He who most distinguished himself was Brasidas. Captain

of a galley, and seeing that the captains and steersmen, impressed by

the difficulty of the position, hung back even where a landing might

have seemed possible, for fear of wrecking their vessels, he shouted

out to them, that they must never allow the enemy to fortify himself in

their country for the sake of saving timber, but must shiver their

vessels and force a landing; and bade the allies, instead of hesitating

in such a moment to sacrifice their ships for Lacedaemon in return for

her many benefits, to run them boldly aground, land in one way or

another, and make themselves masters of the place and its garrison.

Not content with this exhortation, he forced his own steersman to run

his ship ashore, and stepping on to the gangway, was endeavouring to

land, when he was cut down by the Athenians, and after receiving many

wounds fainted away. Falling into the bows, his shield slipped off his

arm into the sea, and being thrown ashore was picked up by the

Athenians, and afterwards used for the trophy which they set up for

this attack. The rest also did their best, but were not able to land,

owing to the difficulty of the ground and the unflinching tenacity of

the Athenians. It was a strange reversal of the order of things for

Athenians to be fighting from the land, and from Laconian land too,

against Lacedaemonians coming from the sea; while Lacedaemonians were

trying to land from shipboard in their own country, now become hostile,

to attack Athenians, although the former were chiefly famous at the

time as an inland people and superior by land, the latter as a maritime

people with a navy that had no equal.

After continuing their attacks during that day and most of the next,

the Peloponnesians desisted, and the day after sent some of their ships

to Asine for timber to make engines, hoping to take by their aid, in

spite of its height, the wall opposite the harbour, where the landing

was easiest. At this moment the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus arrived,

now numbering fifty sail, having been reinforced by some of the ships

on guard at Naupactus and by four Chian vessels. Seeing the coast and

the island both crowded with heavy infantry, and the hostile ships in

harbour showing no signs of sailing out, at a loss where to anchor,

they sailed for the moment to the desert island of Prote, not far off,

where they passed the night. The next day they got under way in

readiness to engage in the open sea if the enemy chose to put out to

meet them, being determined in the event of his not doing so to sail in

and attack him. The Lacedaemonians did not put out to sea, and having

omitted to close the inlets as they had intended, remained quiet on

shore, engaged in manning their ships and getting ready, in the case of

any one sailing in, to fight in the harbour, which is a fairly large

one.

Perceiving this, the Athenians advanced against them by each inlet, and

falling on the enemy’s fleet, most of which was by this time afloat and

in line, at once put it to flight, and giving chase as far as the short

distance allowed, disabled a good many vessels and took five, one with

its crew on board; dashing in at the rest that had taken refuge on

shore, and battering some that were still being manned, before they

could put out, and lashing on to their own ships and towing off empty

others whose crews had fled. At this sight the Lacedaemonians, maddened

by a disaster which cut off their men on the island, rushed to the

rescue, and going into the sea with their heavy armour, laid hold of

the ships and tried to drag them back, each man thinking that success

depended on his individual exertions. Great was the melee, and quite in

contradiction to the naval tactics usual to the two combatants; the

Lacedaemonians in their excitement and dismay being actually engaged in

a sea-fight on land, while the victorious Athenians, in their eagerness

to push their success as far as possible, were carrying on a land-fight

from their ships. After great exertions and numerous wounds on both

sides they separated, the Lacedaemonians saving their empty ships,

except those first taken; and both parties returning to their camp, the

Athenians set up a trophy, gave back the dead, secured the wrecks, and

at once began to cruise round and jealously watch the island, with its

intercepted garrison, while the Peloponnesians on the mainland, whose

contingents had now all come up, stayed where they were before Pylos.

When the news of what had happened at Pylos reached Sparta, the

disaster was thought so serious that the Lacedaemonians resolved that

the authorities should go down to the camp, and decide on the spot what

was best to be done. There, seeing that it was impossible to help their

men, and not wishing to risk their being reduced by hunger or

overpowered by numbers, they determined, with the consent of the

Athenian generals, to conclude an armistice at Pylos and send envoys to

Athens to obtain a convention, and to endeavour to get back their men

as quickly as possible.

The generals accepting their offers, an armistice was concluded upon

the terms following:

That the Lacedaemonians should bring to Pylos and deliver up to the

Athenians the ships that had fought in the late engagement, and all in

Laconia that were vessels of war, and should make no attack on the

fortification either by land or by sea.

That the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to

send to the men in the island a certain fixed quantity of corn ready

kneaded, that is to say, two quarts of barley meal, one pint of wine,

and a piece of meat for each man, and half the same quantity for a

servant.

That this allowance should be sent in under the eyes of the Athenians,

and that no boat should sail to the island except openly.

That the Athenians should continue to the island same as before,

without however landing upon it, and should refrain from attacking the

Peloponnesian troops either by land or by sea.

That if either party should infringe any of these terms in the

slightest particular, the armistice should be at once void.

That the armistice should hold good until the return of the

Lacedaemonian envoys from Athens—the Athenians sending them thither in

a galley and bringing them back again—and upon the arrival of the

envoys should be at an end, and the ships be restored by the Athenians

in the same state as they received them.

Such were the terms of the armistice, and the ships were delivered over

to the number of sixty, and the envoys sent off accordingly. Arrived at

Athens they spoke as follows:

“Athenians, the Lacedaemonians sent us to try to find some way of

settling the affair of our men on the island, that shall be at once

satisfactory to our interests, and as consistent with our dignity in

our misfortune as circumstances permit. We can venture to speak at some

length without any departure from the habit of our country. Men of few

words where many are not wanted, we can be less brief when there is a

matter of importance to be illustrated and an end to be served by its

illustration. Meanwhile we beg you to take what we may say, not in a

hostile spirit, nor as if we thought you ignorant and wished to lecture

you, but rather as a suggestion on the best course to be taken,

addressed to intelligent judges. You can now, if you choose, employ

your present success to advantage, so as to keep what you have got and

gain honour and reputation besides, and you can avoid the mistake of

those who meet with an extraordinary piece of good fortune, and are led

on by hope to grasp continually at something further, through having

already succeeded without expecting it. While those who have known most

vicissitudes of good and bad, have also justly least faith in their

prosperity; and to teach your city and ours this lesson experience has

not been wanting.

“To be convinced of this you have only to look at our present

misfortune. What power in Hellas stood higher than we did? and yet we

are come to you, although we formerly thought ourselves more able to

grant what we are now here to ask. Nevertheless, we have not been

brought to this by any decay in our power, or through having our heads

turned by aggrandizement; no, our resources are what they have always

been, and our error has been an error of judgment, to which all are

equally liable. Accordingly, the prosperity which your city now enjoys,

and the accession that it has lately received, must not make you fancy

that fortune will be always with you. Indeed sensible men are prudent

enough to treat their gains as precarious, just as they would also keep

a clear head in adversity, and think that war, so far from staying

within the limit to which a combatant may wish to confine it, will run

the course that its chances prescribe; and thus, not being puffed up by

confidence in military success, they are less likely to come to grief,

and most ready to make peace, if they can, while their fortune lasts.

This, Athenians, you have a good opportunity to do now with us, and

thus to escape the possible disasters which may follow upon your

refusal, and the consequent imputation of having owed to accident even

your present advantages, when you might have left behind you a

reputation for power and wisdom which nothing could endanger.

“The Lacedaemonians accordingly invite you to make a treaty and to end

the war, and offer peace and alliance and the most friendly and

intimate relations in every way and on every occasion between us; and

in return ask for the men on the island, thinking it better for both

parties not to stand out to the end, on the chance of some favourable

accident enabling the men to force their way out, or of their being

compelled to succumb under the pressure of blockade. Indeed if great

enmities are ever to be really settled, we think it will be, not by the

system of revenge and military success, and by forcing an opponent to

swear to a treaty to his disadvantage, but when the more fortunate

combatant waives these his privileges, to be guided by gentler feelings

conquers his rival in generosity, and accords peace on more moderate

conditions than he expected. From that moment, instead of the debt of

revenge which violence must entail, his adversary owes a debt of

generosity to be paid in kind, and is inclined by honour to stand to

his agreement. And men oftener act in this manner towards their

greatest enemies than where the quarrel is of less importance; they are

also by nature as glad to give way to those who first yield to them, as

they are apt to be provoked by arrogance to risks condemned by their

own judgment.

“To apply this to ourselves: if peace was ever desirable for both

parties, it is surely so at the present moment, before anything

irremediable befall us and force us to hate you eternally, personally

as well as politically, and you to miss the advantages that we now

offer you. While the issue is still in doubt, and you have reputation

and our friendship in prospect, and we the compromise of our misfortune

before anything fatal occur, let us be reconciled, and for ourselves

choose peace instead of war, and grant to the rest of the Hellenes a

remission from their sufferings, for which be sure they will think they

have chiefly you to thank. The war that they labour under they know not

which began, but the peace that concludes it, as it depends on your

decision, will by their gratitude be laid to your door. By such a

decision you can become firm friends with the Lacedaemonians at their

own invitation, which you do not force from them, but oblige them by

accepting. And from this friendship consider the advantages that are

likely to follow: when Attica and Sparta are at one, the rest of

Hellas, be sure, will remain in respectful inferiority before its

heads.”

Such were the words of the Lacedaemonians, their idea being that the

Athenians, already desirous of a truce and only kept back by their

opposition, would joyfully accept a peace freely offered, and give back

the men. The Athenians, however, having the men on the island, thought

that the treaty would be ready for them whenever they chose to make it,

and grasped at something further. Foremost to encourage them in this

policy was Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader of the time and

very powerful with the multitude, who persuaded them to answer as

follows: First, the men in the island must surrender themselves and

their arms and be brought to Athens. Next, the Lacedaemonians must

restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia, all places acquired not by

arms, but by the previous convention, under which they had been ceded

by Athens herself at a moment of disaster, when a truce was more

necessary to her than at present. This done they might take back their

men, and make a truce for as long as both parties might agree.